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Preface
The United States faces concerns about productivity and competitiveness, a lack 
of consistency with major trading partners, and a bewilderment with the complexity of 
the current tax system. All of these factors contribute to an increasing interest in 
numerous proposals to change the federal tax system drastically.
For years, there have been concerns that foreign competitors may get the upper 
hand in the international marketplace because their value-added taxes are rebated to their 
exporters at the border whereas U.S. exporters get no relief from income tax. Economists 
and tax policy experts have expressed concerns about various aspects of the U.S. tax 
system—its inefficiency, its complexity, its excessive intrusion into activities of businesses 
and individuals. As a result, a number of consumption tax alternatives have been floated— 
such as the Business Transfer Tax (by Senator Roth in 1985) and a cash flow 
consumption tax (by the Treasury Department in 1977)—but none gained political support 
substantial enough to consider enactment a serious possibility.
All of that has now changed. Recently a number of proposals with serious political 
backing have been presented. Tax reform will almost certainly be a major issue in the 
1996 Presidential campaign—and in the Congress for the foreseeable future.
The purpose of this study is to educate and enlighten the membership of the 
AICPA Tax Division, the general membership of the AICPA, executives, financial and 
tax officers of corporate and business America, members of Congress and their staffs, 
and other interested parties with regard to how these different approaches operate. 
Analysis is provided of “big picture” aspects as well as ease of compliance and 
administrability of the various proposals. Analysis is also provided on the overall effect 
of each proposal on industrial sectors, both those who emphasize export and those who 
rely more on importation, and on the general economic effect on savings.
An attempt is made to help identify the “winners” and “losers” in business sectors 
under various proposals, as well as to compare the impact on individuals at various 
income levels. The analysis of business is not limited to corporations; it includes 
personal-service businesses that will become subject for the first time to a second level 
of tax even though they operate in unincorporated form. It must be emphasized that in 
spite of the length of this study, it represents only an initial survey.
iii
O f the major proposals, only the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax currently has a fairly 
comprehensive plan expressed in statutory text together with detailed explanatory narration. 
Commentators already have noted “missing pieces” and challenged certain inconsistencies 
in it. For the others, proposed statutory language is either very terse or non-existent; the 
framework of this analysis being based on sponsors’ press releases, media interviews and 
other published statements. As a result, significant gaps exist and an ultimate analysis is not 
yet possible. Thus the intent o f this document is to add to common understanding of the 
proposals’ operation, their advantages, and the deficiencies through an objective analysis. 
Moreover, the analysis was made on the basis of sponsors’ statements that their proposals 
are intended to replace the present Federal income tax system. A much different analysis 
would have been required if  any of the proposals were to supplement or be an “add-on” to 
our current system. As the process unfolds, more specific analyses and policy studies may 
be required.
There is no intention at this time to express preference for any of the alternatives or 
to make an AICPA policy statement on whether any of these alternatives would be preferable 
to our current income tax system.
iv
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PART I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
The Current Debate
Summary
• Members o f  Congress have expressed considerable interest in repealing 
both the individual and corporate income taxes and replacing them with 
consumption taxes. No major industrialized nation has ever repealed its income 
tax.
• There are four basic types of  consumption taxes:
1. retail sales tax
2. credit-invoice value-added tax
3. subtraction method value-added tax
4. individual consumption tax
• Compared to income taxes, consumption taxes provide greater incentives 
fo r saving. However, because saving is concentrated in high-income households, 
consumption taxes can impose a relatively larger burden on low-income 
households.
• Although the term "flat tax" generally means a tax with a single rate, in 
the current debate the term refers to a single-rate value-added tax collected in 
part from  business and in part from  individuals. In its proposed form, the Flat 
Tax would eliminate most tax preferences and thereby significantly reduce 
complexity.
• Although there are substantial opportunities fo r  simplification, it is 
reasonable to expect that any consumption tax enacted into law will include 
numerous exceptions and special rules. Thus, it is unlikely any new consumption 
tax will be as simple as proponents insist.
A. Farewell, Income Tax?
The United States is in the early stages of a major debate about a fundamental 
restructuring of its tax system. The magnitude of change contemplated is 
unprecedented. Under numerous proposals currently being considered, all Federal
1
income taxes—accounting for over $700 billion in revenue in 19951—would be 
repealed. Some proposals also provide substantial relief from payroll taxes, which 
provide nearly $500 billion in revenue.2 These would be replaced by taxes on 
consumption. It is true that most industrialized countries have adopted consumption 
taxes. However, these taxes largely served as replacements to unwieldy systems of 
excise taxes.3 No major industrialized country has ever repealed its individual and 
corporation income taxes.
Many current proposals for restructuring the U.S. tax system are as sweeping 
in concept as they are in terms of revenue. There are at least four components to the 
current debate:
(1) Competitiveness. The proposed changes intend to increase competitiveness 
of domestic businesses through increased capital formation and, in the case 
of some proposals, by improving the terms of international trade.
(2) Tax Simplification. The proposed changes aim to eliminate the complexity 
of the current system.
(3) Tax Reform. The proposed changes would repeal most of the special tax 
breaks in current law.
(4) Redistribution. The proposed changes may significantly redistribute the 
burden of taxation. In particular, compared to income taxes, consumption 
taxes are considered to be more burdensome on low-income households.
If  enacted, the proposed changes would make the Tax Reform Act o f  1986 look like 
an insignificant piece of legislation. Given the enormous difficulties in achieving 
passage of that legislation, long-time observers of the process are skeptical. Yet few 
are willing to write-off the possibility of enactment of a consumption tax. Leaders 
of both major political parties have voiced support and introduced legislation to 
radically restructure the U.S. tax system. Fundamental reform is now on the front 
burner, and the 1996 election is likely to turn up the heat.
1The Office and Management and Budget estimates that in fiscal year 1995 the Federal government will receive 
$151 billion in revenue from the corporation income tax, $589 billion from the individual income taxes, and $484 
billion in revenue from payroll taxes. See, U.S. Executive Office of the President (1995), p. 23. One of the two 
leading consumption tax proposals would include substantial tax credits for most payroll taxes—collecting total 
receipts from new taxes to more than $ 1 trillion annually.
2The Armey flat tax proposal explicitly repeals the estate and gift tax, while others, such as Rep. Archer have 
suggested this should be addressed as part of a national sales tax.
3"The defects of the cascade turnover taxes (see Chapter 2 discussion) were the driving force behind EEC 
adoption of the value-added tax. The multiple taxation of products, relatively favorable taxation of concentrated 
enterprises, and uncertain border tax adjustments combined to create an intolerable situation in the common 
market." Carlson (1980), p 71.
2
This a remarkable turn of events given the poor prospects for passage of any 
type of consumption tax until just recently. Consumption taxes have gone from 
political obscurity to political celebrity in less than a decade. The nadir o f 
consumption tax popularity was immediately after the 1980 defeat o f former Ways 
and Means Committee Chairman Al Ullman, who had proposed a value-added tax 
(VAT) prior to his failed re-election bid. There were some proposals for consumption 
taxes during the 1980s, but none with any prospect o f passage or even serious 
consideration by Congress. Significant congressional interest in consumption taxation 
did not rekindle until the early 1990s as Congress became increasingly concerned 
about U.S. competitiveness. This interest gained further momentum with the 1994 
elections, and the concept o f consumption taxation now enjoys the support of many 
Congressional leaders.
Prior to recent developments, the proponents of consumption taxation were 
mainly business leaders concerned about capital formation and economists concerned 
about deficit reduction. Their efforts went largely unnoticed except by a few tax 
professionals. Now there is interest among the general public, and press coverage of 
the issue is widespread. There is particular interest in the proposed Flat Tax. 
Proponents claim that the Flat Tax is so simple that businesses and individuals would 
only have to file postcard-sized returns. This has great appeal to a general public 
frustrated with the complexity of the current system.
One key development in the politics of consumption taxation is the appearance 
of an emerging consensus among certain political groups about the use of 
consumption tax revenues. In the past, consumption taxes have been proposed to 
increase government spending, to reduce the deficit, and even to reduce income and 
payroll taxes. In all of these cases, the current tax system would largely remain 
intact. Furthermore, proposed consumption taxes usually had rates in the single 
digits. Most of the current support for consumption taxation is conditioned upon use 
o f revenues for elimination of individual and corporate taxation.4 Replacement 
consumption taxes could easily have tax rates that exceed 20 percent.5
4T he rapidity of this change in sentiment about the nature of consumption taxes for the United States is evident 
by comparing the tone of the current debate to that of several relatively recent studies. The working assumption 
of these studies is that any new consumption tax would be an add-on, rather than a substitute, to the current system. 
See, for example, U.S. Department of Treasury (1984), McLure (1987), U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1992), 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1993), and Metcalf (1995).
5According to the Congressional Budget Office (1995), it is estimated that the individual income tax and 
corporate income tax would generate $772 billion and $172 billion in fiscal year 2000. Also according to the 
CBO, a broad-based 5-percent VAT would generate $198 billion in fiscal year 2000. Therefore, a broad-based 
VAT would have to have a rate of approximately 25 percent to replace revenue lost from repeal o f the individual 
and corporate income taxes.
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Recognizing the difference between an add-on consumption tax and a 
replacement consumption tax is critical for ascertaining the economics as well as the 
administration of the tax. Only a replacement consumption tax has the potential to 
increase private saving.6 Only a replacement consumption tax has the potential to 
significantly reduce complexity. Unlike many other recent studies of consumption 
taxation, this volume will focus attention almost exclusively on consumption taxation 
as a replacement for the current system of income taxation.7
B. Consumption Tax Alternatives
1. Comparison to Income Taxes
The most important difference between an income tax and a consumption tax 
is that a consumption tax eliminates the tax burden on income from saving and 
investment.8 Under a consumption tax, income that is saved is not taxed. By 
providing greater rewards for saving than an income tax, replacement consumption 
taxes have the potential to increase private saving. Most economists believe that the 
lack o f saving lies at the core of the current shortcomings in the U.S. economy. If 
saving does indeed respond positively to increases in its after-tax return, a 
replacement consumption tax could increase private saving. Increasing saving would 
likely increase domestic capital formation, which in turn boosts the productivity o f 
U.S. workers, boosts real wages, and increases the rate o f economic growth.
Saving, however, is something that the wealthy do more of than the poor. 
Therefore, consumption taxes generally place greater overall burden on low-income 
households than do income taxes. This potential to shift tax burden to low-income 
households is the major objection to consumption tax, but savings differences are not 
the only reason. A proportional, rather than progressive, rate structure is another 
major factor.
Finally, consumption taxes often are implemented in such a manner that 
imports are subject to tax while exports are exempt. Most economists believe that 
such "border tax adjustments" do not have any significant impact on international
6The impact of consumption taxes on saving is discussed in Chapter 6.
7In order to emphasize the context of this study, the term "replacement consumption tax" will be frequently used.
8A VAT can be based on income or consumption (Break (1985)), but income based VATs are not currently 
under consideration.
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trade. Nevertheless, consumption taxes may still have impacts on international trade, 
particularly if  they can be used to improve economic performance by increasing 
saving.9
2. Different Types o f  Consumption Taxes
There are four major types of consumption taxes that are relevant to the current 
debate:
(1) a retail sales tax,
(2) a credit-invoice value-added tax,
(3) a subtraction method value-added tax; and
(4) an individual consumption tax.10
A retail sales tax is a tax on final sales by retail businesses to consumers. Imposed 
by almost all of the States, it is a tax familiar to most Americans. A value-added tax 
is a tax on the value added of all businesses--the difference between a business’s gross 
receipts from the provision o f goods and services less costs o f goods and services 
acquired from other businesses. There are two major types o f value-added taxes 
under consideration: the credit-invoice method VAT, used by most U.S. trading 
partners, and the subtraction method VA T, currently the favorite o f consumption tax 
advocates in the United States. (The Flat Tax is a type o f subtraction method VAT.)11 
An individual consumption tax is a tax on each individual's annual consumption, 
measured as the difference between that individual’s annual income and annual 
saving.
3. Comparison o f  Types o f  Consumption Taxes
The major argument in favor of adopting any consumption tax is its potentially 
favorable impact on U.S. competitiveness. The major political obstacle is its potential 
to be regressive. These potential impacts are largely similar for each of the four 
major types o f consumption taxes. Choosing among them is not a matter o f 
economics,
9The impact of consumption taxes on trade is the subject of discussion in Chapter 7.
10The terms "personal consumption tax" and "expenditures" tax are also often used to describe an individual 
consumption tax.
11The terms “personal consumption tax” and “expenditures” tax are also often used to describe an individual 
consumption tax.
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There are, however, several important differences among these types of 
consumption taxes. Each imposes different compliance costs—not only in terms of 
total cost but also in terms of the distribution of these costs across taxpayer groups. 
Each of these taxes also imposes different administrative costs on government. Some 
of these taxes would certainly face vigorous opposition from the States while others 
probably would not. Some of these taxes would be vigorously opposed by our trading 
partners while others likely would not. The taxes also differ in how they are 
perceived by the public—some appear as highly visible separately stated regressive 
taxes on consumers, while others are considered “hidden taxes” imposed on business.
One other difference is their degree of flexibility. Different types of 
consumption taxes vary in their ability to provide preferential treatment to certain 
types of products and to certain classes of taxpayers. As a matter of pure tax policy 
the broadest consumption tax base would be preferable. Special exceptions reduce 
the economic efficiency of a consumption tax.12 However, no matter how desirable 
from an economic or administrative perspective, political reality makes it unlikely. 
Providing special exceptions to broad-based consumption taxes is common to all 
consumption taxes currently in existence. And this has been the American way of 
implementing tax policy. As a matter of political acceptability, a tax that is better 
able to accommodate special interest provisions ultimately may prove to be more 
salable.13
C. Simplification and Broadening the Tax Base
As noted, it is not just the adoption a consumption tax, but the replacement 
of income taxes with a consumption tax that lies at the center o f the current debate on 
restructuring the U.S. tax system. As enormous as this change would be, the scope 
of the current debate is even broader. The public interest in the Flat Tax is indicative 
of the breadth of issues now "on the table."
Like other consumption tax proposals, the Flat Tax would eliminate the 
individual and corporate income taxes and would replace them with a broad-based 
consumption tax collected from both business and individuals. But the Flat Tax 
proposal does not stop there. It entirely revamps the rate structure. It replaces the
12Narrowing the tax base reduces efficiency for at least three reasons. First, exceptions cause consumers to 
distort their consumption and businesses to alter their production in order to avoid tax. Second, rates o f tax will 
have to be increased to make-up for revenue losses due to special exceptions. Third, a broad consumption tax base 
in general would be easier to administer.
13On the other hand, some would prefer to make special interest provisions as difficult as possible to 
accommodate. This is a somewhat naive strategy given that Congress's desire to compromise and accommodate 
has rarely been constrained by concerns about complexity or economic efficiency. And taxpayers are less inclined 
to complain about complexity when that complexity is accompanied by tax relief.
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progressive rates of current law with a single tax rate for both business and for 
individuals. It is a radical base-broadening tax reform, eliminating numerous credits, 
exclusions, and deductions intended to achieve a wide variety of social and political 
objectives. It is also, in its current form, massive simplification. Any one of these 
changes on its own would be an extraordinary legislative event.14,15
There is little doubt that current tax law is often incomprehensible to most 
taxpayers and that there is tremendous interest in simplification. What is less clear is 
how well consumption tax alternatives in practice would fare in terms of 
administration and compliance costs. Although a move from consumption taxation 
generally has the potential to reduce complexity, it is an open question whether 
significant simplification can actually be realized.16
1. Complexity Inherent in the Income Tax
Some of the complexity under current law is unique to the income tax, and a 
switch to a pure consumption tax would eliminate this complexity.17 This is 
particularly true for business taxation and the taxation of income from saving and 
investment. For example, depreciation and amortization provisions ordinarily would 
be replaced with expensing.18 There would, therefore, no longer be disputes over 
capitalizing business development costs because all business costs are immediately 
deductible. Costs of inventories would be deducted at the time costs were incurred. 
The corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum tax would be 
eliminated. The notoriously complex rules surrounding corporate distributions, 
liquidations, and reorganizations would become almost entirely obsolete. And 
because most consumption taxes are “territorial”--[that is, tax is only imposed on 
activity within its borders- all foreign source income would be exempt from U.S. tax,
14 Much confusion arises because the more general, generic term "flat tax" is used interchangeably with the 
specific flat tax proposals offered by Majority Leader Armey and others. Although it has a nice ring to it, the 
term flat tax is not the best description o f the proposals now bearing that label. First o f all, the term is not pre­
cisely applied because there would actually be a second, zero tax bracket for low-income households who are 
allowed large personal exemptions. At the same time, the term is overly broad. In the context o f taxation, "flat" 
is an adjective that is usually applied to rates. Flat tax rates can be applied to a consumption or an income 
base. Furthermore, a tax system with a single rate of tax need not be simpler than a system with multiple rates.
15Thus, there are small "f" flat taxes and capital "F" Flat Taxes. In this volume, most references will be to the 
specific proposals like those offered by Majority Leader Armey and will therefore be capitalized.
 16See AICPA(1990).
17This is the basic theme o f U.S. Treasury (1977) and Bradford (1980).
18Although every major proposal has included a provision for expensing, it is not inherent to a value-added tax.
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eliminating the need for foreign-tax-credit and for anti-deferral rules.19 Furthermore, 
under a consumption tax, most income generated by personal saving would 
effectively be exempt from tax.20 As a result, a replacement consumption tax 
eliminates the need for the complicated rules associated with preferential treatment 
of types of saving by individuals. For example, complex rules concerning pensions, 
IRAs, tax-exempt bonds, annuities and life insurance could be eliminated because all 
saving would receive tax-favored treatment.21
2. Complexity Shared by Income and Consumption Taxes
Nevertheless, many of the issues that are the source of complexity under the 
current income tax will remain equally complex after the switch to consumption 
taxation. For example, the age-old problem of distinguishing between business 
expenses and expenditures on personal consumption does not disappear. Business 
meals, home office deductions, and education expenses are just three areas of 
contention that will remain in any realignment from income to consumption taxation.
3. Complexity Due to Special Provisions
Then there is the complexity in current law that is due to special tax breaks and 
limitations on those breaks. It is often remarked that consumption taxes appear 
simpler than income taxes because they are idealized proposals untainted by 
legislative compromise. If history is any guide, consumption tax proposals will 
accrete complexity as they move through the legislative process and as subsequent 
Congresses amend the initial legislation.22 A great deal of complexity under current 
law is a by-product of a political system that endeavors to compromise rather than 
simplify— and of a system that wishes to use the tax code to achieve a wide variety 
of social and economic objectives that have little to do with raising revenue.
Many consumption tax proposals, especially those of the Flat-Tax variety, 
include significant base broadening. For example, under the Armey proposal, the 
exclusion of employer-provided benefits from the tax base and the deductibility of 
home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and local taxes would be
19Complex source rules, however, would still be an issue as they are under the income tax system.
20As shall be explained in greater detail in Chapter 6, the exclusion of saving from the consumption tax base is 
the equivalent of exempting investment income from tax.
21As shall be explained in greater detail below, consumption taxes provide relief for investment in capital either 
by exempting investment income from tax or by allowing deductions for investment. Senators Nunn and Domemici 
have proposed allowing deductions for new investment in municipal bonds and  retaining the exemption of interest 
from these bonds.
22The higher the rates the more likely this is to occur.
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eliminated. Clearly, if  in addition to transforming the income tax base to a 
consumption tax base, Congress also undertook broadening the tax base, much 
additional simplification would result.23 It is not so clear, however, why such tax 
reform will be more successful under the umbrella of consumption taxation than 
under that o f income taxation. Special interest groups would surely mount massive 
lobbying efforts to proposed curtailment of benefits. While the political dynamics 
surrounding tax law changes may be different now than in the past, it seems unlikely 
the system is immune from the influence of special interests.
4. Complexity Unique to Consumption Taxes
In the move from an income to a consumption tax, simplicity is not entirely a 
one-way street. It is likely that some new complexities will arise as the imposition 
o f consumption taxes introduces new administrative and compliance issues not 
present under the income tax. For example, a credit-invoice value-added tax would, 
in many respects, increase record-keeping requirements o f businesses. Under the 
credit-invoice method, business would be required to retain records of all invoices in 
order to earn tax credits. At a minimum, under a subtraction method VAT, taxpayers 
would be required to revise their accounting procedures so as to include a set o f books 
using alternative capital recovery methods and to differentiate non-deductible internal 
costs from deductible external costs. An individual consumption tax would require 
taxpayers and tax authorities to maintain previously unrequired records of changes 
in their total savings balances and net indebtedness.
5. Complexity During Transition
Finally, there is the enormous issue of transition. In order to avoid penalizing 
taxpayers caught between the old income tax and any new consumption tax, complex 
transition rules are likely to be included into any new tax plan. For businesses, there 
are likely to be special rules for cost recovery of previously acquired (but not fully 
depreciated) capital. For individuals, some sort o f provision for basis recovery on 
existing assets would likely be included (so that only gains, and not the entire 
proceeds on the sale of existing capital, would be subject to tax). The general public, 
tax departments of businesses, and tax advisors would have to be educated as to the 
working of this new system. IRS employees would play a major role in this process, 
but they also would have to be educated. Finally, the IRS would have to devise new 
tax forms, instructions, audit procedures, and regulations.
“ However, this is not always the case. For example, the Armey Flat Tax would eliminate the deductibility of 
employer-provided health insurance. Separating the costs of this insurance from other costs could impose a new 
compliance burden on taxpayers.
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This discussion of complexity has presupposed that any new consumption tax 
would be used to replace the income tax. If  instead the consumption tax was an add­
on tax--i.e., consumption tax revenues were used for deficit reduction, or government- 
provided universal health coverage, or were only sufficient to reduce (and not 
eliminate) income taxes--the imposition of this second tax system on top of the 
current one would result in a vast increase in the complexity of the U.S. tax system.
D. Objective o f  This Study
The primary objective of this study is to provide insight to tax professionals, 
business and legal advisors, businesses, and policymakers about the impact of 
consumption taxes. Chapters 2 through 5 provide a description of the four major types 
of consumption taxes. Chapters 6 through 8 review the major economic policy issues 
surrounding the new tax. Chapter 9 introduces, in general terms, the issues that are 
likely to be of concern to businesses under any new consumption taxes. Chapters 10 
and 11 describe the two leading proposals now under consideration by policymakers 
in Washington. Chapters 12 and 13 provide detailed estimates of the impact of these 
proposals on business and individual tax liability. Chapter 14 through 17 examine the 
special problems that consumption taxation poses for housing, financial institutions, 
charitable organizations, state and local governments, and financial statements.
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PART II. THE MAJOR TYPES OF 
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Chapter 2 
A Retail Sales Tax
Summary
• A national retail sales tax might be an attractive revenue source because 
it is relatively uncomplicated and familiar to most Americans.
• Some issues that are particularly problematic fo r  a Federal retail sales 
tax are:
1. potential fo r  widespread evasion by small retailers;
2. potential fo r  widespread evasion by business purchasers o f  items 
fo r  personal use; and
3. objections by States to sharing a major revenue source.
• The validity o f  these issues increases with the tax rate. While it does not 
seem likely that a retail sales tax is a good replacement fo r  income taxes, it might 
be viable as a supplement to existing taxes.
A. Introduction
In weighing consumption tax options, it seems reasonable to start with the 
familiar. Most Americans encounter retail sales taxes every day. They are levied by 
forty-five states and by numerous local jurisdictions. Americans seem to have 
accepted the current level o f state sales taxes, and they do not seem to bear them the 
same hostility that they have for income taxes.24 Although retail sales taxes are highly
24See Break (1985).
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visible in that they are separately stated from purchase prices, most consumers face 
no compliance burden. Retail businesses file sales tax returns and make sales tax 
payments to State and local authorities.25
From the perspective of promoting economic efficiency, a retail sales tax 
should tax all consumption equally in order not to distort consumer choices and to 
keep tax rates low. Only final sales by businesses—that is, sales by businesses to 
consumers—should be subject to tax. The taxation of sales by businesses to other 
businesses would result in over-taxation o f consumption because final sales would 
bear not only retail sales tax but also the costs of whatever taxes are paid on inputs 
used to produce, market, or distribute consumer products. This over-taxation of 
certain products was a major factor contributing to the adoption of European and 
Canadian value-added taxes.
Because retail sales taxes are imposed on final sales within the taxing 
jurisdiction, they are, in effect, exempt from tax goods produced within and sold 
outside that jurisdiction. Similarly, the tax would also be imposed on goods produced 
outside and consumed inside the jurisdiction. Thus, a Federal retail sales tax would 
exempt exports and impose a tax on imports. This feature, shared with many 
consumption taxes, is particularly attractive to domestic businesses competing in the 
international market place.26
In practice, states retail sales taxes fall short of the ideal of taxing all 
consumption once. On the one hand, states exempt many final goods and services. 
This results in undertaxation of some sectors. On the other hand, states tax many 
intermediate goods. This results in over taxation of some sectors.
B. Statutory Exemptions
In practice, state governments exempt many types of goods and services from 
sales tax for a variety of reasons. Some products are exempted from taxation because 
they are considered necessities—such as food, clothing, and housing. Because 
necessities are generally a larger fraction of income for the poor than for the wealthy, 
such exemption confers tax relief that is proportionately greater for low-income
25The objections raised by the states to a Federal retail sales tax are discussed in Chapter 16.
26Thus, retail sales taxes operate under the destination principle. When exports are included in the tax base and
imports are not taxed, a consumption tax is said to operate under the origin principle. It would be possible to
structure a retail sales tax to operate under the origin principle, but in practice, retail sales taxes and value-added 
taxes utilize the destination, not the source, principle. As shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, 
economists believe consumption taxes should operate under the destination principle so that consumer choice 
between imports and domestically produced goods is not distorted.
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households. (However, as shall be discussed in detail later, granting such relief still 
leaves the poor bearing a greater relative burden than the wealthy.) Some services, 
like many types of financial services, are exempt because of the great difficulty in 
identifying the amount of such services.27 Some services, like those provided by 
governments (Federal, state, and local) and charitable organizations, are exempt 
because it is difficult to place a dollar amount on these services--and because it is 
good politics. Finally, other goods are exempt because they are considered “merit” 
goods that deserve public support—such as goods and services provided by charities. 
It is also quite common for state sales taxes to provide broad exemptions for services.
For whatever reason exemptions are granted, they generally increase the 
administrative burdens of tax authorities and compliance burdens of taxpayers, in 
addition to impeding economic efficiency. It is widely acknowledged that the 
administrative costs of a retail sales tax would be greatly reduced if  no exemptions 
or special rates were allowed.28 Much time and debate are involved in identifying 
exactly which items should be exempt from taxation. Once these items have been 
identified, retail businesses must distinguish taxable from nontaxable sales. In the 
case of service providers, invoices to customers must allocate total charges between 
taxable products and nontaxable provision of services.
This complexity is not inherent in the structure of the tax, but the result of 
political considerations. It seems highly unrealistic to assume that enactment of a 
consumption tax would not include tax relief for certain sectors. Political 
considerations will likely complicate the administration of any retail sales tax.29 All 
states with sales taxes—as well as almost every country with a retail sales tax or value- 
added tax—provide numerous instances of preferential treatment.30 There is nothing 
in the history o f the Federal tax legislative process to suggest that a Federal 
consumption tax would be untainted by special interest provisions.
27See Chapter 14 for a discussion of the difficulties in taxing financial services.
28See, for example, U.S. Treasury (1984), Cnossen (1989), and General Accounting Office (1980).
29This is the working hypothesis made by McLure (1987), former Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Treasury for 
Tax Policy, in his study of value-added taxation. The major reason for his preference for a credit-invoice value- 
added tax over a subtraction method value-added tax is its superior ability to accommodate the political 
compromises that he considers inevitable.
30One notable exception is the broad-based single-rate VAT introduced by New Zealand in 1986. The only 
significant exemption is rental payments for residential housing.
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Proponents of various consumption tax plans with no special tax relief will face a 
heavy burden in explaining how their proposals can maintain their conceptual 
simplicity in the face of a myriad of political forces.
C. Taxation o f  Intermediate Goods
Even if  all exemptions for politically-favored consumer products were 
somehow eliminated, the problem of separating taxable sales to consumers from non- 
taxable sales to businesses would remain. State governments generally use two 
methods-both imperfect--to help separate retail sales from non-retail sales. The first 
is to grant "exemption certificates" to business taxpayers. The second is to impose 
sales tax on some types of products irrespective of whether sales are retail or not. 
Because of the bluntness o f each of these tools, retail sales taxes overtax final sales 
o f some products at the same time they undertax sales o f other products.
When intermediate goods are taxed, the purchase price of the final product 
embodies not only the tax on the final sale, but also the tax on inputs to the final 
product. For example, if  a state sales tax of five percent is imposed on delivery 
services, and sales taxes also apply to the purchase of gasoline and computers that 
account for 20 percent o f the cost of delivery services, the total state-imposed sales 
tax on delivery services is six percent. This phenomenon is referred to as tax 
"cascading." Cascading can result in higher tax burdens on products that happen to 
use more intermediate goods subject to tax. It can also result in unfair competition 
within industries if firms provide their own intermediate inputs and their competitors 
must purchase intermediate inputs in taxable transactions.
In its 1984 study of consumption taxes, the Treasury Department reported that 
approximately 20 percent of state sales taxes were collected on intermediate goods. 
This occurs because certain products, such as gasoline, tools, and office equipment, 
are sometimes taxed regardless of whether they are used by business or by consumers. 
It is not clear whether cascading is an inherent problem of retail sales taxes. As 
discussed below, a thorough sorting out of business and non-business uses o f certain 
types of property would at a minimum add complexity and might greatly increase 
compliance costs. State governments probably consider these non-retail taxes a 
relatively painless method of raising revenue.
As shall be explained further below, cascading is not an issue under a value- 
added tax (under either the credit-invoice or subtraction methods). For example, 
under the credit-invoice method, any taxes paid on intermediate sales between 
businesses would be rebated to the business making sales to consumers. In the 
example used in the prior paragraph, the taxes on gasoline (collected by the gas 
station) and on computers (collected by the computer dealer) would be rebated to the 
company providing delivery services to consumers.
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It is also important to note that the tax treatment of exports may be problematic 
when a sales tax system includes some non-retail sales. Unlike a value-added tax, a 
retail sales tax has no mechanism for rebating non-retail taxes on exports. Even if  
rebates are attempted, they usually can only be implemented with a rough estimate 
as to the amounts o f tax paid at intermediate levels. If  the burden of proof is placed 
on exporters to demonstrate the payment of tax at intermediate levels, it is likely- 
given the difficulty exporters would have identifying and documenting taxes paid by 
all their suppliers (and at prior levels of production)--that the rebates will be less than 
the taxes paid, resulting in a penalty on exports. On the other hand, governments 
predisposed to promoting their exports may be generous in their estimates of 
intermediate level taxes in order to use rebates as a mechanism for export subsidies.
Cascading has been recognized as a problem by foreign governments that have 
relied heavily on sales taxes. Moreover, the problem o f cascading taxes—particularly 
in the context of international trade--is often cited as a major reason for adoption of 
value-added taxes throughout the world.
D. Evasion by Business Purchasers
Under a retail sales tax, it may be possible for businesses—especially closely- 
held businesses—to claim exemption on items that are used wholly for personal 
consumption. States usually grant businesses "exemption certificates" that allow them 
to make purchases without payments of sales tax. There is, however, little to prevent 
bearers of exemption certificates from purchasing items and then using them for 
personal consumption.
Beyond checking the validity of the exemption certificate, it is not reasonable 
to expect sellers to aid much in enforcement. In order to determine whether items 
should be taxable or tax-exempt, sellers would have to know the use to which items 
would be put. Sellers of goods and services cannot read buyers' minds to know the 
intended use of purchased items. And of course, sellers do not want to lose a sale, 
much less the goodwill of a customer, by challenging purchasers.
Unless special precautions are taken, a retail sales tax places little burden of 
proof on business purchasers. The only way business purchases can be audited is if  
the seller retains records of business purchases, including the business purchasers' 
taxpayer identification numbers. Even with such exhaustive record keeping, the 
threat of audit in most cases would not be significant, given the small amount of tax 
any single taxpayer could evade with purchases from a single retailer. These issues 
exist now and mechanisms are in place to control tax avoidance, but attempts at 
evasion may increase at higher levels of tax.
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There may be a greater threat of audit in the case of big-ticket items—such as 
automobiles and personal computers—that have extensive business and personal use. 
In these cases, it does not seem inappropriate to require recordkeeping of taxpayer 
identification numbers by sellers. Still, detection o f evasion would require audit o f 
both sellers and purchasers. One alternative possibility is for the government to 
consider rebates instead of exemptions for large ticket items (such as rebates payable 
upon receipt of valid invoices to tax authorities). Rebates, however, would entail 
substantial administrative costs.
The problem of distinguishing business items from personal-use items is hardly 
restricted to retail sales taxation or to consumption taxes in general. Under the 
income tax, small business owners have similar incentives to claim business 
deductions for items of personal use. (In fact, the higher the marginal rate o f income 
tax, the greater the incentive for evasion.) Under the income tax, however, the 
business must stand ready to defend all deductions claimed, and even a valid business 
deduction improperly documented can be disallowed. Under a credit-invoice VAT, 
businesses may attempt to claim credits on items purchased for personal use. 
Similarly, under a personal consumption tax or a subtraction method VAT, closely- 
held businesses may attempt to deduct as business expenses the cost o f items 
purchased for personal consumption. Thus, evasion through overstatement o f 
business expenses is a significant concern under almost any tax.
There is, however, a critical difference in detecting evasion under a retail sales 
tax versus other consumption taxes: evasion by retail sales tax purchasers would 
require cross-checking and the auditing of multiple taxpayers. Under other types of 
taxation, evasion can be detected by audit of the purchaser. Given the difficulty even 
in the best of circumstances of distinguishing business- from personal-use items, the 
problem of evasion by business purchasers under a retail sales tax cannot be easily 
dismissed.
E. Evasion at the Retail Level
Perhaps the most cited difficulty with enactment of a Federal retail sales tax 
is the likely lack of compliance by retailers. The tax rate of a Federal sales tax that 
would be necessary to replace income tax revenue would almost certainly exceed 20 
percent.31 Most tax administrators believe that ten or twelve percent o f gross receipts 
is the maximum burden that may be reasonably placed on a sector comprised of 
numerous small businesses.32 Because tax is imposed only at the point o f final sale,
31See Chapter 9, Table 9.8.
32See McLure (1987), p. 107, Tait (1993), p. 18, and Tanzi (1994), pp. 48-52.
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weaknesses in collections at that point would be particularly harmful to compliance 
compared to an income tax or value-added tax in which the compliance burden is 
spread more evenly across businesses and, in the case of the individual income tax, 
on tens of millions of individual taxpayers. Compliance by small business is already 
an issue under both the Federal income tax and state sales taxes. In fact, under a 
VAT, many commentators argue that significant exemptions--or subsidies—should be 
granted to small businesses because of the high compliance costs. This would not be 
possible under a retail sales tax without a substantial loss of revenue.
Real world experience seems to support the comments o f tax administrators 
that there is an upper limit on the rate of retail sales tax. While most countries with 
value-added taxes have standard rates of 15 or 20 percent, retail sales tax rates are 
usually less than 5 percent. Among developed economies other than the U.S., only 
Iceland and South Africa now have retail sales tax rates in excess of 10 percent.33 
Given this evidence, and given the existence of current State sales taxes, there seems 
to be little room for an additional Federal sales tax that would not result in significant 
compliance problems for both state and Federal tax collectors. Nevertheless, the 
retail sales tax cannot be ignored as an option as an add-on tax. As concluded by one 
prominent commentator when asked about the viability o f retail sales tax for the 
United States: "The answer to the question is simple.
Provided the retail sales tax rates are low and not too different between (especially 
neighboring) countries, the retail sales tax is a good alternative to the VAT."34
33Tait (1988), p. 18.
34Tanzi (1994), p.51.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Reasons Why Evasion is a Larger Problem 
Under A Retail Sales Tax Than A Value-Added Tax
Understandably, many politicians--as well as the general public—are more 
comfortable with the notion of replacing the income tax with a sales tax than a value- 
added tax. However, of the two alternatives, many tax experts only consider value- 
added taxation viable. The purpose of this appendix is to summarize why a retail 
sales tax is not held in high esteem by tax administrators.
There are several reasons why enforcement is a problem at the retail level 
under any kind of tax:
• It is not usually possible to cross-check retailer sales with the records of 
purchasers because taxable sales by retailers are made to consumers.
• The retail sector has a relatively large proportion of small businesses. Evasion by 
small business is more likely than by large business because audits are much less 
likely and the relative costs o f compliance higher.
• The life expectancy of a small retail business is short. Collections from a 
discontinued business can be difficult and costly.
A retail sales tax imposes its entire compliance burden on the sector from which 
collections are most troublesome.35 The retail sector must remit far greater amounts 
of revenue under a sales tax than under a VAT or an income tax. In addition, a retail 
sales tax imposes the unique compliance burden of requiring a separation of receipts 
between taxable sales to consumers and nontaxable sales to other businesses.
35Although there is more total revenue at risk under a retail sales tax, it is interesting to note that on the margin 
the incentives for retailers to evade tax are no more than they would be under a value-added tax with an equal rate. 
(Furthermore, marginal incentives are likely to be larger under an income tax, assuming the rate of income tax is 
greater than the rate o f consumption tax.) Assuming the national sales tax rate was 25 percent, one dollar of 
unreported retail sales reduces tax revenue by 25 cents. One dollar o f unreported retail sales would also reduce 
revenue by 25 cents under a 25-percent VAT. (A small business owner in the top bracket can reduce income taxes 
by 40 cents on each dollar.) Taxpayers’ marginal incentives, however, may not be all that matters in determining 
the amount of tax evasion. For example, the dependency of the retail sales tax on small business would mean 
greater noncompliance under a retail sales tax. In addition, if retailers can totally avoid being identified as 
taxpayers or if collection is difficult (for example, in the case of firms going out-of-business), the rewards for sales 
tax evasion can be greater under a retail sales tax than under a VAT (or an income tax).
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Chapter 3
The Credit-Invoice Method VAT
Summary
• Almost every industrialized country has a credit-invoice value-added tax. 
The credit-invoice VAT, however, is not among the proposals currently receiving 
the most attention in the United States.
• A credit-invoice VAT imposes new compliance costs on business by 
requiring both seller and buyers to keep detailed records o f  each transaction. 
Compliance costs increase substantially as the number o f  tax rates and the 
number o f  exemptions increase.
• This recordkeeping improves compliance thorough cross-checking o f  taxes 
(paid by sellers) with credits (claimed by buyers). It also eliminates the need fo r  
retailers to distinguish sales to business from  sales to consumers.
• R e lie f from the VAT is provided through exemption and through zero­
rating. In general, zero-rating provides more satisfactory results than simple 
exemption from  tax.
A. Introduction
Currently in the United States there is tremendous interest in consumption 
taxes, but there is little interest in the consumption tax most widely used in other 
countries. The credit-invoice method VAT is the method most popular with foreign 
governments for implementing a consumption tax. Nevertheless, the credit invoice 
method is not receiving any significant consideration on Capitol Hill.
Most o f what has been written about consumption taxes--particularly 
concerning administration and compliance issues—has focused on the credit-invoice 
method. And while there are important differences between current U.S. proposals 
for consumption taxes (non-credit invoice) and foreign VATs (credit invoice) in 
place, there are a sufficiently large number of similarities that the United States can 
benefit greatly by taking into account the experience of other countries.
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Finally, the credit-invoice method cannot be written off as an option for the 
United States. It seems fair to say that until just a few years ago, the credit-invoice 
method VAT was among the most--if not the most-viable consumption tax options 
under consideration in the United States. The prospect for a credit-invoice method 
VAT could rise again if  concerns about compliance become greater, or if  Congress 
decides that it must provide exemptions to governments, nonprofit institutions, and 
certain businesses. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government proposed 
a subtraction method VAT in the mid-1980s but ultimately adopted a credit-invoice 
method in 1991.36
1. The Concept o f  “Value Added"
For each business “value added” is the contribution of its labor and its capital 
to national output. It may be measured using either of two methods: the subtraction 
method or the addition method. Under the subtraction method, value added is 
measured as the difference between the firm's sales and the firm's purchases from 
other businesses. Under the addition method, value added is calculated as the sum 
of a firm's payments to its workers and return to owners (and lenders) o f the firm for 
the use of their invested capital. The difference between the two methods is 
illustrated in the following example:
Table 3.1
Calculation of Value Added 
by Subtraction and by Addition
Income Statement
Sales $100
Less Payments to
Other Businesses $40
Less Wages $50
Equals Profit $10
A. Value Added by Subtraction
Sales $100
Less: Payments to
Other Businesses $40
Equals value added $60
36Substantial revisions to the Canadian value-added tax are now under consideration. Canada retained its income 
tax system.
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B. Value Added by Addition
Wages $50
Plus Profit $10
In this example, value added equals $60 when measured as the difference between 
business receipts and payments to other businesses (the subtraction method). Value 
added also equals $60 when measured by addition of wages and profits (the addition 
method). It is important to note that financial flows (i.e., the payment and receipt 
o f investment income as well as any increase or decrease in investment balances) 
between businesses are not included in the calculation. Most notably, interest income 
is not included in gross receipts and interest payments are not deductible.
The addition method is rarely applied in other countries nor has it been 
included in any proposals for Federal taxation in the United States.37 The subtraction 
method is currently used in Japan, and this method is now receiving the most 
consideration in the United States. In concept, the credit-invoice method is more 
closely related to the subtraction method.
2. The Equivalence o f  Final Sale Price to Total Value Added
In a modem economy, the process by which most consumer products are 
brought to market involves a long chain of production and distribution comprising 
many businesses. In this chain each business purchases goods and services from 
other businesses. These purchases from other businesses serve as inputs to the goods 
and services provided by that business to its own customers. At the end of the chain 
are retailers who make sales to household consumers. Table 3.2 provides an example 
showing how the sum of value added equals the retail price o f the goods sold to the 
final consumer. At each link in the production-distribution chain the business adds 
value to its purchased inputs.
37The addition method is used by the State of Michigan. The Michigan Single Business Tax is generally 
considered to be very complex. The addition method has also been considered for use in determining value added 
of financial institutions, which is difficult to measure under more conventional methods of calculating VAT liability.
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Table 3.2 The Value Added Chain
Business Chain Sales Purchases Value Added
Link # 1: Farmer 20 0 20
Link # 2: Miller 50 20 30
Link # 3: Baker 100 50 50
Sum 100
• Link #1. In this simple example, the fanner uses his own land and seed and 
purchases no inputs from other businesses. He sells his wheat for 20 cents. This 
20 cents is the farmer's value added.
• Link #2. The miller purchases the wheat from the farmer for 20 cents. The wheat 
is then ground into flour and sold to the baker for 50 cents. The difference 
between the 50-cent sale and the 20 cents of cost is the miller's value added.
• Link #3. The baker purchases the flour from the miller for 50 cents. The flour is 
then used to bake bread and sold to consumers for one dollar. The difference 
between the one-dollar sale and the 50 cents of cost is the baker's value added.
The example shows that the total value added at each stage of the production process 
equals the final sales price.
By not specifying how the cost of "purchases" would be measured, the above 
example abstracts from the important issue of capital cost recovery. All proposals for 
credit-invoice VATs, as well as most credit-invoice VATs currently in force 
throughout the world, allow a benefit for the entire cost of capital expenditures in the 
year of purchase (i.e., to be "expensed"), instead of allowing a benefit of the cost over 
the life of the asset. As shown in an Appendix to this chapter, in order to make a 
value-added tax a consumption tax, it is essential to allow the expensing of capital 
purchases.38
B. Overview o f  the Credit-In voice M ethod
1. The Basic Mechanics o f  the Credit-Invoice Method
Under the credit-invoice method, tax is imposed on each firm's gross receipts. 
In addition, tax credits are available to the extent each business can show that its 
suppliers paid tax on their sales to that business. The amount of creditable taxes
38If, instead of expensing, capital purchases were amortized using depreciation schedules reflecting their true 
decline in value, the tax would be equivalent to an income tax.
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appears on the invoice provided by suppliers to the business. For example, in Table 
3.2, the miller had $50 of sales and $20 of purchases from the farmer. If the rate of 
tax is 10 percent, the miller pays $5 of tax on gross receipts and also receives $2 of 
credit. The $2 of credit corresponds to the tax paid by the farmer, and this $2 is 
reported on the invoice provided by the farmer to the miller. Table 3.3 summarizes 
the basic operation of a credit-invoice method VAT as it would apply to the example 
shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 The Operation of a 10-Percent Credit-Invoice VAT 
Compared to a 10-Percent Retail Sales Tax
Business Chain Sales Gross VAT Credits Net VAT Retail Tax
Link # 1: Farmer 20 2 0 2 0
Link # 2: Miller 50 5 2 3 0
Link # 3: Baker 100 10 5 5 10
Total 17 7 10 10
The table also shows that, because total value added equals the retail sales prices, a 
comprehensive value-added tax imposes the same total burden as a comprehensive 
retail sales tax (with the same tax rate).
2. Comparison to a Retail Sales Tax
Because a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT (with the same rate) 
generally impose the same amount of tax on the same tax base (i.e., total final sales), 
economists believe that the taxes will have largely the same impacts on saving, 
international trade, and the distribution of income. To economists, the differences 
between a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT are primarily matters of 
administration and compliance.
In order to better understand the credit-invoice method, it is useful to divide the 
calculation of tax liability into two parts: (1) the calculation of gross VAT and (2) the 
calculation o f credit.
The calculation of gross VAT is largely similar to a retail sales tax. Both taxes 
apply the rate o f tax to gross taxable sales. Because both taxes are, usually, 
separately stated at the cash register, they are both highly visible to consumers.39
39The separate statement of tax is a feature of all retail sales taxes and many VATs. It would be possible, with 
some minor adjustments, to impose both taxes without this feature.
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Both taxes routinely exempt exports. To the extent there are exemptions or special 
rates for certain types of products, taxpayers must differentiate between sales of 
exempt and non-exempt products under both taxes.
There are, however, some important differences between the calculation of 
gross VAT and a retail sales tax. In one respect a retail sales tax is simpler than the 
calculation of gross VAT: a retail sales tax only applies to retail business while a 
VAT applies to all business. On the other hand, a retail tax is more complicated than 
gross VAT because under a VAT, it is not necessary to make a distinction between 
sales to business or sales to consumers. Under a VAT, all sales by businesses are 
taxable. If the purchaser is a business, the tax will be creditable. Thus, one of the 
most vexing administrative problems of a retail sales tax is absent under a VAT.
The most important distinguishing feature of the credit-invoice method is the 
second part of the VAT calculation—the calculation of credits. There are no tax 
credits under a retail sales tax. Under the credit-invoice method, gross liabilities of 
businesses are substantially reduced by credits. It is noteworthy that businesses earn 
credits only for taxes paid by other businesses. The credits are only allowed if  the 
taxpayer has a verifiable record of taxes paid by the seller. This unique 
interdependence of tax liability is important for at least two reasons.
The first reason is administration and compliance. All transactions between 
businesses are subject to tax and both buyer and seller must keep records of tax 
liability associated with that transaction. If the buyer does not maintain a detailed 
record of the date of purchase, the type of product, the identification of the seller, and 
the amount of tax paid by the seller for each transaction, the VAT credit can be 
denied for that transaction. (See Box 3.1) Not surprisingly, tax authorities like this 
feature o f the VAT. All credit claims by purchasers can be cross-checked with the 
records of sellers.40 On the other hand, the credit-invoice VAT places an enormous 
new compliance burden on businesses that is not present under a retail sales tax or an 
income tax.
40Under a VAT, final sales to consumers cannot be cross-checked because only sellers maintain records. So, 
in the case of final sales, credit-invoice VATs have the same type of enforcement problems as retail sales taxes. 
Because consumers do not maintain detailed records of their spending, underreported sales cannot be cross­
checked against the records of purchasers.
24
Box 3.1
Invoice Information Retained by Buyers and Sellers For Each 
Transaction Under a Credit-Invoice VAT41
• Name and address of person issuing invoice
• VAT registration number
• Serial number of the invoice
• Date and issue of the invoice
• Date of supply of goods or services
• A description of goods and services
• Amount charged, excluding VAT
• Rate o f tax
• Name and address of customer
The second reason why interdependence of tax liability is important is its 
unusual effect on tax exemption. Under an income tax or almost any other type of 
consumption tax, exemption only affects the exempted taxpayer, and exemptions 
generally reduce overall tax receipts. However, under the credit-invoice method of 
calculating VAT, the impacts of exemption can extend far beyond the exempted 
party, and tax exemption can even have the unintended side effect of increasing 
taxation. This is explained more fully in the following section.
3. Exemption from  a Credit-Invoice Value-Added Tax
One of the more tedious aspects of learning about value-added taxation is 
understanding how tax relief may be implemented. In practice, value-added taxes 
usually have numerous special rates and exemptions. There are two basic methods of 
providing tax relief under a VAT: exemption and zero-rating. Understanding the 
impact of exemption and zero-rating is critical to understanding the impacts of a 
credit-invoice VAT on those sectors and products frequently provided VAT relief, 
such as food, housing, medical care, small business (including farmers), exports, used 
goods, state and local governments, financial intermediaries, and charitable 
organizations. In addition, the differences between exemption and zero-rating also 
serve to highlight some important differences between the credit-invoice and 
subtraction methods of calculating VAT.
41Tait (1988), pp. 279-280.
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Exemption of a business under a credit-invoice VAT removes tax liability and 
the availability o f credit, leaving the business in a zero-tax position. This is not, 
however, the end of the story. It is still possible for an exempt business to face a 
significant burden from a VAT. Overall burden may increase because business 
customers of an exempt business will be unable to receive tax credits on purchases 
from the exempt business. In a competitive market, the exempt business that gives 
its customers invoices without credits will have to reduce its prices or lose sales.
While exemption can increase burden—it can also reduce burden or leave it 
unchanged from what it would be without exemption. Whether exemption from a 
credit-invoice VAT increases, reduces or does not affect burden depends on where 
in the production-distribution chain exemption is granted:
1. If a business at the beginning of the production chain is exempt, no tax 
is paid by the exempt business, but an additional amount o f tax is paid 
by the next business in the chain that exactly offsets this. In this case, 
total VAT liability is the same as in the case without exemptions.
2. If  an intermediate business is exempt from tax, the business making 
purchases from that exempt business is not able to credit any taxes paid 
by business earlier in the chain. Thus, the purchaser from an exempt 
business pays as much tax as if  no tax were previously paid. In this 
case, total VAT liability is greater than the case without exemptions.
3. If  a retailer making final sales is exempt from tax, all taxes on value 
added prior to purchases by the retailer are properly paid and the value 
added by the retailer is exempt from tax. In this case, total VAT 
liability is less than the case without exemptions.
These three points are illustrated in Table 3.4. While exemption is seemingly the 
most straightforward way of relieving administrative burden, its impact on the tax 
burdens associated with different products can be markedly uneven. As a rough rule 
o f thumb, however, it can be noted that businesses that provide goods and services 
to other businesses will generally be hurt by exemption, while businesses that provide 
goods and services to consumers will generally benefit from  exemption.
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Table 3.4
The Effects of Exemption at Various Stages 
of Production Under a Credit-Invoice Method
No
Exemptions
Exempt
Farmer
Exempt Miller Exempt
Baker
Farmer
Gross VAT 2 2 2
Credits 0 - 0 0
Net VAT 2 - 2 2
Miller
Gross VAT 5 5 5
Credits 2 0 - 2
Net VAT 3 5 - 3
Baker
Gross VAT 10 10 10
Credits 5 5 0 -
Net VAT 5 5 10 -
Total VAT 10 10 12 5
In general, the degree of overtaxation associated with any product will be greater, the 
closer the exempted business is to the retail level. Thus, exemption of millions of 
small farmers, with relatively small purchases from other businesses,42 is unlikely to 
result in significant overtaxation of food and might well be justified by the significant 
reduction in compliance and administrative costs.
It should also be noted that under credit-invoice VATs, many businesses would 
be due refunds because a significant portion of their sales is not subject to tax.
42Furthermore, to help alleviate any overtaxation when farmers are exempt, farm implements, seed, and fertilizer 
can be exempt from tax.
27
4. Zero-Rating as an Alternative to Exemptions
The large and uneven economic distortions that can result from exemptions has 
led to the use of zero-rating as an alternative to exemption. When the sales o f a 
business are zero-rated, the business must still become part of the VAT system and 
file annual returns. However, the business’s compliance burden is not so much an 
issue because zero-rated taxpayers receive refunds. (In fact, under most VAT systems 
where exemptions are allowed, many businesses opt to remain zero-rated taxpayers.) 
A zero rated business pays no gross VAT but is eligible for credits. Besides being 
good for the zero-rated firm, the economic impacts are much more even than under 
a system of exemptions. Any zero-rating before the retail stage does not impact total 
liability o f a final product. And zero-rating at the retail stage results in complete 
exemption of a product. These points are illustrated in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5
The Effects of Zero-Rating at Various Stages 
of Production Under a Credit-Invoice Method
No Zero Zero Rated Zero Rated Zero Rated
Rating Farm er Miller Baker
Farmer
Gross VAT 2 0 2 2
Credits 0 0 0 0
Net VAT 2 0 2 2
Miller
Gross VAT 5 5 0 5
Credits 2 0 -2 2
Net VAT 3 5 -2 3
Baker
Gross VAT 10 10 10 0
Credits 5 5 0 5
Net VAT 5 5 10 -5
Total VAT 10 10 10 0
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C. Concluding Remarks
Despite widespread acceptance throughout the rest of the industrialized world, 
perceived high compliance costs and the perceived similarity to sales taxation have 
kept the credit-invoice method from playing a prominent part in the current 
consumption tax debate in the United States. Instead a somewhat similar alternative— 
the subtraction method VAT—lies at the core of almost all current consumption tax 
proposals. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
How to Make a VAT a Consumption Tax
One of the most prominent features o f a consumption tax imposed on 
businesses is the immediate write-off of the full price o f capital purchases. (Under 
a credit-invoice VAT, the equivalent of expensing is achieved by allowing a tax credit 
for the full price of capital purchases.) Expensing does more than just simplify the 
tax and enhance its political appeal, it is the feature o f a value-added tax that makes 
it a consumption tax. The example in Table 3A.1 illustrates why.
In this example, it is assumed that the economy is composed of two industries 
-a consumer-goods industry and a capital-goods industry. Value added is most often 
calculated by allowing deductions for the entire purchase price o f new capital (i.e., 
expensing). In this case, total value added in the economy equals total consumption 
of 100. If, however, value added is calculated by allowing depreciation instead of 
expensing, then total value in the economy equals total income of 105. Thus, a value- 
added tax with depreciation (instead of expensing) would not be a consumption tax 
but an income tax.
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Table 3A.1
Expensing Makes a VAT a Consumption Tax
Consumer- 
Goods Industry
Capital-Goods
Industry Total Economy
INCOME STATEMENTS: 
( 1) Sales 100 25 125
(2) Purchased capital 25 0 25
(3) Depreciation 20 20
(4) Wages 70 20 90
(5) Profits
VALUE ADDED 
- -TW O METHODS:
10 5 15
Value added (depreciation 
method) Sales (1) minus
80 25 105
Depreciation (3)
Value added (expensing 
method) Sales ( 1) minus 
Purchases (2)
75 25 100
ECONOM IC
STATISTICS:
Total Income Equals
Wages Plus Profit
105
Consumption Equals Total 
Income Less Net
Investment Equals 
Consumption
100
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Chapter 4
The Subtraction Method VAT
Summary
• The subtraction-method VAT is the general type o f  consumption tax now 
receiving the most attention on Capitol Hill.
• No country except Japan (using a 3-percent rate) has any experience 
implementing a subtraction method VAT
• A subtraction method VAT is likely to be simpler to administer than a 
credit-invoice VAT.
• Besides being somewhat simpler, a subtraction method VAT may be more 
politically viable than a credit-invoice VAT. A subtraction method VAT has an 
appearance similar to that o f  the corporation tax while a credit-invoice VAT 
more closely resembles a sales tax.
A. Introduction
Although its proponents may not like to admit it, the subtraction-method VAT 
has a great deal in common with the credit-invoice VAT. The tax base is calculated 
as the difference between business receipts and purchases from other businesses. So, 
like the credit-invoice method, the starting point in calculating tax liability is gross 
business receipts. Instead of credits, however, the subtraction method uses deductions 
to modify the tax on gross receipts to a value-added tax. Given the same tax rate, the 
subtraction and credit-invoice methods collect the same amount of tax from taxpayers. 
This is illustrated in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Comparison of the Subtraction Method 
and the Credit-Invoice Method
1 0%  Subtraction 10% Credit Invoice
Method VAT VAT
L in k  #1: Farm er
Sales 20 Sales 20
Purchased Inputs 0 Gross Tax 2
Value-added 20 Invoice Credits 0
VAT 2 VAT 2
Link # 2 : M iller
Sales 50 Sales 50
Purchased Inputs 20 Gross Tax 5
Value-added 30 Invoice Credits 2
VAT 3 VAT 3
Link #3: Baker
Sales 100 Sales 100
Purchased Inputs 50 Gross Tax 10
Value-added 50 Invoice Credits 5
VAT 5 VAT 5
Total
VAT 10 10
Gross receipts do not include financial income or other proceeds from sale of 
financial assets. Nor do they include export sales. There are deductions only for 
inputs purchased from other businesses. There are no deductions fo r  wages pa id  to 
one's own employees or fo r  interest payments. On the other hand, capital 
expenditures are written o ff when purchased, and business inputs are deducted when 
purchased even i f  they only accumulate in inventory. A simple comparison of the 
corporate income tax and the subtraction method VAT is presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2
Comparison of Corporate Income Tax and a 
Subtraction Method VAT
Income
Tax VAT
Business Receipts—Domestic 90 90
Business Receipts—Exports 10 -
Interest Income 5 -
Total Gross Receipts 105 90
Business Purchases
(Other than capital) 35 35
Wages 45 -
Interest Expense 10 -
Depreciation 10 -
Capital Spending - 15
Total Deductions 100 50
Tax Base 5 40
There are no significant differences in the economic impacts between a 
subtraction method and credit-invoice method VAT. Like the retail sales tax, both are 
taxes on consumption (assuming immediate deductions for capital expenditures). 
Both equally have the ability to increase capital formation and improve 
competitiveness. Both potentially have the same impacts on the distribution of the 
tax burden. There are, however, three important differences between the credit- 
invoice method and the subtraction method: ( 1) differences in compliance and 
administrative costs, (2) different degrees of flexibility, and (3) differences in the 
perceived similarity to a retail sales tax.
B. Administration and Compliance
The basic difference between the credit-invoice method and the subtraction 
method VAT is that tax liability under the subtraction method tax paid by purchasers 
may be calculated without reference to taxes paid by sellers. Generally, proponents 
argue that this greatly reduces the compliance burden in two ways. First, businesses 
selling products do not have to provide tax information on invoices to business 
customers or retain records of these invoices. Secondly, businesses buying products 
do not have to retain special tax records of each purchase in order to claim credits.
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Under the subtraction method, businesses can use annual accounting flows 
similar to those used under current financial and tax accounting rules to calculate tax 
liability. Businesses would not be required to keep detailed records of each 
transaction. It is important to note, however, that current accounting records would 
have to be supplemented to determine the subtraction method liability. For example, 
cost categories such as cost of goods sold and advertising would have to be divided 
between (non-deductible) internal costs and (deductible) purchases from other 
businesses. In addition, the subtraction method VAT permits deduction of the full 
purchase price of capital when acquired. Similarly, inventory items (such as supplies, 
repair parts, and other items usually capitalized under an income tax) are deducted 
when purchased, not when removed from inventory.
Despite these adjustments, it seems likely that a subtraction method VAT 
entails lower compliance costs for business taxpayers than a credit-invoice VAT. 
This simplification, however, comes at the cost of increased potential for evasion and 
less flexibility.
Under a subtraction method VAT compliance is likely to be lower than under 
a credit-invoice VAT because it is more difficult for tax collectors to cross-check 
business tax returns under the subtraction method. Duplicate records of invoices held 
by sellers and business purchasers make it much easier to identify unreported sales 
under a credit-invoice VAT. Tax evasion by retailers not reporting sales to 
consumers, however, is still a problem under the subtraction method as it is under the 
credit-invoice method and the income tax.43
C. Flexibility
Many commentators have pointed out that a credit-invoice VAT is much better 
able to accommodate tax relief for particular products and particular business sectors 
than the subtraction method.44 This lack of flexibility is considered by some to be an 
advantage of the subtraction method VAT because an absence of preferential 
treatment would reduce complexity and improve economic efficiency. On the other 
hand, this inflexibility is seen as a disadvantage by those who believe some types of 
special relief are desirable or inevitable, and without the ability to accommodate 
certain sectors o f the economy (e.g., farmers, health care providers, state and local 
governments, charitable and cultural organizations) a value-added tax should not or
43If VAT rates are lower than current income tax rates, the incentives to underreport sales would be less.
44See, for example, Congressional Budget Office (1992), McLure (1987), and U.S. Treasury (1984).
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could not be enacted. This point deserves serious attention because it is important in 
determining how the tax will be administered and in determining the political 
dynamics surrounding its passage (as well as post-enactment modifications).
Like a retail sales tax and credit-invoice VAT, preferential treatment of 
products (e.g., food, exports) under a subtraction method VAT is effected by 
identifying those products at the retail level and excluding them from the tax base. 
As noted above, preferential treatment adds significant administrative and compliance 
costs but no more so for the subtraction method VAT than a retail sales tax or a 
credit-invoice VAT. Therefore, a subtraction method VAT can be effectively 
administered at multiple rates as long as preferential rates are imposed at the retail 
level.45
The critical difference between the subtraction and credit-invoice methods is 
preferential treatment before the retail level. A credit-invoice VAT is particularly 
well-suited to provide preferential treatment for non-retail sales (e.g., small farmers). 
As shown in Table 3.5 in the prior chapter, the sales of the zero-rated taxpayer escape 
tax and even generate rebates for that taxpayer, but the overall taxation of the final 
product is unchanged. As a result, the credit-invoice VAT does distort consumer 
choice, and therefore ultimately is not likely to bestow any particularly large benefits 
on the zero-rated business.
Unlike the case of zero-rating under a credit-invoice VAT, preferential 
treatment of non-retail sales under a subtraction method VAT results in uneven 
taxation of final products. If non-retail sales are exempt (or subject to preferential 
rates),46 there is no tax on the seller's value added. However, unlike a subtraction 
method VAT, the lost revenue is not made up further along the production chain. 
Thus, exemption at the intermediate level does provide relief for the final product. 
This is illustrated in the first column (Example #1) of Table 4.3 where the 
intermediate producer--the miller—is exempt from the system.
45If preferential rates were provided at the retail level, a subtraction method VAT would face the problem - 
similar to that encountered under a retail sales ta x -o f distinguishing retail from non-retail sales. However, the 
items likely to receive preferential treatment under a VAT—off-premise consumption of food, clothing, public 
transportation, and medical care— are much easier to identify as retail sales than those at issue under a retail sales 
tax—such as tools, personal computers, and automobiles.
46Zero rating is not an alternative under a subtraction method VAT (unless it is significantly modified to be 
similar to a credit-invoice VAT).
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Table 4.3
The Distortionary Effects of Exemption of Intermediary Sales 
Under the Subtraction Method
Example #1: 
Final Product Fully 
Taxable
Example #2
Final Product 
Exempt from Tax
Farmer—TAXABLE 
Receipts 20 20
Purchases 0 0
Value-Added 20 20
VAT 2 2
Miller—EXEMPT 
Receipts 50 50
Purchases 20 20
Value-Added 30 30
VAT 0 0
Baker-TAXABLE
Receipts 100 0
Purchases 50 50
Value-Added 50 -50
VAT (or Refund) 5 (5)
Total Value-Added
Tax (or Refund)
7 (3)
Note:
VAT Using Credit- 
Invoice Method 10 0
However, if  there is preferential treatment of non-retail sales under a 
subtraction method VAT and final sales are excluded (e.g., exports, food), the 
preferentially treated final sales do better than being exempt or zero-rated. Their tax 
is not only eliminated, but they get a subsidy because they, in effect, are being 
granted a rebate for taxes not paid at prior levels. This is illustrated in the second 
column (Example 2) of Table 4.3.
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There are three responses to the problem of exemption of intermediate product 
sales under a subtraction method VAT. One is to not allow preferential rates or 
exemption of products before the retail level. (This seems to be the response favored 
by most proponents of subtraction method VATs.) It is important to note that such 
a restriction does not hinder implementation of policies intending to promote trade 
(e.g., exemption of exports) and policies intending to provide relief for low-income 
households (i.e., exemption of food and medical care). Such a restriction, however, 
would be an impediment to providing relief for small business and small farmers who 
often face a disproportionate compliance burden and are at the same time politically 
influential.
The second response to the problem is to disallow deductions for business 
purchases on which no tax was paid. This would require sellers reporting to buyers 
that tax was paid and the buyer and seller keeping records of all transactions. The 
administration of such a system would be much different from that o f a credit-invoice 
VAT.
Finally, the problem—particularly if  not o f a large magnitude-c a n  simply be 
ignored: allow deductions even though there have been exemptions prior to the retail 
level.
D. Perceived Similarity to a Retail Sales Tax
Economists are often indifferent in their choice of consumption taxes because 
different types of consumption taxes are widely believed to have similar economic 
impacts. Politicians, on the other hand, are acutely sensitive to the differences 
between consumption taxes. This is because the public has a very different 
perception about the various types of consumption taxes, and politicians realize that 
it is the public perception of consumption taxes that will drive the political debate.
There are two notions of a subtraction method VAT that make it more 
attractive to the general public than a credit-invoice VAT. The first is its dissimilarity 
in appearance to a sales tax. The second is its similarity in appearance to a corporate 
income tax.
Retail sales taxes are widely perceived as regressive taxes. From the point of 
view of the final consumer, a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT are 
indistinguishable. Both types of tax are collected at the cash register and are 
separately stated from the retail prices.
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If  a subtraction method VAT is not separately stated (as under all recent 
proposals), it does not have the appearance of a sales tax. Moreover, the subtraction 
method VAT imposes significant tax liabilities on large businesses as does the 
corporate income tax. This similarity in appearance to the corporate income tax 
should not be discounted. Many current proposals would use the revenues from a 
subtraction method VAT to replace the corporate income tax. Much of the current 
public affinity for the corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum 
tax is due to the perceived unfairness of large corporations not paying tax. Given the 
history of the corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum tax, it is 
likely there would be a significant public outcry if  large corporations paid no tax.47
It is not only the public's perceptions that matters in the choice between the 
credit-invoice and subtraction methods. State governments may be more willing to 
accept a "hidden" subtraction method VAT that does not visibly compete with its 
retail sale tax base than a credit-invoice VAT that does. The perceptions of foreign 
governments also matter. However, in this case, it is preferable for the tax to be 
considered a sales tax. Under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
"indirect taxes" (like sales taxes) may be rebated at the border, but "direct" taxes (like 
the individual and corporate income taxes) may not.48 This is an area of strong 
controversy and debate.
47Even though almost all economists believe the burden of a consumption tax falls on consumption, and many 
economists believe the burden of the corporate income tax is borne by capital, replacement of the corporate income 
tax with a subtraction method VAT might be politically acceptable. It probably is more palatable than the 
replacement of the corporate income tax with a retail sales tax— even though economists consider both proposals 
are economically equivalent.
48The impact of consumption taxes on international trade is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 5
The Individual Consumption Tax
Summary
• Unlike other types o f  consumption taxes that are collected from businesses, an 
individual consumption tax is collected from individuals. Households would file  
annual returns as they now do fo r the income tax.
• To its proponents, the major advantage o f  an individual consumption tax 
compared to other consumption taxes is that the inherent regressivity o f  the 
consumption tax base may be offset with a progressive rate structure.
• Under the tax, consumption is calculated by subtracting net savings from total 
income. This deduction for net savings presents numerous practical difficulties, 
particularly during the transition from an income to a consumption tax.
• The major disadvantage o f  an individual consumption tax compared to other 
consumption taxes is its complexity.
A. Introduction
Retail sales taxes and value-added taxes are consumption taxes collected from 
businesses. In contrast, an individual consum ption tax49 is im posed solely on 
individuals. U nder an individual consum ption tax, individuals w ould file annual 
returns as is done under current individual income tax rules. The defining difference 
betw een the current incom e tax and an individual consum ption tax is that
49The individual consumption tax is also referred to as the "personal consumption tax" or the "expenditures 
tax." Sometimes the individual consumption tax that is part o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal is called the 
"Savings Exempt Income Tax" (SEIT) or the "Unlimited Saving Allowance" tax (USA tax.).
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the new tax would allow an unlimited deduction for net annual additions to saving. 
In order to arrive at net additions to saving, additions to savings must be reduced by 
dissaving in the form of additional borrowing.
The basic calculation of an individual consumption tax is illustrated with the 
following simple example:
Table 5.1
Calculation of the Individual Consumption Tax
Income $100
Plus
New Loan for Automobile Purchase $15
Reduction in Mortgage Principal ($10)
Net New Debt $5
Less
Beginning of Year Bank Balance $40
End of Year Bank Balance ($50)
Increase in Saving ($10)
Equals Consumption Tax Base $95
In this example, a family has $100 of wage and interest income. Because it has taken 
out a new car loan of $15 and paid off $10 of mortgage principal, its net new debt is 
$5. This is $5 over and above income available for consumption. On the other hand, 
the family was also able to increase its bank balance by $10. This is $10 of income 
not used for consumption. Thus, after adding and subtracting from loan and savings 
balances, this family has $95 available for consumption.
Many commentators have noted that an individual consumption tax is probably 
the most complex of all types of consumption taxes.50 Despite this additional 
complexity, some still consider individual consumption taxes an attractive option 
because of their unique ability to address issues of regressivity. Because the tax is 
levied on households and not businesses, there can be a progressive rate structure. 
Retail sales taxes and value-added taxes (levied on businesses) can only alleviate
50See, for example, Graetz (1979), Kuttner (1987), and Toder (1995).
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regressivity through adjustments to the tax base and/or with administratively complex 
refundable credits. As shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, preferential 
treatment o f necessities is administratively complex and economically inefficient. 
Moreover, such adjustments to the tax base are not particularly effective in achieving 
distributional objectives. An individual consumption tax, on the other hand, can 
achieve almost any desired distribution of after-tax income solely through adjustments 
to the tax rate.
Thus, at first glance, it appears an individual consumption tax is the best of 
both worlds. There need not be a tradeoff between economic efficiency and equity. 
An individual consumption tax has all of the economic benefits o f a consumption tax 
base. At the same time, the tax can be made to be just as progressive as the current 
income tax. The individual consumption tax has not, however, received even a small 
fraction of the attention of that is given to other consumption taxes.
Except for brief temporary appearances in India and Sri Lanka, tax authorities 
around the world have had no experience with an individual consumption tax. The 
Treasury Department proposed an individual consumption tax in 1942 to help fund 
wartime spending and reduce consumption, but the proposal got nowhere in Congress. 
The Treasury Department again brought attention to the idea with a major study of 
tax reform in 1977, but again the plan was just presented as an option--and did not 
receive serious consideration by Congress. More recently, however, the individual 
consumption tax has received significant attention as one (along with a subtraction 
method VAT imposed on business) of the two major components of the legislation 
(S. 722) proposed by Senators Nunn and Domenici in April of 1995. Until the 
introduction of this legislation, there had been no serious congressional consideration 
of an individual consumption tax.51
The problem with an individual consumption tax is the difficulty in finding 
a workable method of calculating the deduction for new saving--the deduction that 
lies at the heart o f an individual consumption tax. In order to better understand the 
issues involved, it is useful to differentiate "old saving" (that is, the individual net 
wealth at the time of enactment of the tax) from "new saving" (additions to net wealth 
after enactment). It is likely that the two would be treated differently under any 
individual consumption tax.
51Chapter 11 provides more detail of the Nunn-Domenici proposal.
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B. New Saving
New saving would be treated like deductible contributions to an individual 
retirement account (IRA) that had no limitations on the amount o f deductions or the 
timing o f withdrawals. Taxpayers would deduct all income saved, including net 
additions to bank, mutual fund, and brokerage accounts; all purchases of stocks, 
bonds, and other financial instruments; and all investments in partnerships and 
proprietorships. When funds were withdrawn from such investments—whether in the 
form of income or reduction of principal, the entire amount of the proceeds would be 
subject to tax.52
Conversely, proceeds from new loans or other forms of indebtedness would 
be included in the tax base, while payments of both interest and principal would be 
deducted.
The computation of the deduction for new saving would require knowledge of 
the annual change in the outstanding balance of each taxpayer's investments and 
indebtedness. Under an individual consumption tax, the custodian of each investment 
and indebtedness account would have to report these amounts to taxpayers once a 
year as they now report interest earned and paid.
C. Old Saving
Saving accumulated before the enactment is more problematic than new saving 
for two reasons. The first is a matter of compliance. The second is a matter of 
fairness.
Once an individual consumption tax comes into effect, all additions to saving 
would be deductible and all withdrawals would be taxable. Shifting funds from one 
investment to another (e.g., depositing a dividend in a bank account) has no tax 
consequences because receipts (dissaving) are exactly offset by saving. A large 
revenue loss could result, however, if somehow existing wealth was undetected by tax 
authorities, and then these funds were deducted when invested in new forms. This 
could occur if  prior to enactment individuals drew down their saving and held it in 
cash. The investment of this cash subsequent to the enactment date would result in
52With regard to taxing the entire proceeds from investment, tax professionals can think in terms of the entire 
amount being gain. Tax basis is zero because the entire value of the initial investment is written off when the 
investment is made.
43
deductions despite lack of additional new saving. In order to prevent this, it has been 
noted that it may be necessary to require taxpayers to declare (subject to certain de 
minimis rules) their outstanding cash balances at the outset. It is not clear how such 
a requirement would be enforced.53
The other important transition issue is primarily a matter o f policy. Under the 
standard operating rules of an individual consumption tax, all proceeds from saving 
are included in gross receipts and subject to tax. The taxation of the entire proceeds, 
however—and not just capital gains, dividends, interest, and other capital incom e- 
results in large tax penalties in the case of existing saving. Thus, the standard 
operating rules of the tax would result in harsh treatment o f old saving, and many 
would consider such tax treatment a retroactive tax increase. This burden would fall 
primarily on the elderly who draw down their saving during retirement.54
In order not to impose a double burden on the elderly (and others drawing 
down saving to consume), special transition relief is required. One method of 
providing this relief would be to treat existing saving like new saving and allow the 
balance of existing saving to be deducted at the time of enactment.55 Then, under the 
regular rules of the individual consumption tax, all proceeds can be included when 
the assets are sold or the account is closed out. There are, however, several potential 
objections to this type of transition relief. First, given the enormous amount of 
individual wealth outstanding in the United States, this deduction for all existing basis 
would result in an enormous revenue loss (and an increase in tax rates to pay for the 
loss). Secondly, a significant portion of old saving received favorable treatment under 
the income tax (IRAs, pensions, life insurance, annuities, and tax-exempt bonds). 
Having never been subject to tax (or having received substantial tax relief), this 
saving would not be subject to "double taxation" upon enactment of an individual 
consumption tax. Third, given that two major objectives o f implementing a 
consumption tax are to increase saving and to simplify taxation, some propose moving 
to a new system "cold turkey," (i.e., without transition relief) because tax relief for 
old saving does nothing to increase incentives for new saving and such rules are
53Perhaps U.S. citizens could be required to exchange their green money for red money.
54It is important to recognize that the burdensome taxation of old saving under an individual consumption tax 
with transition relief is exactly equivalent to what would be experienced under a retail sales tax or a value-added 
tax.
55This deduction of basis is equivalent to selling the asset at the time of enactment and paying income tax on any 
gain, and then reinvesting and deducting the entire proceeds.
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extremely complex.56 Finally, some question whether the "retroactive" tax burden 
imposed on old saving is truly "unfair".57 They conclude that it is entirely appropriate 
to impose an additional tax burden on the elderly given the transfer of wealth being 
exacted by the Social Security system from the current work force to current 
retirees.58 This last view--if  it ever gets serious attention in the political arena— will 
undoubtedly be met with fierce opposition from those savers that would have their 
after-tax income subject to tax a second time under the consumption tax.
D. Tax Rates Under an Individual Consumption Tax
Although particular proposals must be evaluated with a full array of details, 
two general observations can be made about tax rates that might prevail under a 
replacement consumption tax. In general, because total consumption is less than 
income, it can be expected that a consumption tax will have higher rates than an 
income tax. (If, however, significant base broadening occurs, this need not be the 
case.) Second, because upper-income families consume proportionately less o f their 
income than lower-income families, it is generally necessary for a consumption tax 
to have more steeply graduated rates than under current law in order to achieve the 
same degree of progressivity as current law.
E. Overview o f  the Four Major Types o f  Consumption Taxes and Preview o f
Following Chapters
This and the prior three chapters have attempted to provide some operational 
details of different types of consumption taxes. Table 5.2 provides a summary 
comparison of some of the major features of these taxes. Columns A and B of this 
table highlight some practical issues already discussed. Administrative issues and 
public perceptions of these taxes vary dramatically. Columns (C) through (F) 
summarize the economy-wide effects of these taxes. Despite their considerable 
operational differences, these taxes in their basic forms do not have fundamentally 
different effects on growth, trade, inflation, and the distribution o f  income. These 
economic issues are explored in more detail in Chapters 6 through 8.
56This is the position taken by Sam Gibbons, ranking minority member of the House Ways and Means 
Committee. See, Gibbons (1994).
57See, Graetz (1977).
58See, Makin (1987).
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Each of the four major types of consumption taxes (like any tax) has its 
weaknesses. From Table 5.2, the following conclusions may be drawn:
• Because regressivity is a major problem with consumption taxes, the ability to 
implement a progressive rate structure could make the individual consumption tax 
a highly attractive option. An individual consumption tax, however, loses much 
of its luster because of its complexity—particularly with regard to computing a 
deduction for saving.
• A retail sales tax is generally perceived as regressive and may not be enforceable 
at rates necessary to make it a replacement tax. Nevertheless, the perceived 
simplicity of a retail sales tax is attractive to voters.
• Many of the enforcement problems prevalent under a retail sales tax disappear 
under a credit-invoice VAT. Like a retail sales tax, however, a credit-invoice VAT 
is highly visible and perceived as regressive by the public. Moreover, it imposes 
substantial new compliance burdens on businesses. Even the credit-invoice 
VAT’s advantages over other VATs--its ability to effectively provide product and 
business exemption-is often perceived as a weakness by those who would prefer 
a consumption tax not have any special tax breaks.
• From the standpoint of political viability, the subtraction method VAT appears to 
pose the least difficulty. Administrative and compliance costs seem relatively 
low. Except for the individual consumption tax, it is no better or worse than most 
other consumption taxes with regard to growth or income distribution. Moreover, 
because it is promoted as a tax on business, the public may have some trouble 
recognizing its regressivity (no matter how much economists may insist this is the 
case).59
After reviewing some major economic issues in Chapters 6 through 8, the 
remainder of this study-- Chapters 9 through 17—is devoted to describing how actual 
proposals might impact business. One major finding is that a replacement subtraction 
method VAT would radically shift the tax burden from individuals to businesses. 
Furthermore, within the business sector, it radically shifts the burden from capital- to 
labor-intensive industries.
59See Chapter 9.
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The Flat Tax modifies the basic structure of a subtraction method VAT by 
removing the wage component of value added from the business tax base and, instead 
imposes a wage tax on individuals. In so doing, the Flat Tax distributes the tax burden 
between businesses and individuals and across businesses in a manner that much 
more closely resembles current law. (To be sure, there are still major differences, but 
these differences in tax payments are far less than those that would be experienced 
under a "plain vanilla" subtraction VAT.) Given that a consumption tax with a less 
radical alteration in tax collections is likely to have more political viability, the Flat 
Tax may be viewed as a political refinement of the subtraction method VAT.
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PART III. THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES
Chapter 6
The Effect of Consumption Taxes on 
Saving, Inflation, and the Business Cycle
Summary
• Proponents o f  consumption taxation argue:
(1) saving is critical to long-term economic growth
(2) the current U.S. saving rate is low compared to the rate o f  U.S. 
saving in the past and compared with rates o f  saving in other 
countries
(3) the replacement o f  an income tax with a consumption tax would 
increase the after-tax rate o f  return on saving (by eliminating the 
bias against saving inherent in the income tax)
(4) an increase in the after-tax rate o f  return on saving will increase 
private saving.
• There is broad agreement among economists about all o f  these points 
except the last one: economists dispute the magnitude o f  the response o f  private 
saving to a replacement consumption tax. Given the uncertainty o f  economic 
analysis, it is unlikely any consensus about the general impact o f  taxes on saving 
will emerge in the foreseeable future.
• A replacement consumption tax is unlikely to have much impact on the 
business cycle.
• A consumption tax may have a one-time impact on the price level i f  the 
Federal Reserve increases the money supply.
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A. Introduction
Capital formation is a critical ingredient of economic growth, but the money 
has to come from somewhere. The vast majority of funds necessary to purchase new 
equipment, new plant, new roads, and new technology come from saving. Without 
increases in saving, any increase in one type of investment (e.g., new machinery) 
must be at the expense of other types o f investment (e.g., technology). With more 
capital, workers have more tools that enable them to be more productive. Productivity 
growth leads to higher wages and a higher standard of living.
The financial markets channel funds to purchasers of capital who need the 
funds. Although there is a tendency to focus on personal savings by individuals— 
primarily in the form of pensions and accounts with financial intermediaries— 
significant funding for capital spending in the United States comes from other 
businesses (i.e., retained earnings), State governments (that generate budget 
surpluses), and foreign individuals and businesses investing in the United States.
It is important to note that saving can also be negative as well as positive. 
When consumption exceeds income, there is a drain on funds available for capital 
investment. Therefore, from the standpoint of capital formation, reducing 
indebtedness by individuals is just as important as increasing savings by individuals. 
O f course, the biggest culprit o f them all when it comes to dissaving is the deficit- 
prone Federal government. It is often remarked that the surest method of increasing 
national saving is to reduce the Federal budget deficit.
There is substantial disagreement among economists about the impact of a 
replacement consumption tax on saving and economic growth. Some claim the 
impact is dramatically large. Others argue it is imperceptibly small. Unfortunately, 
this difference of opinion is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Decision makers 
in both the private and public sectors will have to evaluate consumption taxes with 
this uncertainty.
B. The Low Level o f  U.S. Saving
Since peaking in 1978 at 8.1 percent of total Gross Domestic Product, the 
annual rate of saving in the United States has rarely exceeded four percent. As shown 
in Table 6.1, net saving by individuals, by businesses, and by governments have all 
declined.
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Table 6.1
Components of National Saving as a Percentage of GDP
Average over 
Period:
Net Personal 
Saving
Net Business 
Saving
Net Govt. 
Saving
Total National 
Saving
1950-59 4.7 2.8 -0.1 7.4
1960-69 4.7 3.6 -0.1 8.1
1970-79 5.5 2.6 -1.0 7.2
1980-89 4.8 1.6 -2.5 3.9
1990-92 3.5 1.6 -3.5 1.7
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (1995).
Not only is the U.S. rate of savings low by historical standards but, as shown in Chart 
6.1, it is also extremely low in comparison to other major industrialized countries.
Chart 6.1
NATIONAL SAVING AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 
1989
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (1995).
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C. The Impact o f  Taxes on the Rate o f  Return
Two fundamental observations can be made about the impact of taxes on 
saving. The first is that an income tax penalizes saving: the more an individual saves, 
the greater his or her lifetime tax burden. This is illustrated in the example in Table 
6.2.
Table 6.2
Comparing the Income Tax Burden of a Spender and a Saver
Assumptions:
PRE-TAX RETURN
TAX RATE
AFTER TAX
RETURN
8 .0%
3 0 .0 %
5.6%
A . "spender"
PRESENT VALUE PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2
INCOME $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
SAVING $ 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
CONSUMPTION $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
TAXES $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
S . "SAVER"
PRESENT VALUE PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2
INCOME $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ 5 .6 0
SAVING $ 7 0 .0 0 ($ 7 3 .9 2 )
CONSUMPTION $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0 $ 7 3 .9 2
TAXES $ 3 1 .5 9 $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 1 .6 8 60
In this simple example, two individuals live only two periods ("working years" and 
"retirement"), and they start out with the same initial wealth (from wages or 
inheritance) of $100. The "spender" consumes all of his wealth during his working
1.68 tax at 6% rate of return has a present value of $ 1.59.
52
years. The "saver" invests and does not consume anything until retirement. 
Proponents argue that despite the same initial opportunities and the same lifetime 
wealth (measured as the present value of lifetime consumption), the burden of 
taxation is greater for the saver.
The second fundamental observation about taxes and saving is that a 
consumption tax neither rewards nor penalizes saving. The burden of taxation is the 
same irrespective of an individual’s savings behavior. The example in Table 6.3 
shows the tax burden of the saver and spender under a consumption tax.
Table 6.3
Comparing the Consumption Tax Burden of a Spender and a Saver
PRE-TAX RETURN
TAX RATE
8 .0%
3 0 .0 %
A . "SPENDER"
PRESENT VALUE PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2
INCOME $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
SAVING $ 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
CONSUMPTION $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
TAXES $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0
B . "SAVER"
PRESENT VALUE PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2
INCOME $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ 8 .0 0
SAVING $ 1 0 0 .0 0 ($ 1 0 8 .0 0 )
CONSUMPTION $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 0 .0 0 7 5 .6 0
TAXES $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 3 2 .4 0 61
The present value of an individual's lifetime tax burden is unaffected by the amount 
o f saving under a consumption tax. Thus, a consumption tax does not—by itself— 
provide any incentive to increase savings. The benefit to saving is the removal o f  the 
income tax from  saving income.
61Present value.
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D. Evidence o f  the Responsiveness o f  Savings to Tax Changes
Calculations like the ones presented above are often used to illustrate the 
detrimental impact of income taxation on after-tax return to saving. There is, 
however, substantial uncertainty about whether this change in the after-tax return to 
saving will affect the amount o f saving. Moreover, it is not even clear for a given 
change in the rate of return what direction the change in amount may be.
It is natural to expect that an increase in the returns to saving will increase 
saving: With greater rewards for saving, individuals will do more of it. The opposite, 
however, may also be true. This may be understood by considering the case of a 
"target saver." A target saver would be an individual who saves to achieve a certain 
dollar amount of future consumption (e.g., tuition for a child’s college education). An 
increase in the after-tax rate of return on saving would reduce the amount o f savings 
necessary to achieve the desired amount of saving.62 Another example of target 
saving that declines with increases in rate of return is the funding of defined benefit 
pension plans: when interest rates increase, employers can more easily meet their 
pension obligations and therefore reduce their funding of pension plans.
Empirical research by economists does little to clear up the ambiguity as to the 
effects of a consumption tax on saving. (In fact, given the importance of the 
responsiveness of savings to changes in the after-tax rate of interest, there have been 
remarkably few studies that attempt direct empirical estimates. This is because of the 
significant practical difficulties in formulating meaningful statistical tests.). Many 
economists believe that saving is not responsive to the rate o f interest or that 
statistical tests are not conclusive.63 Others believe that saving is responsive to the 
return on savings.64
The work of Michael Boskin, former Chairman of the President's Council of 
Economic Advisors, is frequently cited by proponents of consumption taxes as 
evidence o f the responsiveness of savings to changes in taxation. His estimates of 
responsiveness of saving are at the upper end of empirical estimates. At the other end 
o f the spectrum, many economists believe that changes in the after-tax return to 
saving has little or no effect on saving. In order to ascertain the order of magnitude
62For example, suppose the parents of a newborn wish to provide $100,000 of college tuition to their child on 
the child’s eighteenth birthday. If the rate of interest is 8 percent and the parents’ tax bracket is 30 percent, they 
would have to save $3,182 annually to accumulate $100,000 in eighteen years. If their savings is exempt from tax, 
they only need to save $2,472 annually in order to achieve their objective.
63See, for example, Boskin (1978).
64See, for example, von Furstenberg (1981).
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of the possible effects of a consumption tax, Boskin's work can be used as a point of 
reference as a reasonable upper-range empirical estimate of the responsiveness of 
saving to taxes. A reasonable lower range estimate is no effect at all.
Boskin’s best estimate is that for a one percent increase in the after-tax return 
to saving there will be a 0.4 percent increase in the amount o f saving. Thus, with the 
elimination of an income tax with a rate of 40 percent,65 there would be an increase 
in personal saving of approximately 25 percent.66 Using the data shown in Table 6.1 
above, it can be seen that using this estimate a replacement consumption tax would 
have increased personal saving from 4.8 percent to approximately 6.0 percent during 
the 1980s and from 3.5 percent to 4.3 percent during the 1990-1992 period.67
If, on the other hand, the elasticity of saving is close to zero—as maintained by 
many economists—tax changes will have little impact on saving.
E. The Impact o f  Saving on Growth
Given the magnitude of these estimates, it is unlikely that any change in 
taxation can fundamentally solve the problem of low saving in the United States. 
Assuming the upper-bound estimates of responsiveness are correct, a replacement 
consumption tax would result in a significant increase in saving, but such an increase 
would only partially offset the large recent declines in the personal saving rate in the 
United States. For example, assuming an elasticity of saving of 0.4, a replacement 
consumption tax that became fu lly effective in 1990 would do little more than restore 
the rate o f personal saving to that which prevailed during the 1980s. From an 
international perspective, these changes also seem small. The most optimistic 
estimate of increases in the saving rate resulting from a replacement consumption tax 
still results in a rate of U.S. saving rate far below that of most trading partners.
65 Although there are many instances in which the marginal rate of tax on saving exceeds 40 percent (e.g., 
dividends received by individuals subject to both individual and corporate tax, and capital gains due to inflation 
that are subject to tax), the vast majority of private saving in the economy is taxed at rates below 40 percent (e.g., 
saving by those not in the top marginal bracket, pension saving, life insurance, annuities, and IRAs.)
66The elimination of a 40 percent tax raises the after-tax rate of return by 67 percent. (For example, if the 
before-tax rate of return is 10 percent, the after-tax would increase from 6 to 10 percent.) The elasticity of 0.4 is 
multiplied by 67 percent to arrive at an estimate of 26.7 percent increase in private saving.
67There is a class of theoretical models, known as "life-cycle" models, which predict extremely high responses 
of saving to changes in the interest rate. (Savings elasticity's in the order of magnitude of 1.0 or 2.0 are common 
in these models.) These models in general have wide acceptance as theoretical constructs in the economics 
profession, but there have been no compelling explanations of why the high responsiveness of saving to changes 
in the interest rate predicted by these models is not observed in the economy. For arguments for and against the 
usefulness of the life-cycle models of savings see Starrett (1988) and Summers (1988).
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If upper-range estimates are correct, savings would increase by approximately 
one percent of GDP (in 1995)--about $70 billion. An increase in $70 billion in saving 
sustained over a period of years can result in a substantial increase in the nation’s 
productive capacity. In ten years, for example, this would result in a net increase in 
the capital stock of $700 billion. If that capital had a rate o f return of 10 percent, that 
would be a $70 billion permanent increase in the economy, an increase of 
approximately one percent.68
F. Impact on the Business Cycle and Inflation
1. Business Cycle Effects
Up to this point this chapter has focused on long-term "supply-side" effects of 
a replacement consumption tax. Although widely discredited since its heyday of 
influence in the 1960s, the predicted impact of a consumption tax by "demand-side" 
or "Keynesian" economists still deserves consideration (if only because it has so long 
dominated the textbooks and press reports). In a nutshell, Keynesian economics says 
if  there is significant unemployment and less than full capacity utilization, the 
economy can be expanded because increases in government deficits can help spur 
private and public spending.
This type of reasoning has lead to some concerns that a tax on consumption 
could be a significant drag on the economy that could lead to recession. There are 
many good arguments to discredit this claim, but perhaps the best in this case is that 
most consumption taxes under consideration would be offset by reductions in income 
taxes. Because there would be no change in the deficit, the impact on overall demand 
would be small.69
68This calculation is provided to give an understanding of a reasonable order o f  magnitude in the potential 
change in the economy that results from an increase in saving. Economists alternatively might use models 
employed in a branch of economics known as "growth theory." In this framework, one might observe that the 
return to capital (in the form of corporate profits, interest, and some reasonable portion of proprietorship income) 
accounts for about 20 percent o f GDP (i.e., about $1.5 trillion), and the current size of the business capital stock 
producing that GDP is about $10 trillion. $700 billion of saving could increase that capital stock by about 7 
percent. If income from capital also increased by 7 percent, this would be an increase in national income of about 
$150 billion (or about 2 percent of GDP).
There are two reasons to expect this measurement might be biased upward. First, it is common to assume that 
capital is subject to diminishing returns, i.e., the additional $700 billion in capital is unlikely to be as profitable as 
the initial $7 trillion. Second, measured capital does not take into account intangibles (such as patents, trademarks, 
goodwill, etc.). To the extent profits may be attributable to these factors, increases in tangible capital might not 
be accompanied by rates of return that include returns to both tangible and intangible capital. (Although, it is often 
argued that capital formation spurs technological innovation).
69The case can be made that placing a heavier tax burden on consumption and a lesser burden on saving will 
dampen overall demand (macroeconomists refer to this as the theory of the "balanced-budget multiplier"), but these 
impacts—to the extent they exist at all—are likely to be small and temporary. Any reductions in overall demand due 
to reduced consumption are likely to be offset by increases in spending on plant and equipment.
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2.  Inflationary Effects
Because it is widely believed that the burden of consumption taxes will result 
in higher prices, there are concerns that a consumption tax will be accompanied by 
an increase in the rate of inflation.70 If consumption taxes imposed on businesses are 
passed forward in higher prices, the effect on the price level will depend on the rate 
of tax and the comprehensiveness of the tax base. If the rate of tax is 15 percent, and 
the tax applies to 80 percent of the goods and services in the economy, the increase 
in the price level that accompanies the imposition of the tax could be 12 percentage 
points.
Because changes in the price level are ultimately controlled by monetary 
policy, any increase in the price level from a consumption tax would have to be 
accommodated by the Federal Reserve (i.e., a 12-percent increase in the price level 
would have to be accompanied by an increase in the money supply of approximately 
12 percent). Because the Fed's actions are not under the direct control of Congress 
or the President, it is difficult to know how the Fed policy would react to the 
imposition of a large consumption tax.
It is also important to stress that any changes in the price level due to the 
imposition of a new consumption tax (or an increase in the rate of an existing tax) are 
likely to be one-time changes in the price level and not permanent increases in the 
rate of inflation.
G. Conclusion
In terms of its impact on saving, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding 
the enactment of a replacement consumption tax. "Definitive" statements about a 
consumption tax's impact on saving and economic growth should be accepted warily. 
One thing that does seem clear is that even under the most optimistic assumptions, it 
seems unlikely that a replacement consumption tax can increase U.S. saving to a level 
comparable to that o f its major trading partners.
Potentially the impact on long-term economic growth can be significant. If 
saving is not responsive to tax changes, however, the impacts on growth will be small. 
In summary, with regard to economic growth, a replacement consumption tax is 
unlikely to do any harm but does have significant upside potential. Most conclude 
its impact on inflation will be a short-term initial increase only.
70The choices faced by business will be (1) raise prices, (2) absorb costs, or (3) reduce wages (because there 
is no income tax).
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Chapter 7
Consumption Taxes and International Trade
Summary
• M ost consumption taxes operate under the "destination principle" (that 
is, they tax domestic consumption not domestic production).
• In order to effect the destination principle, value-added taxes rebate tax 
on exports and impose import duties. These are known as "border tax 
adjustments."
• Border tax adjustments are necessary to maintain a level international 
playing fie ld  between domestic and foreign producers.
• Consumption taxes that replace income taxes may improve the trade 
balance i f  they can increase national saving.
A, Introduction
A major issue in consumption taxation is whether or not tax should be levied 
on domestic production—in which case exports would be taxed and imports would be 
exempt—or on domestic sales—in which case exports would be exempt and imports 
would be taxed. The difference may have important implications for international 
trade.
Taxes on production are said to follow the "origin principle." Taxes on sales 
are said to follow the "destination principle." From an economic perspective, the 
destination principle is superior to the origin principle because it is less likely to 
distort consumers' choices between domestic and imported goods. In practice, most 
consumption taxes are imposed only on domestic sales.71 In addition, most
71Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rebates are allowed for exports and taxation of 
imports are allowed in the case of indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are taxes imposed on products, such as retail sales 
taxes and VATs using the credit-invoice method tax. Border tax adjustments are not allowed in the case of direct 
taxes. Direct taxes are imposed on wages and profits. Even if border tax adjustments on direct taxes were allowed 
under GATT, it is not at all clear how they would be implemented. Generally, one would expect the amount of 
corporation tax associated with the final sales price of any product to be positively related to the capital intensity
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consumption tax proposals--with the notable exception of the Flat Tax--are imposed 
on domestic sales. Income taxes, on the other hand, are typically imposed on 
domestic production. 72
Throughout this study it has been emphasized that it is important when 
evaluating a consumption tax to distinguish the case of an add-on consumption tax 
from a replacement consumption tax. This is particularly true in evaluating 
international issues. As shall be discussed in greater detail below, most economists 
believe that consumption taxes levied on the destination principle are neutral with 
regard to international trade. Therefore, an add-on consumption tax operating under 
the destination principle does not have any major effect on the trade balance. In 
contrast, many economists believe that income taxes, levied on the origin principle, 
can be detrimental to international trade. Therefore, it is only when a consumption 
tax replaces an income tax that there may be a benefit to international trade.
This chapter provides a more detailed discussion of the arguments for and 
against these assertions.
B. Border Tax Adjustments
It is easy to apply the destination principle under some consumption taxes. For 
a retail sales tax and a personal consumption tax, the taxation of purely domestic sales 
follows naturally from the mechanical application of the tax.73 For value-added taxes, 
however, a concerted effort must be made. In order for value-added taxes to apply 
to only domestic sales, there must be special rules for both domestic production sold 
abroad (i.e., exports) and foreign production sold domestically (i.e., imports). These 
special rules are called "border tax adjustments." To relieve exports o f tax, firms 
exclude receipts from exports sales from the tax base. To tax imports, duties are 
imposed at the border. Without border tax adjustments, value-added taxes would be 
levied on domestic production.
of its production. However, beyond this generalization, there is no clear guidance as to how much corporate tax 
should be attributed to a product Any  method of allocating a firm's corporate tax to its exports would be arbitrary. 
Taxation of imports would even be more problematic. Arbitrary assignments of tax would have to be estimated 
from the amount of tax paid by domestic firms computing similar products. Given that profitability varies 
considerably from year-to-year, border tax adjustments on imports would have to be recalibrated frequently. Such 
changes, however, could never be frequent enough because import taxes are imposed on transactions, but profit 
taxes of firms selling comparable products are not computed—even on a preliminary basis—until several months 
after the end of the taxable year.
72The United States provides some partial relief from its income tax for certain types of exports.
73 A retail sales tax achieves the destination principle by only taxing domestic retail sales. A personal 
consumption tax only taxes domestic consumers, so imported goods are subject to tax and exported goods are 
excluded.
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International competition for sales into domestic markets is preserved by use 
o f border tax adjustments on imports. With these adjustments, goods produced 
abroad and domestically are both subject to the same tax. For example, under a 10- 
percent VAT, all domestic goods and services are taxed at a 10-percent rate and 
imports are subject to a 10-percent duty at the border. Even though border tax 
adjustments on imports to some may have the appearance of a tariff, there is no 
discrimination against imports or favoritism to domestic producers because both the 
sales o f importers and domestic producers are subject to the same tax.
International competition in overseas markets is preserved by border tax 
adjustments on exports. With these adjustments, exported goods are exempt from tax 
as are the goods of their foreign competitors selling in foreign markets. For example, 
if the United States levied a 10-percent destination-principle VAT, exports to Canada 
would be exempt from U.S. tax as would goods produced and sold in Canada. 
Sometimes this preferential treatment of exports vis-a-vis goods sold in domestic 
markets is likened to an export subsidy, but as can be seen by the above example, they 
are necessary to maintain a level playing field between overseas markets.
In conclusion, border tax adjustments in and of themselves appear not to have 
any significant impacts on trade. On the contrary, economists argue that border tax 
adjustments are necessary to maintain a level international playing field for traded 
goods. Yet, there are still many reasons to believe consumption taxes may have a 
positive impact on the trade balance i f  consumption tax revenues are used to reduce 
income taxes or to reduce the Federal budget deficit.
C. Trade Balance and Saving
1. Introduction
To the extent that a consumption tax increases saving, there may be a positive 
impact on the trade balance. This is because there is a linkage between domestic 
saving and the value of the dollar, and—in turn—between the value of the dollar and 
the trade balance. If domestic saving increases, there is generally less need for 
foreign capital to finance domestic investment. Reduced capital inflows into the 
United States mean that foreign investors have less need for U.S. currency. A 
reduction in this demand for dollars causes its price to drop (just as a reduction in the 
demand for apples causes the price of apples to drop).
This decline in value—or depreciation—of the dollar is beneficial to U.S. trade. 
A depreciation of the dollar means that foreigners wishing to purchase U.S. goods (in 
dollars) will find these goods less expensive in their currency. This decline in price 
will stimulate increased exports. Similarly, a depreciation of the dollar means that 
consumers in the United States will have to pay more in U.S. dollars for foreign goods
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(whose prices are denominated in foreign currency). This increase in price means 
reduced imports. Both increased exports and reduced imports improve the trade 
balance.
The chain of causation from increased saving to an improved trade balance is 
summarized in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1
The Link Between Savings and Trade
Increased (private or public) Saving  
Reduced Capital Inflows  
Reduced Demand for Dollar  
Decline in Value of Dollar
Lower Export/Higher Import Prices  
Increased Exports/Reduced Imports 
2. Increased Saving By Reduced Federal Budget Deficits
Deficits by the Federal government are a form o f a negative saving. For the 
reasons outlined above, there is broad agreement among economists that the increase 
in national saving that would result from reduction in the Federal budget deficit would 
reduce the trade deficit. (This is often referred to as the "twin deficits" problem.) 
Despite strong sentiment for deficit reduction, however, use of a consumption tax for 
deficit reduction is not currently receiving any notable attention by Congress. In the 
current political climate, it seems much more likely that deficit reduction will be 
achieved through reductions in Federal spending.
3. Increased Saving By Reducing the Income Tax
Nearly all economists state that income taxes are inefficient taxes because they 
penalize individuals for saving. Corporate taxes are particularly inefficient because 
they add an additional layer o f income taxation to the income from certain types of 
capital (i.e., equity financed) of certain businesses (i.e., corporations). Thus, not only 
is there a bias against capital formation, there is additional discrimination across 
different types of capital. Given the absence o f these problems under a consumption 
tax, it should not be surprising that replacement of the income tax with a consumption 
tax can improve overall U.S. economic performance and the U.S. trade balance in 
particular.
If the burden of income taxation takes the form of a reduced after-tax return 
on investment (i.e., the burden of the income tax is on capital), removal o f the tax will
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increase the after-tax return to saving.74 To the extent that saving responds 
positively75 to the increase in the after-tax return on investment, the increase in 
domestic personal saving could positively impact the trade balance. The chain of 
causation is similar to that which would result from a reduced Federal budget deficit 
(illustrated in Figure 7.1): increased domestic saving reduces the need for inflows of 
foreign capital, reducing the demand for dollars, and causing a depreciation. This 
depreciation, in turn, reduces the price of U.S. exports and increases the price o f U.S. 
imports.
D. Exchange Rate Adjustments
Up to this point, this chapter has ignored the impact of trade flows on 
exchange rates. Exchange rate adjustments can be particularly important in 
evaluating origin-based taxes-like the Armey Flat Tax—or any other taxes that might 
impact trade. Economists believe that when exchange rates are flexible (as they have 
been generally since 1971) even consumption taxes without border tax adjustments 
will not distort international trade. This is because exchange rates will adjust in such 
a manner that will have the same impact as border tax adjustments.76
The basic argument is best understood with an example. Suppose that a 10- 
percent value-added tax is imposed without border tax adjustments (i.e., like the Flat 
Tax). In this case, most economists assume the domestic price level would increase 
by 10 percent. Without border tax adjustments, export prices would also increase by 
10 percent, and import prices would remain at their before-tax levels. In this case, 
exports would be at a competitive disadvantage and imports would be at a competitive 
advantage. These changes, however, would reduce the demand for the dollar and, as 
a result, cause the dollar to depreciate. Economists believe that equilibrium in foreign 
exchange markets could only be restored when the dollar depreciated by 10 percent. 
This decline in the exchange rate would obliterate any impact of the VAT on trade. 
As a result of the depreciation of the currency, imports are 10 percent more
74Even if repeal of the income tax does not increase the return to saving, there can still be a positive impact on 
the trade balance. Instead of reducing profits, the burden of income taxes might be passed forward in the form of 
higher prices. Under this alternative scenario, reducing income taxes can reduce prices. A replacement 
consumption tax would cause an offsetting price increase. In the context of trade, however, the impact on prices 
is not offsetting because a border-adjustable tax (i.e., a consumption tax) would replace a tax without border 
adjustments (i.e., the corporate income tax). Thus, if the burden of income taxes is passed forward in higher prices, 
a replacement consumption tax can reduce prices on exports. Although there is no definitive answer to the question 
of the incidence of business income taxes, this discussion shows that a positive effect on trade is possible whether 
the burden of income taxes is borne by consumers or is borne by business.
75This is the primary topic of discussion on Chapter 6.
76If indeed it is true that in a world of freely floating exchange rates there is no difference between an origin- 
principle and destination-principle value-added tax, a strong case can be made for preference for an origin- 
principle tax because border tax adjustments involve considerable administrative and compliance costs.
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expensive-just as if  there were border tax adjustments imposed on imports. 
Similarly, as a result o f the depreciation, there is a 10-percent reduction in the price 
o f exports that exactly offsets the 10-percent increase in price due to the lack of 
border tax adjustments.
This view is widely held by economists.77 It follows from the basic tenet of 
international finance that exchange rates adjust to restore equilibrium to international 
markets. In equilibrium, a country’s trade deficit is equal to net foreign investment, 
that is,
Imports minus Exports equals Net Capital Inflows
Given this identity, and assuming that net capital inflows are unaffected by the 
imposition of a consumption tax, there is no clear-cut reason to disagree with 
economic reasoning. It is likely that any positive impact o f a consumption tax on 
trade will be offset by exchange rate movements in order that equality in the above 
equation is maintained.78
Therefore, as long as net capital flows are unaffected, exchange rate 
movements can eliminate any detrimental impact o f an origin-based tax on trade. 
Moreover, because capital inflows are likely to be reduced under a replacement 
consumption tax (as discussed in the previous section), it is still possible for a 
replacement origin-principle consumption tax--like the Flat Tax—to positively impact 
the trade deficit despite the absence of border tax adjustments. Thus, even in the 
context of an a non-border adjustable VAT, the central issue is again the impact of 
a replacement consumption tax on saving.
E. Conclusion
Economists generally agree that (1) it is unlikely for border tax adjustments per  
se to have any significant impact on the trade balance and  (2) it is unlikely that a lack 
o f border tax adjustments will have any significant impact on the overall trade 
balance once exchange rates have adjusted (although they may have some important 
differential impacts across industries). In either case, a consumption tax is likely to
77See, for example, Joint Committee on Taxation (1991).
78The above reasoning does not say anything about the differential impact o f these changes across industries. 
For example, suppose (as was assumed above in footnote 3) that the burden of the corporate tax is on consumers 
because the tax results in higher prices, and assume the tax is repealed and replaced with a consumption tax. The 
repeal of the corporate income tax will not result in a uniform reduction in prices. It will generally reduce prices 
more in high-profit and capital-intensive sectors of the economy. Any offsetting exchange rate adjustment will 
uniformly impact the price of all products. In the end, there may be no change in overall exports, but it may be the 
case that capital-intensive firms' exports increased while other firms' exports decreased.
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improve the trade balance only by causing a dollar depreciation that would follow 
from any increase in domestic saving. A consumption tax might increase private 
saving if  it is a replacement tax that increases the after-tax return to saving. A 
consumption tax can increase public saving by using revenues to reduce the Federal 
budget deficit.
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Chapter 8
Consumption Taxes and Income Distribution
Summary
• Consumption taxes are widely perceived as placing undue burdens on the 
poor. There are two reasons fo r  this perception: (1) consumption as a 
percentage o f  annual income is greater fo r  low-income households than high- 
income households, and (2) consumption taxes generally do not have progressive 
rates.
• Many economists believe that consumption taxes appear more regressive 
than they really are. This is because there are systematic biases in the standard 
measures o f  “rich” and “poor".
• Nevertheless, any politically realistic consumption tax will likely be 
supplemented with features to alleviate the burden on low-income households.
• The exemption o f  necessities is not a particularly effective method o f  
reducing regressivity o f  consumption taxes.
• Some form  o f  tax credit fo r  low-income households likely will play an 
important role in alleviating the regressivity o f  any consumption tax enacted into 
law.
A. Introduction
On average, low-income households consume a larger proportion of then- 
income than do high-income households. For this reason, consumption taxes are 
widely considered regressive.79 This is particularly true if  the consumption tax is 
levied—as is often the case—at a single, flat rate.
79If tax as a percentage of income is greater for low-income households than high-income households, the 
tax system is considered "regressive." Conversely, if tax as a percentage of income is lower for low-income 
households than high-income households, the tax system is considered "progressive." If tax as a percentage of 
income is the same for all taxpayers, the system is considered "proportional."
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Regressivity is the Achilles’ heel of consumption taxation. No matter how 
effective any consumption tax might be in increasing saving, improving the trade 
balance, and reducing complexity, such a tax might never become law solely because 
it is regressive. In order to be politically viable, the basic structure o f any 
consumption tax may have to be substantially modified or supplemented in order to 
eliminate its inherent regressivity. Moreover, if  a consumption tax replaces the 
current income tax, the new tax likely must go beyond avoiding regressivity. In order 
to gain acceptance, it may have to be as progressive as current law.80 Methods of 
alleviating regressivity are among the most important issues in the design of 
consumption taxation systems, and a variety o f options are available. All o f these 
mechanisms, however, greatly increase administrative and compliance costs.
It is also important to recognize that despite the widespread perception of 
regressivity by the general public, there have been a variety of challenges to this 
traditional view:
(1) Government transfer programs that favor the poor should be taken into 
account when evaluating regressivity. The benefits provided by these 
programs may substantially offset any burden imposed by a 
consumption tax on a large portion of low-income families.
(2) The economic growth that could result from the imposition of a 
consumption tax could make everybody better off, so the focus on 
relative burden may be misplaced.
(3) It is possible that the corporate income tax is not borne by capital but 
by consumers, in which case the current tax system may not be as 
progressive as is commonly believed. In that case, a switch to 
consumption taxation may not alter the distribution of the tax burden 
by as much as is commonly perceived.
(4) Economic well-being is usually measured by reference to annual 
income instead of lifetime income. Most economists believe that use 
of annual income as a measure of well-being makes consumption taxes 
appear more regressive than they really are. Some economists even 
argue that a consumption tax is fairer than an income tax.81 
80Richard Gephardt, the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, has recently proposed an income tax 
with a progressive rate structure and few deductions or exclusions. The top bracket is 39 percent and is applicable 
to all forms of income including capital gains.
81 This argument is often made by David Bradford, a former Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Tax Policy). See, for example, Bradford (1986).
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Although these arguments are well understood by the experts, to-date they have not 
entered the mainstream political debate. It is also unclear if  they ever will; one 
impediment is that they are unfamiliar or relatively difficult to understand.82
In any case, it is likely that methods of alleviating regressivity--not the larger 
question of whether consumption taxes are actually regressive--will take center stage 
in the consumption tax debate.83
B. Methods o f  Alleviating Regressivity
There are three general methods of reducing the regressivity of consumption 
taxes. The first is to provide tax exemptions and/or low tax rates for low-income 
households and to increase tax rates with the level of income. This type of progressive 
rate structure can only be implemented under a personal consumption tax.84 The 
second method is to provide tax exemptions or tax reductions for the products 
consumed in greater proportions by low-income households. Tax relief for food and 
other necessities is only practical under a retail sales tax or a value-added tax. The 
third method is to provide tax credits or direct payments to households to compensate 
them for their disproportionate burden. These payments may be implemented under 
any type of consumption tax, but are less costly to administer if  they piggyback on a 
personal income or personal consumption tax already in place.
1. Progressive Rates
As noted, a progressive rate structure is only practical under a personal 
consumption tax. If  it can be implemented, almost any degree of progressivity can 
be achieved. For example, large personal exemptions could keep tens o f millions of 
households free of tax. Rates could be slightly or steeply progressive. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, however, there is considerable uncertainty about the practicality and 
popularity of a personal consumption tax. Calculating the net savings deduction 
under a personal consumption tax would entail substantial administrative and
82The Appendix to this chapter provides more explanation of these arguments.
83No matter how meritorious these new methods might be, change will be difficult. To the extent these changes 
are not well understood, many will be suspicious of technical changes with such large political ramifications. 
Opponents of consumption taxation are likely to claim that "the books are being cooked" or that “the rules are 
being changed in the middle of the game." As the debate in consumption taxation develops, it will be interesting 
to see whether proponents o f consumption taxation will accept the traditional view of regressivity and fight their 
battle on those terms or whether they will try to redefine the terms of the debate.
84 Someday it may be technologically feasible to produce nontransferable identification cards electronically 
encoded with each consumer’s tax rate. These cards would be presented at the cash register so that retail sales tax 
and VAT burdens may be adjusted according to each individual’s circumstances. Still, substantial enforcement 
and administrative problems would exist under such a system.
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compliance burdens, making it the most complex of all major types of consumption 
taxes. A personal consumption tax has never been enacted into law in any modem 
developed economy.85
2. Exemption o f  Necessities
In practice, the method most often used to alleviate regressivity of 
consumption taxes is the exemption of products considered necessities. Most value- 
added taxes in other countries as well as most retail sales taxes implemented by the 
States provide tax relief for food, health care, housing, and other necessities. As 
indicated in the following table, these items generally represent a larger fraction of 
income for low-income households than high income households.
Table 8.1
Expenditures on Necessities as a Percentage of Total Consumption
Income
Group
Food at Home Shelter Health Care Total
Lowest
Fifth
17.1% 29.9% 12.2% 59.2%
Highest
Fifth
11.0% 27.5% 11.2% 49.6%
Source: Vasquez (1987), p. 321.
Although tax relief for these items reduces regressivity, a consumption tax with 
preferences for certain types of consumption greatly increases administrative and 
compliance costs.86 Preferences also take their toll in terms of economic efficiency. 
When certain consumption items receive preferential treatment, consumers are likely 
to rearrange their consumption patterns to avoid tax.87 Distortions result throughout 
the economy as consumption shifts towards items receiving preferential treatment. 
Furthermore, given the necessity o f achieving certain revenue targets, any exception
85See Chapter 11 for a discussion o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal, which includes—along with a subtraction 
method VAT—a personal consumption tax.
86Among the more famous examples was whether or not "Head and Shoulders" dandruff shampoo would receive 
preferential treatment under the French value-added tax as a health product. Another administrative nightmare was 
determining which food items would be subject to California's "snack tax."
87For example, at a donut shop in Virginia, some patrons were observed eating donuts in their cars in the parking 
lot rather than at the counter. This inefficient (and messy) behavior is the result of preferential treatment given 
under the Virginia sales tax to carryout food.
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provided for certain items results in higher taxation for other items. These higher 
rates of tax further distort consumption and reduce the economic benefits of 
consumption taxation.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of this type of tax relief is its failure to 
substantially reduce the regressivity of the tax. Although, as a percentage of income, 
the benefit of exempting food helps the poor, a substantial portion of the revenue cost 
o f preferential treatment for food provides benefit to upper-income households as 
well. Most studies show that tax relief for necessities does somewhat alleviate 
regressivity, but not by much. The result of one of these studies is shown in Table 
8.2. The table shows that under a broad based 10-percent value-added tax, the lowest 
income class would pay tax equal to 14 percent of income while the wealthiest 
families would pay consumption tax equal to 1.6 percent of income. If the tax base 
is narrowed to zero-rate (i.e., to remove tax on) home-prepared food, medicine, and 
utilities, the lowest income class would pay tax equal to 9.3 percent of income while 
the tax on the highest income class would remain almost unchanged at 1.5 percent of 
income.
Table 8.2
Effective Tax Rates Across Income Classes of a 
Broad-Based VAT and of a VAT Excluding Necessities
Adjusted Gross Income ($ thousands)
Proposal 0 -
10
10-
15
15-
20
2 0 -
30
3 0 -
50
5 0 -
100
100-
200
+20
0
(1) 10% Broad- 
Based VAT 14.0% 9.1% 7.5% 6.3% 5.1% 4.0% 3.1% 1.6
%
(2) 10% VAT 
excluding Food, 
Medicine, and Utilities
9.3% 6.3% 5.3% 4.5% 3.8% 3.1% 2.6% 1.5
%
(3) 13.7% VAT 
excluding Food, 
Medicine, and Utilities 
(equal revenue to (1))
12.8% 8.6% 7.2% 6.2% 5.2% 4.2% 3.6% 2.1
%
Source: Brashares, Spreyer, and Carlson (1988), p. 171.
Furthermore, in order to make up for the revenue loss by zero-rating 
necessities, the overall tax rate must be increased. In this case, the 10-percent rate 
must be increased from 10 to 13.7 percent. As a result, the net absolute impact on the 
poor as a result of zero-rating of necessities is small. Under a narrow-based tax, the
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lowest income classes would pay tax equal to 12.8 percent of income compared to the 
14 percent they would pay under a broad-based VAT that generated the same amount 
of revenue.
3. Tax Credits and Transfer Payments
Another method of alleviating the regressivity of a consumption tax is to 
increase the availability of tax credits or transfer payments to low-income households. 
This type of relief from a consumption tax could take a variety o f forms.
a. Expansion o f  the EITC
The earned income tax credit primarily provides refundable income tax credits 
to low-income working families who have children.88 The credit was significantly 
expanded as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993. The advantage of 
further expanding the EITC to offset the regressivity o f a consumption tax is that the 
administrative structure is already in place and, because it is refundable, the credit can 
provide benefits to families who do not pay income tax. The major shortcoming of the 
credit as it is currently structured is that it does not help the poor who are not working 
or who do not have children. There are also substantial problems of fraudulent claims 
for the EITC.89
b. Payroll Tax Credit
Allowing consumption taxes to be credited against payroll taxes is another 
method of alleviating regressivity. (This is a feature of the Nunn-Domenici proposal.) 
Currently, payroll taxes are imposed in equal amounts on employers and employees. 
Each pays a tax of 7.65 percent on the first $61,200 (1995 level) of wages and 1.45 
on all wages above that amount. Given this rate structure, and the absence of standard 
deductions and personal exemptions, the payroll tax is a highly regressive tax. A 
payroll tax credit would be somewhat broader than the EITC because it applies to all 
workers regardless of family status. Moreover, the credit can provide relief without 
refunds for many low-income working families because the payroll tax applies to 
every dollar of wages while the income tax only applies after personal exemptions 
and deductions. If the credit is not refundable, it can avoid encountering some of the 
fraud problems that plague the EITC. However, a payroll tax credit does not help the
88Under changes instituted as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, some limited relief is available 
to working families without children.
89See, for example, Steuerle (1995).
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poor who are unemployed. The payroll tax credit also would not alleviate the burden 
on certain low-income retirees who depend on small amounts o f dividend and interest 
income.
c. New Broad-Based Refundable Tax Credit
An alternative to a payroll tax credit or an expansion o f the EITC would be to 
implement a new refundable credit (or, equivalently, undertake a significant 
restructure o f the EITC such that it applied to all low-income individuals regardless 
of family or employment status). Ideally, such a credit would be equal or proportional 
to the burden of the consumption tax on low-income households. If  successful, such 
a program would greatly expand the administrative and compliance costs because 
millions of low-income households who now do not file tax returns would be required 
to file.
There may be a problem of insufficient participation. State experience with 
programs designed to provide relief from sales taxes has not generally been successful 
in inducing low-income individuals to file tax returns to obtain refunds.90 Compared 
to a state credit, the filing rate for a national tax credit might be improved by greater 
public awareness (e.g., because of television) and by a larger amount o f credit that 
might be available from a tax with a rate high enough to replace the revenues lost by 
the current income tax. On the other hand, there could be a problem o f too much 
participation--i.e., fraud--as there has been for the EITC.
d. Transfer Payments
Yet another method of alleviating the regressivity of a consumption tax would 
be to work entirely outside of the tax system by increasing government transfer 
payments to low-income households. It is important, though, to note that some 
government transfer payments would likely increase automatically with the 
imposition of a business consumption tax. This is because many existing programs 
automatically index their benefits for inflation. If  a household receives all o f its 
income in the form of indexed transfer payments, the household will be fully 
insulated from the effects o f the tax (e.g., a 10-percent rise in the price level due to 
a 10-percent VAT will be matched by a 10-percent increase in government support.) 
Examples of indexed transfer payments include Social Security and Federal employee 
retirement benefits.
90There have been some successes at the State level. See, Kuttner (1987) for discussion o f New Mexico’s 
experience with a refundable tax credit.
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However, many transfer payments are not indexed for inflation, and many low- 
income taxpayers bearing the burden of a consumption tax may not be receiving any 
significant assistance from the government. Examples of transfer payments not 
indexed for inflation are unemployment benefits and AFDC benefits.
Upon imposition of a consumption tax, the Federal government could mandate 
increases in non-indexed transfers to offset the impact of the tax. In addition, the 
government might use the revenues from a consumption tax to expand eligibility for 
existing programs or to fund entirely new programs. While such benefits would not 
be captured in standard distributional tables that only record the impacts o f taxation, 
they would in fact offset the burden of a consumption tax.
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Appendix 8A
Why Consumption Taxes May Not Be Regressive
This chapter explored the center stage of the political debate about income 
distribution and income taxes: how consumption taxes may be made less regressive. 
This appendix examines the somewhat more academic arguments as to why 
consumption taxes might not be as regressive as they first appear. Although these 
arguments have not yet received attention in the political arena-even proponents of 
consumption taxes do not frequently espouse them—this is unlikely to remain the case 
if  consumption taxes undergo thorough consideration.
A. A Broader View o f  Government Redistribution
The tax system has a major impact on the distribution of income, but so do a 
wide variety of government programs. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are just some of the 
Federal government’s spending programs that collectively amount to a massive 
redistribution of wealth across income classes and across generations. Some argue 
that it is misleading and arbitrary to focus attention on the distributional effects of the 
tax system without looking at the uses of government revenues as well. For example, 
in analyses of the "fairness" of the tax system it is common practice to include 
refundable earned income tax credits (Internal Revenue Code Section 32) in the 
distributional analysis, but AFDC payments (not in the Code)-though in many ways 
functionally equivalent—are not included. Certainly one’s views about the 
appropriateness of a heavy tax burden on the poor should take into account the use 
of those revenues. A greater tax burden on low-income households may be more 
tolerable if  those revenues are used to provide food, medical care, and education to 
the poor. Nevertheless, the notion of including both taxes and transfers in 
distributional analyses has received remarkably little attention.
B, Economic Growth
Changes in tax law simultaneously may affect the overall amount of national 
income as well as its distribution. In its official distributional analyses, the Federal 
government generally holds economic growth constant. (The main reason for this is 
that there is a great deal of dispute and uncertainty about the impact of taxes on the 
overall economy.) Thus, government distribution analyses assume tax policy is a 
zero-sum game.
Despite the difficulties with precise quantification, most economists 
acknowledge that a replacement consumption tax will increase economic growth— 
particularly in the long run. Many would consider it particularly misleading to 
assume economic growth will be unaffected in a distributional analysis of a
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replacement consumption tax. Even if  the relative burden of some income classes 
increases, it may be possible for all income classes to be better off if  all incomes rise 
sufficiently.
C. Incidence
It is critical to recognize that the burden or "incidence" of a tax is not always 
on those writing checks to the government. For example, there is much dispute about 
whether the burden of the corporate income tax is borne by shareholders of 
corporations. To some degree the burden may be shared by the owners of all 
businesses (because rates of return are driven lower), by business customers (because 
prices rise), or by employees (because wages fall) as a result of the tax.
In the case of consumption taxes, the general consensus among economists is 
that the tax is passed forward to consumers in the form of higher prices. There is one 
important caveat, however. If the Federal Reserve does not "accommodate" the 
introduction of a consumption tax with an increase in the money supply, it is unlikely 
prices can rise.91 In this case, economists believe the burden of the tax would be 
passed backward to employees in the form of lower wages. If this were to occur, 
consumption taxes would still be regressive because wages account for a larger 
percentage of income among low-income households than high-income households. 
Still, there is an important difference between a consumption tax that increases prices 
and a consumption tax that would reduce wages: the non-working poor who did not 
receive government support indexed to inflation would bear a considerably lower 
diminished burden under a consumption tax that resulted in lower wages. Thus, there 
must always be much uncertainty about how the burden would be shared among low- 
income households because it depends so much on the actions of an independent 
Federal Reserve.
It is also important to note that the substantial uncertainty about the incidence 
of the corporate income tax can have a large impact on the consumption tax debate. 
Almost all major consumption tax proposals call for elimination of the corporate 
income tax. If the burden of this tax is perceived to be on capital, it is a progressive 
tax. This is the current view of the Treasury Department.92 On the other hand, some 
commentators believe the burden of the corporation is passed along—at least partially
91One of the less controversial propositions of macroeconomics is that changes in the money supply are highly 
correlated with changes in the price level.
92See, for example, Toder (1995).
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-to the consumer in the form of higher prices. The more the corporate income tax is 
considered progressive, the more difficult it will be for new consumption tax 
proposals to maintain distributional neutrality to current law.93
D. Redefining Regressivity
Perhaps the notion that is most damaging to the idea that consumption taxes 
are regressive is recognition that fairness should not be evaluated by comparing taxes 
paid as a percentage of annual income. The problem with using annual income as a 
measure of economic well-being is that many households with low annual incomes 
are not really poor. Many individuals with significant wealth earn relatively little 
current income. Sometimes this is due to transitions in and out of the workforce (e.g., 
career switching, child rearing, temporary layoffs.) In other cases, relatively well-off 
individuals may earn low incomes because they have not yet entered the workforce 
(e.g., graduate students) or they have retired. Trying to alleviate the burden of these 
individuals should not receive the same priority as families with similar incomes and 
no wealth, but this type of distinction is not often made in distribution analyses.
It is sometimes advocated that annual consumption rather than annual income 
is a better measure of economic well-being. Some argue that each individual should 
be taxed on consumption rather than on income because income is what one "puts 
into” the economy while consumption is what one "takes out." The more accepted 
argument is that wealth or lifetime income are better measures of economic well being 
than annual income, and consumption is a good proxy for measuring wealth or 
lifetime income.94 Although there is some dissent, the notion that lifetime income is 
a better approximation of economic well-being has wide acceptance by economists. 
The major issue is not so much with the concept but with the practical application of 
the concept. It is much more difficult to measure lifetime income than annual income.
Despite considerable uncertainty about the details, there is little doubt that any 
movement away from annual income and toward lifetime income as a measure of 
economic well-being will make consumption taxes appear considerably less 
regressive.
93Uncertainty about the incidence of the corporate income tax has caused Congressional analysts to simply 
exclude the tax from its distributional analysis. For a review of issues surrounding official distribution analysis, 
see Sullivan (1995).
94Most economists accept the notion that—in general—changes in consumption are highly correlated with 
changes in wealth or lifetime income. On the other hand, annual income varies considerably from year to year and 
is not as closely related to wealth.
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PART IV. SOME IMPORTANT DETAILS
Chapter 9
The Impact of Consumption Taxes on Business: 
Some Basics
Summary
• In  order to assess the impact o f  a replacement consumption tax, 
businesses should take into account:
• tax liability under a consumption tax (over several years)
• potential changes in the economy
• potential elimination o f  current tax preferences
• transition provisions
• changing impacts over the business cycle
• the impact on financial statements
• The corporate income tax is a tax on a small slice o f  business income: 
only income from equity-financed capital in corporate form  is subject to tax. In 
contrast, a value-added tax is a tax on income from  both debt and equity—and it 
taxes the capital income generated by partnerships, Subchapter S  corporations, 
and sole proprietorships as well as corporations.
• M ore importantly, a value-added tax is also a tax on all wages paid  by 
business to employees. For most businesses, total wages and benefits are many 
times larger than total interest, dividends, and retained earnings.
• Most value-added taxes provide substantial relief fo r firms that export and 
fo r  firm s with large new investment in plant and equipment.
• Nevertheless, on net, the value-added tax base is many times larger than 
the income tax base fo r  most firms. Whether or not a business has a lower tax 
liability under a replacement VAT depends on whether rates can be sufficiently 
reduced to offset the increased tax burden due to base broadening.
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For economists it is all very simple. Businesses should not be greatly 
concerned about their tax liability under a consumption tax. Once the economy has 
fully adjusted to the imposition of a consumption tax, there will be no burden on 
business. In response to a consumption tax, prices will rise and the burden will be 
passed forward to customers in higher prices. There is no adverse effect on after-tax 
profits.
Businesses, however, are not so sure. The abstractions of economists--the 
"market forces" that make pricing adjustments--are the everyday reality faced by 
business. Businesses cannot take for granted that consumption taxes can be 
automatically passed forward in the form of higher prices without any adverse impact 
on their sales or market share. Therefore, businesses want to know (1) whether they 
pay more or less tax under a consumption tax than an income tax and (2) the relative 
burden of each consumption tax. Politicians, in turn, also wish to determine these 
impacts in order to ascertain political support and opposition to various plans.
It is inevitable that current consumption tax proposals will be revised and many 
new consumption proposals will introduced. At this stage in the process, it is 
probably more important for businesses to grasp concepts rather than details about 
how consumption taxes can affect businesses. Unfortunately, the instincts of experts 
schooled in income taxation are not particularly helpful under the proposed new 
regimes. This chapter tries to help readers become familiar with the new issues that 
businesses may confront under a consumption tax.
The analysis is divided into five parts. Part A focuses on the impact o f tax 
changes on tax liability—that is, the actual amount of taxes paid. Part B focuses on 
the impact o f changes in the economy that might result from imposition of a 
replacement consumption tax. Part C discusses the impact o f the elimination of tax 
preferences. Part D examines certain issues that arise in the transition from an 
income to a consumption tax. And Part E looks at how consumption taxes and 
income taxes differ in their treatment of business over the business cycle and over the 
firm's own life cycle.
A. Direct Impacts on Business Tax Liability
1. Retail Sales Tax
Under a national sales tax, only retail businesses collect taxes. Therefore, if 
all income taxes were repealed, businesses without retail sales would entirely escape 
tax liability (along with approximately 130 million individual tax filers). Retailers 
would bear the bulk of the burden in terms of compliance costs as well as actual 
liability.
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2. Individual Consumption Tax
Under an individual consumption tax, only individuals pay tax. If all income 
taxes are repealed, businesses would be entirely exempt from tax. Moreover, there 
would be no direct impact on prices because businesses would not have any tax 
burden to pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
2. Value-Added Taxes
Unlike gross receipts (the base of the sales tax) or profits (the base of business 
income taxes), value added is not a concept that is routinely encountered by tax 
professionals in the United States. Nor is the concept of value added included on 
financial statements. Therefore, the impact of a replacement value-added tax on a 
business's tax liability usually cannot be easily determined. The income tax base and 
a value-added tax base are vastly different. The major differences are summarized 
in Table 9.1 (Question marks indicate that not all major consumption taxes have that 
particular feature.)
Table 9.1
Comparison of a VAT to an Income Tax
Major Advantages o f  a VAT
1. Expensing of Capital Purchases
2. Exemption of Exports from Taxable Receipts (?)
3. Foreign Subsidiaries Exempt from Tax
4. Lower Rate (?)
5. Payroll Tax Credit (?)
Major Disadvantages o f  a VAT
1. Interest Not Deductible
2. Wages not Deductible (?)
3. Fringe Benefits Not Deductible
4. Import Duty (?)
5. Noncorporate Business Subject to Business Tax
6. Local Taxes Not Deductible (?)
7. Tax Credits and Other Tax Benefits Repealed (?)
With all o f these major changes—some major benefits, some major drawbacks--it is 
nearly impossible to know which businesses would be hurt and which would benefit 
by a switch to a value-added tax without detailed analysis.
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To begin the comparison of business tax liability under income and value- 
added taxes, this section examines a purely domestic firm, i.e., a firm with no 
overseas operations and no international transactions. For the moment also, the all- 
important issue of tax rates will be put aside in order to focus on differences between 
income and consumption tax bases.
a. The Nondeductibility o f  Interest and Wages
Unlike the income tax, a value-added tax does not include any deductions for 
wages or for interest expenses. As illustrated in the following example, these changes 
from current law unambiguously broaden the business tax base.
Table 9.2
Example of the Impact of Nondeductibility 
o f  Wage a nd Interest on  th e  Tax Base
INCOM E TAX SUBTRACTION
VAT
SALES 100 SALES 100
PURCHASES 50 PURCHASES 50
15 DEPRECIATION 15
DEPRECIATION
WAGES 25
INTEREST 3
TOTAL COSTS 93 TOTAL COSTS 65
PROFIT 7 VALUE-ADDED95 35
For many leveraged firms, the loss o f interest deductions could be a major setback96 
In general, however, the loss of deduction for wages and fringe benefits will have a 
much larger impact. The significance of the loss of the deduction for wages and 
fringe benefits can hardly be overemphasized. Even for the most capital intensive 
firms, wages are usually many times larger than total profits. In the example, the
95In this example, value-added is calculated using the income method, i.e., capital costs are recovered over time 
rather than expensed. All current proposals for a value-added tax allow expensing so that the tax is a consumption 
tax. (See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further discussion of why expensing makes a value-added tax a 
consumption tax.) Expensing is discussed in subsection b that immediately follows.
96In 1992, for example, corporations had taxable income of approximately $570 billion and interest deductions 
of approximately $597 billion. See, Statistics o f  Income Bulletin, Fall (1994), p. 181. Thus, for the corporate 
sector as a whole, loss of the interest deduction would approximately double the tax base.
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value-added tax base is five times larger than the income tax base. This broadening 
of the tax base is primarily attributable to the nondeductibility o f wages. As shall be 
seen in Chapter 12, when actual data for the U.S. economy are examined, changes in 
the tax base of this order of magnitude are not uncommon. In fact, for most firms 
they are likely to be larger.
b. The Temporary and Permanent Benefits o f  Expensing
The prior example neglected one important benefit that is common to all 
current VAT proposals: in lieu of deductions for capital recovery, businesses will be 
allowed to expense capital purchases. Expensing provides a significant benefit from 
newly purchased capital. The acceleration of capital recovery to the first year 
provides a tax benefit that is (under reasonable conditions) approximately equivalent 
to tax exemption for all income generated by the capital being expensed.
In the context of the income tax, expensing provides enormous benefits. 
Newly purchased capital is effectively exempt from the tax. Moreover, if  newly 
purchased capital is financed with debt, the combination of the deduction for interest 
and newly purchased capital can easily generate more deductions than income. In this 
case, effective tax rates on new capital are driven below zero, that is, the purchase of 
new capital is not only exempt from tax, it generates deductions that may be used to 
shelter other income.
In the context of the value-added tax, however, the benefit of expensing—while 
significant--is not so dominant. As under the income tax, expensing effectively 
exempts the income from new capital. For highly-leveraged firms, however, interest 
deductibility provided near total exemption from the income tax. For these firms, the 
loss of interest deductibility by itself may entirely offset any benefit from expensing. 
Nevertheless, the loss of deductions for wages is far more important. Because income 
from capital is a relatively small component of total value added for most firms, the 
favorable impact of expensing on a firm’s tax liability in almost all cases will be more 
than completely offset by the inclusion of labor costs in the tax base.
i. Permanent Effects
Although usually small compared to wage costs, the impact o f expensing is 
still important. In order to better understand them, it is useful to distinguish 
permanent effects from temporary effects. Over the long term, the benefit of 
expensing amounts to the replacement of a depreciation deduction by a deduction for 
new capital purchases. On average, it can be expected that a deduction for expensing 
will be somewhat larger than a deduction for depreciation. For example, if  a firm 
grows at a rate of five percent annually and writes off its capital over ten years (using 
the straight-line method), it will have an expensing deduction approximately 33
80
percent larger than its depreciation deduction. For the economy as a whole, the 
National Income and Product Accounts published by the Commerce Department 
indicate new capital expenditures are approximately 45 percent larger than economic 
depreciation.97 Changes of this order o f magnitude are illustrated in the following 
example:
Table 9.3
Example of the Impact of Expensing 
on the VAT Base
SUBTRACTION
VAT
(income method)
SUBTRACTION
VAT (consumption 
method)
SALES 100 SALES 100
PURCHASES 50 PURCHASES 50
DEPRECIATION 15 EXPENSING 20
TOTAL COSTS 65 TOTAL COSTS 70
VALUE-ADDED98 35 VALUE-ADDED99 30
ii. Temporary Impacts
A larger impact of a switch from depreciation to expensing occurs in the short­
term while taxpayers are able to deduct depreciation of existing capital in addition to 
expensing new capital purchases. (There is some issue as to whether these transition 
deductions should be allowed or modified, but almost all proposals currently under 
consideration provide such relief.) Over time, o f course, these effects become 
increasingly less important.
Because of these types of timing issues, commonly employed "snap shot" cash 
flow analyses of changes in tax liability due to a replacement VAT can be misleading 
-particularly for capital-intensive firms. Consider the following stylized example 
where a highly capital-intensive business that is not growing has 100 each of income, 
capital purchases, and depreciation (straight-line over 10 years) annually.
97Economic Report o f the President (1995).
98In this example, value added is calculated using the income method; i.e., capital costs are recovered over time 
rather than expensed. All current proposals for a value-added tax allow expensing so that the tax is a consumption 
tax. (See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further discussion of why expensing makes a value-added tax a 
consumption tax.)
99In this example, value added is calculated using the consumption method, i.e., capital costs are expensed.
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Table 9.4
Example of Differences in VAT Liability 
During and After Transition
C urrent
Law
VAT
Year 1
VAT
Y ear 5
VAT
Y ear 10
SALES 100 100 100 100
Less
PURCHASES (80) (80) (80) (80)
DEPRECIATION (10) (9) (5) 0
EXPENSING 0 (10) (10) (10)
INTEREST (5) 0 0 0
TAX BASE 5 1 5 10
Under the current income tax, this business can deduct depreciation and interest 
expense. Under a subtraction method VAT, the business can expense new capital 
purchases and--during the transition-depreciation on capital in-place prior to the 
effective date of the new consumption tax. At the beginning of the transition period, 
the loss o f interest deductions is offset by the ability to expense combined with 
deductibility of transition depreciation. This advantage dissipates over time as older 
capital is discarded. In this example, by year 10, depreciation allowances for existing 
capital are no longer available and--on a cash flow basis--the taxpayer has a larger tax 
base than under the income tax.
c. Impact o f  a Replacement VAT on International Business
There are three major impacts o f a value-added tax on international business: 
(1) the exclusion of exports from the tax base, (2) the taxation of imports, and (3) the 
exemption of foreign subsidiaries and branches of U.S. businesses from U.S. tax. As 
noted in Chapter 7, the exclusion of exports and the taxation of imports—the so-called 
"border tax adjustments"--are necessary to effect the destination principle. Under the 
destination principle, final goods and services are taxed where they are consumed, not 
where they are produced. With one very notable exception—the Armey Flat Tax— 
almost all consumption taxes are administered in a manner consistent with the 
destination principle.
i. Exports
The exclusion o f exports from taxable gross receipts can have enormous 
impacts on some firm’s tax liability. This is illustrated in the following example.
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Table 9.5
Examples of the Importance of Exports 
on VAT Liability
EXPORT-INTENSITY
NO ABOVE
EXPORTS AVERAGE AVERAGE
A. CORPORATE INCOM E TAX
DOMESTIC 1000 950 600
RECEIPTS
EXPORTS 0 50 400
TOTAL RECEIPTS 1000 1000 1000
Less
PURCHASES (500) (500) (500)
WAGES (300) (300) (300)
DEPRECIATION (100) (100) (100)
TAXABLE (900) (900) (900)
INCOME 100 100 100
CORP. TAX @35% 22 22 22
B. VALUE-ADDED TAX
DOMESTIC
RECEIPTS 1000 950 600
Less
PURCHASES (500) (500) (500)
DEPRECIATION (50) (50) (50)
EXPENSING (100) (100) (100)
(650) (650) (650)
VALUE-ADDED 350 300 -50
VAT @20% 22 62 -10
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ii. Imports
Import duties imposed under consumption taxes unambiguously increase 
business tax liabilities. Obviously, greater reliance on imports results in greater 
tax, as illustrated in the following example.
Table 9.6
Example of the Importance of 
  Imports on  VAT L iability
IMPORT-INTENSITY
NO ABOVE
IMPORTS AVERAGE AVERAGE
A. CORPORATE INCOM E TAX
RECEIPTS 1000 1000 1000
PURCHASES
DOMESTIC (500) (450) (300)
IMPORTS 0 (50) (200)
Less
WAGES (300) (300) (300)
DEPRECIATION (100) (100) (100)
(900) (900) (900)
TAXABLE
INCOME 100 100 100
CORP. TAX @35% 25 25 25
B. VALUE-ADDED TAX
RECEIPTS
Less
1000 1000 1000
PURCHASES
DOMESTIC (500) (450) (300)
IMPORTS (0) (50) (200)
DEPRECIATION (50) (50) (50)
EXPENSING ( 100) ( 100) (100)
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VALUE-ADDED
(650)
350
(650)
350
(650)
350
PLUS
IMPORTS 0 50 200
VAT BASE 350 400 550
VAT @20% 22 80 110
It is important to stress here that the burden of an import duty need not be direct. For 
example, clothing manufactured abroad may result in higher costs for clothing 
retailers even when retailers purchase their products from wholesalers who do the 
importing. It is also important not to examine the impacts of the import tax in 
isolation. Import prices indeed may rise, but it is also possible (as claimed by 
economists) that the cost of domestically produced goods is likely to rise 
commensurately. If this is the case, importers should expect increases in costs, but 
they should not feel singled out--or necessarily expect any advantages of switching 
to domestic suppliers.
iii. Exemption o f  Foreign Subsidiaries
All consumption tax proposals exempt foreign subsidiaries and branches of 
U.S. businesses from tax. (This is known as a "territorial" tax system.) Under the 
current system, U.S. businesses are subject to tax on their worldwide income. 
However, it is standard practice among nations to give host countries primary tax 
jurisdiction over multinationals operating outside their home country. The United 
States grants U.S. multinational corporations a tax credit for taxes paid. U.S. firms 
can only incur U.S. tax liability on their foreign source income if  the average tax rate 
on foreign source income is below the U.S. rate. Although there are numerous 
exceptions, the vast majority of foreign source income is subject to relatively little 
U.S. tax.100
For most firms, the change in tax liability resulting from a switch from the 
current system (taxation of worldwide income with foreign tax credits) to a territorial 
system will not result in enormous changes in tax liability. However, tax compliance 
and international tax planning will be vastly simplified. (This is true, of course, only
100Obviously, the whole system of U.S. tax treaties—based on U.S. worldwide corporate and individual income 
taxation—would have to be thoroughly re-examined if the U.S. system were replaced with a territorial, 
consumption tax.
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with regard to U.S. Federal income tax. Businesses still have to contend with 
numerous issues that result from income taxes imposed by state as well as foreign 
governments.)
There are at least three areas where tax considerations will be changed 
dramatically under a territorial system:
First, there are location decisions. Under current U.S. tax law, it is highly 
advantageous for U.S. multinational corporations to “average” income from a high-tax 
jurisdiction (like Germany) with income from a low-tax jurisdiction (like Ireland). 
Thus, under the current system, a U.S. multinational corporation with an existing 
facility in Germany can reap substantial benefits by opening a second facility in 
Ireland. Conversely, a U.S. multinational with a single facility in Ireland will not 
necessarily bear the full burden of high German tax rates if a second facility is opened 
in Germany. Real world fact patterns are more complex, but the net result is that 
current tax considerations in location decisions must take into account the interaction 
of new taxes on the existing web of U.S. liabilities. Under a territorial system, the net 
tax burden of locating in a jurisdiction will depend only on the tax rate in that 
jurisdiction.
On net, one would expect a switch in the composition of investment away from 
high-tax countries to low-tax countries. Currently, the effective tax rate on 
investment in low-tax countries is somewhere between the foreign tax rate and U.S. 
tax rate. Under a territorial system, the effective rate of tax would be the foreign rate. 
This would encourage investment in low-tax countries. Currently, the effective tax 
rate in high-tax countries is somewhere between the high foreign tax rate and the U.S. 
tax rate. Under a territorial system, the rate of tax would be the high foreign rate. 
This would discourage investment in high-tax countries.
Second, there is the issue of repatriation. Under current U.S. law, profits of 
overseas subsidiaries are only taxable when subsidiaries pay dividends to their U.S. 
parent or when subsidiaries become subject to any of a number of complex anti­
deferral rules. Under a replacement VAT, anti-deferral rules would be eliminated. 
Moreover, the timing of repatriation of profits would not be an issue because this 
would no longer be a taxable event.
Finally, for both U.S. multinational corporations operating abroad and foreign 
multinationals operating in the United States, transfer pricing would no longer be an 
issue for Federal tax purposes. This follows not from the tax being territorial, but is
86
the result of border tax adjustments.101 When a foreign multinational imports from 
a related corporation, U.S. tax must be paid on the import price, but reducing the 
import price only commensurately increases U.S. tax (by reducing deductions for 
purchased inputs). So the total tax on a foreign multinational is unaffected by how 
prices are set by related parties. Similarly, there is no advantage to manipulating 
export prices because gross receipts are entirely exempt from tax in any case. The 
following example shows the tax liability o f a dealer importing televisions from a 
related manufacturer at $125 and $150. In both cases, total U.S. tax liability is the 
same.
Table 9.7
Example of the Irrelevance of Transfer Prices
For a Border Adjustable VAT
A. High Transfer Price B. Low Transfer Price
Gross Receipts
Cost of Imports 
Value-Added
200
(150)
50
Gross Receipts
Cost of Imports 
Value-Added
200
(125)
75
VAT @10% 5 VAT @10% 7.5
Import Duty @10% 15 Import Duty @10% 12.5
Total U.S. Tax 20 Total U.S. Tax =22
d . Impact o f  a Replacement VAT on Noncorporate Business
Under a replacement VAT, all businesses—including Subchapter S 
corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships as well as other pass-through entities— 
would be subject to tax. If VAT revenues were used solely to replace the corporate 
income tax, the new tax would undoubtedly represent a major new burden for non­
corporate businesses—particularly service businesses with few inputs other than labor.
Most consumption tax proposals, however, usually include individual and 
payroll tax relief as well. In these cases, it is not always clear whether a replacement 
consumption tax will hurt noncorporate business. Under many reasonable scenarios, 
it is possible for owners of noncorporate business to be better off under a replacement 
consumption tax. For example, in a system that repealed the current individual and
101Because there are no border tax adjustments under the Armey Flat Tax, there would still be incentive to 
manipulate transfer prices. However, the nature of these incentives may be different than under the prevailing 35- 
percent corporate income tax. Because of the low rate of tax under the Armey plan (17 percent, after a transition 
period), there would generally be an incentive (except in the case of transactions with related companies operating 
in tax havens with accumulated net operating losses) to set transfer prices of exports high and transfer prices of 
imports low.
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corporate income tax system and replaced it with a 25 percent VAT (and assuming 
no changes in payroll taxes), a sole proprietorship with $1 million o f wage and profits 
paid to its owner would incur $250,000 of tax liability (and no individual tax) under 
the VAT but would pay well over $300,000 of individual income tax under current 
law.
The treatment o f noncorporate businesses highlights the importance of looking 
at changes to the taxation of individual as well as businesses per se. The impact of 
the total (i.e., both entity and individual) tax impact on noncorporate businesses will 
be examined more closely in the following chapters after the details of both the 
individual and business tax components of new consumption tax proposals have been 
discussed.
e. Tax Rates
It is easy to get lost in technicalities and forget about the important, but simple, 
details. Obviously, the rate of consumption tax is critical. What rate is reasonable 
to expect? There are several possible answers, and they are all over the lot.
Early press reports about the Nunn-Domenici Tax indicated the rate of tax for 
the plan’s business subtraction method VAT could be as low as 9 percent. Its rate on 
introduction was 11 percent. (The Nunn-Domenici plan also includes a individual 
consumption tax with rates as high as 40 percent.102)
The Armey Flat Tax has a rate of 17-percent (after a transition period with a 
rate o f 19 percent.) The Armey legislation, however, also includes substantial 
controls on government spending. So the tax provisions by themselves are not 
revenue neutral. The Treasury Department has estimated that a revenue-neutral rate 
for the Armey plan would be approximately 24 percent.
As indicated earlier, a broad based VAT would have required a rate of 25 
percent to make up revenues for repealing both the individual and corporate income 
tax. If payroll taxes were also repealed, the rate would have to be about 33 percent. 
If preferential treatment were granted, rates could even be higher.
 
In summary, legislation introduced to date has used rates far below the current 
35-percent corporate rate. However, as seen from the following table, anything is 
possible.103 The table shows that replacing revenues lost due to the repeal of the 
individual income tax would require imposition of a VAT with a rate of 19.5 percent.
102The rate as high as 40 percent starts at $24,000 or less.
103Data are from Congressional Budget Office (1995), p. 332 and p. 393.
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Replacing the corporate income tax would add 4.2 percent to the VAT rate. And 
replacing the payroll taxes would add 15.6 percent to the VAT rate. To totally 
replace the current tax system would require a consumption tax rate in excess o f 40 
percent. This does not include higher rates that might be required to account for any 
permanent or transitional relief.
Table 9.8
Tax Rates Required to Raise Revenue 
Sufficient to Replace Current U.S. Taxes
Year 2000 
($Billions) 
Revenue
Replacement 
VAT Rate
Cumulative
Increase in
VAT R ate
5%  Broad Based VAT $198.3 5.0% -
Individual Income Tax $772 19.5% 19.5%
C orporate Income Tax $167 4.2% 23.7%
Business Payroll Tax $309 7.8% 31.5%
Individual Payroll Tax $309 7.8% 39.3%
Estate and Gift Tax $ 20 0.5% 39.8%
Excise Taxes $ 59 1.5% 41.3%
B. Indirect Impact on Business Through Economic Changes
1. Can Economic Benefits Be Realized?
The most-cited reason for enacting a replacement consumption tax is its overall 
positive impact on economic growth. The underlying economic reasoning is basically 
this: the replacement of an income tax with a consumption tax increases the after-tax 
return to saving and removes the penalty income taxes impose on saving. To the 
extent this increase in after-tax returns increases saving, it is likely that interest rates 
will drop and domestic capital formation will increase. Increases in domestic capital 
formation means that workers will have more capital to work with and be more 
productive. In the long run, this means a higher standard of living and a larger 
economy. The potential economic changes that might result from a replacement 
consumption tax are listed in Table 9.9.
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Table 9.9
Summary of Potential Macroeconomic Impacts 
o f  a Replacement Consumption Tax
• Increased Saving
• Reduced Consumer Spending
• Reduced (Before Tax) Interest Rates
• Increased Capital Formation
• Increased Overall Long-Term Growth
• Higher Prices (short term)
Despite the widespread acceptance of this reasoning in political circles, the 
reasoning is hardly iron-clad. For example, the numerous tax incentives for saving 
and investment already in the current income tax code leave some question as to 
whether the switch from the current system (which many economists characterize as 
a “hybrid income-consumption tax") to a pure consumption tax will really have that 
large an impact on the overall cost of new capital. Second, increased domestic saving 
may just be used to fund overseas investment that would have little impact on 
domestic capital formation and growth. Third, interest rates may be more influenced 
by the flow of international capital than domestic savings so interest rates may not be 
significantly impacted by changes in domestic saving.
These potential shortcomings in the economic reasoning in favor of 
consumption taxes are overshadowed by the central question of whether these 
changes in the after-tax return induced by saving have any impact on saving at all. 
This was discussed in some detail in Chapter 6. After decades of analysis and debate, 
it seems fair to say that no consensus has emerged in the economics profession as to 
the impact of a replacement consumption tax on saving. If there is a large impact on 
saving, then it is likely that interest rates will drop, domestic capital formation will 
increase, and productivity, wages, and the size of the overall economy will all 
increase. If  there is no significant impact on saving, there will be little impact on 
saving, interest rates, productivity, wages, and economic growth.
2. Uncertainty fo r  Business Planners
The problem for business planning is that either scenario is possible. 
Predictions are precarious because they depend on empirical economic analyses that 
are subject to dispute. Models used by economists are simply not reliable. Moreover, 
there is often a remarkable consistency between an economist's political views and
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the results of his or her economic analysis.104 Despite the conviction of many 
economists as to the impact of a consumption tax, it seems fair to say economic 
modeling has not sufficiently advanced to predict results with any degree o f certainty, 
and that the analysis using existing models is inconclusive.105
It will be important for businesses to sort through ideologically charged debate 
in order to ascertain the most likely economic impacts o f a consumption tax. 
Businesses cannot rule out the possibility that, as a result of enactment of a 
replacement consumption tax, overall business conditions might sufficiently improve 
so as to offset any negative effects (if any) of increased tax liability. Business also 
cannot rule out that there will not be any perceptible effects o f macroeconomic 
conditions as a result of the changes.
This is particularly difficult for businesses operating in sectors sensitive to 
changes in the macroeconomy. For example, financial service businesses may be 
more concerned about the impact of a consumption tax on their products than on 
direct tax liability. Firms that specialize in lending may be concerned about the new 
level playing field for debt and equity financing. Retailers may be concerned about 
declines in consumption and the higher cost of imports. Constructions firms and 
manufacturers of consumer durables may benefit from lower pre-tax rates o f interest.
C. Impact from  Loss o f Tax-Advantaged Treatment
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced or eliminated numerous special 
interest provisions, many remain. Their annual dollar value totals in the hundreds of 
billions.106 Their elimination would have a large impact on certain businesses--either 
directly on tax liability or indirectly through the impact on customers and suppliers.
Most consumption tax proposals currently under consideration eliminate 
numerous special tax benefits (known as "tax expenditures’’) available under existing 
law. To many businesses, preferential treatment under current law can provide 
significant benefits, and each business's overall appraisal o f a new consumption tax
104For example, it is quite common for economists of liberal persuasion to argue that saving and investment are 
unresponsive to changes in taxes while at the same time quite common for conservative economists to believe that 
saving and investment are responsive to tax changes.
105The United States has had extensive experience with the investment tax credit since its original enactment 
in 1962 until its repeal in 1986. Although there have been hundreds of studies of the impact of the investment tax 
credit, there is no consensus in the economics profession about the impact of the credit on investment.
106See, for example, United States Senate, Committee on the Budget (1992).
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may be dependent on whether or not preferential treatment is maintained under the 
new system. To help sort out some of these issues, it is useful to divide current tax 
expenditures into two categories.
7. Obsolete Tax Expenditures
First, there are those tax rules which provide treatment that is considered 
preferential under an income tax but would become standard under a consumption 
tax. For example, interest on most municipal bonds is exempt from tax under current 
law, and this is considered a major tax benefit. Under a consumption tax, all interest 
income would be exempt (or provide tax treatment that is largely equivalent to 
exemption). Thus, under a consumption tax municipal bond interest would continue 
to be tax-free but this would no longer be considered a tax benefit. This type of tax 
expenditure can be called an "obsolete tax expenditure.” A list of tax expenditures 
whose status would no longer be special is provided in Table 9.10. Most of these tax 
benefits are made obsolete by the elimination of tax on income from capital under a 
consumption tax. Some tax expenditures relating to international taxation, however, 
would no longer be tax benefit items because under a standard consumption tax 
exports are exempt from tax and because all foreign source income would be exempt 
from tax.
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Table 9.10
Obsolete Tax Expenditures:
Examples of Current Tax Preferences Eliminated Because 
They (or Their Equivalent) are Automatically Provided 
Under a Consumption Tax
(1) Exclusion of Employer Pension Contribution and Earnings
(2) Step-Up Basis on Capital Gains at Death
(3) Accelerated Depreciation
(4) Deferral of Capital Gains on Home Sales
(5) Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Debt
(6) Exclusion of Interest on Life Insurance Saving
(7) Preferential Treatment of Capital Gains
(8) Exception from the Passive Loss Rules for $25,000 of Rental Loss
(9) Net Exclusion of Individual Retirement Account Contributions
(10) Exclusion of Capital Gains on Home Sales for Persons Over the Age of 
55
(11) Possessions Tax Credit
(12) Expensing of R&D
(13) ESOP Benefits
(14) Deferral of Unrepatriated Foreign Source Income
(15) Expensing for Certain Small Investments
(16) Exclusion of Income of Foreign Sales Corporations
(17) Favorable Source Rules for Exported Goods
(18) Deferral of Interest on Savings Bonds
(19) Deferral of Income on Installment Sales
(20) Exclusion of Income earned Abroad by U.S. Citizens
(21) Expensing of Multiperiod Timber Growing Costs
(22) Deferral of Gains from Sales of Broadcasting Facilities to Minority 
Owned Business
(23) Special Rules for Allocation of Research Expenditures
(24) Expensing of Exploration and Development Costs
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Prior beneficiaries of tax expenditures made obsolete by a consumption tax may 
be hurt by the change even though they receive the same tax benefits under the new tax. 
This would happen because relative advantages have been eliminated by a consumption 
tax. For example, under current law, many products offered by life insurance companies 
provide unique tax advantages not available from products provided by banks and other 
financial firms. Elimination of these special provisions can impact businesses by 
eliminating competitive advantages.
It is still possible to restore these items to situations of relative tax advantage by 
providing them with even greater benefits than they receive under current law. It seems 
likely that there will be political pressures to retain preferential treatment for certain types 
of investments under a consumption tax. For example, under the consumption tax 
proposed by Senators Nunn and Domenici, interest on municipal bonds would remain tax 
exempt even though the purchase price of these bonds is deductible. Retaining this 
preferential treatment may solve some political difficulties, but it leaves the new 
consumption tax with the same economic distortions and administrative costs as current 
law.
2. Consumption Tax Expenditures
Second, there are tax benefits that could still be considered tax benefits after a 
switch to a consumption tax. For example, tax credits for research expenditures are 
equally viable under a consumption tax and an income tax. These types of tax 
expenditures can be called "consumption tax expenditures," and they are listed in Table 
9.11.
While obsolete tax expenditures are in effect automatically repealed by a 
replacement consumption tax, there is no mechanical linkage between a replacement 
consumption tax and repeal of consumption tax expenditures. For example, with regard 
to the research credit, all o f the policy reasons for enactment o f the credit remain intact 
under a consumption tax. Current rules for the research credit could remain largely 
unchanged. The only difference is that the credit would be used to reduce consumption 
rather than income taxes.107
107Because of differences in the tax base, there would be a difference in the utilization of tax credits. Because 
almost all firms, including start-ups, are taxable under a VAT, most firms would be able to use their credits 
immediately and would make little use of carryforward provisions.
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Table 9.11
Consumption Tax Expenditures:
Current Tax Preferences That Could Survive 
the Transition from Consumption to Income Tax
(1) Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Medical Insurance Premiums 
and Medical Care
(2) Deductibility of Mortgage Interest on Owner-Occupied Homes
(3) Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
(4) Deductibility of Charitable Contributions
(5) Exclusion of Social Security Benefits for Retired Workers
(6) Earned Income Credit
(7) Credit for Child and Dependent Care Expenses
(8) Low Income Housing Credit
(9) Exclusion of Benefits for Armed Forces Personnel
(10) Exclusion of Employer Provided Parking
(11) Exclusion of Veterans Disability Compensation
(12) Exclusion of Social Security Disability Benefits
(13) Additional Deduction for the Elderly
(14) Percentage Depletion
(15) R&E Credit
(16) Alternative Fuel Production Credit
(17) Exclusion of Scholarship and Fellowship Income
(18) Exclusion of Employer Provided Child Care
(19) Exclusion of Public Assistance Benefits
(20) Exclusion of Employee Meals and Lodging
(21) Parental Personal Exemption for Students Age 19 and Over
(22) Exclusion of Railroad Retirement System Benefits
(23) Targeted Jobs Credit
(24) Exemption of Credit Union Income
(25) Empowerment Zones
(26) Exclusion of Parsonages Allowances
(27) Special Rules for Allocation of research expenditures
(28) Deductibility of Casualty Losses
(29) Credit for Disable Access Expenditures
(30) Exclusion from Income of Conservation Subsidies Provided by Public 
Utilities
(31) Exclusion of Employer Premiums on Accident and Disability 
Insurance
(32) Small Life Insurance Company Deduction
(33) Exclusion of Military Disability Pensions
(34) Special Blue Cross/Blue Shield deduction
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(35) Tax Incentives for Preservation of Historic Structures
(36) Cancellation of Indebtedness
(37) Tax Exemption for Certain Insurance Companies
(38) Exclusion of Special Benefits for Disable Coal Miners
(39) Exclusion of Employer Provided Educational Assistance
(40) Investment Credit for Rehabilitation of Structures
(41) Exclusion of Veterans Pensions
(42) Expending of Certain Agricultural Outlays
(43) Exclusion of GI Bill Benefits
(44) New Technology Credit
(45) Tax Credit for Elderly and Disabled
(46) Special Rules for Mining Reclamation Reserves
(47) Tax Credit and Deduction for Clean-Burning Fuels
In general, it will probably be more difficult for Congress to eliminate 
consumption tax expenditures than those made obsolete by replacement o f income tax 
with a consumption tax. These tax provisions would not be eliminated out of logical 
necessity, but in the spirit o f tax reform. As noted in Chapter 1, except for the 
political dynamics, there is no particular reason to link the switch from an income tax 
to a consumption tax with elimination of these preferences. Nevertheless, most 
consumption tax proposals call for the elimination of most tax preferences (At one 
extreme, the Armey Flat Tax proposal repeals all special interest provisions.)
In all cases, businesses will want to carefully peruse these lists in order to 
determine which tax expenditures are of importance to their own tax liabilities as well 
as those of their customers, suppliers, and employees.
D. Transition Treatment
Although they often sound like nothing more than nebulous technicalities, the 
tax rules that govern the transition from an income tax to a new consumption tax can 
be of critical importance to some businesses.
In the context o f income tax legislation, "transition relief" has often been a 
euphemism for exceptions that postpone or otherwise mitigate adverse tax changes. 
These rules have served more to lubricate the political process rather than to address 
inconsistencies in the tax law. In contrast, special rules during a transition from an 
income tax to a consumption tax often are necessary to prevent retroactive tax 
increases on existing business operations. In many cases, the absence of special 
transition rules can result in businesses being haphazardly subject to tax penalties.
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These tax burdens serve no policy or political objective (except by dumb luck). In 
many cases, the incongruities between an income and consumption tax result in 
double taxation of income from business operations set in motion long before 
enactment.
There is no doubt that transition relief makes a replacement consumption tax 
more complex. During the transition, taxpayers may have to keep records to comply 
with rules relating to both the old and new tax regimes. Therefore, even if  the new 
tax system will ultimately be more simple than current law, during the transition it 
may be more complicated. Most consumption tax proposals have at least some 
transition relief. The major impediment to more complete transition relief is the steep 
revenue cost. To pay for transition provisions, most tax plans that include them must 
have higher tax rates during the transition period. Because of the added complexity 
and revenue cost, at least one prominent Member of Congress108 has advocated a 
"cold turkey" approach, that is, no transition relief for the switch from an income tax 
to a consumption tax.
1. Depreciation
The importance of transition depreciation deductions has already been noted 
in Chapter 3. If  businesses are not allowed deductions for depreciation allowances 
outstanding on the date of enactment of a replacement consumption tax, these existing 
assets will bear a tax penalty (i.e., bear a greater burden of tax than under existing 
law).109 This burden seems particularly harsh when contrasted with the treatment of 
newly-purchased capital which--due to availability of expensing-would be effectively 
exempt from tax. Without transition rules allowing depreciation of existing assets, a 
business making an investment in an asset shortly before the effective date will face 
a sharp increase in tax while those making the same investment shortly after 
enactment will be effectively tax exempt.
Because of the inherent difficulties of switching to an entirely new system, it 
is likely that many months or even years might transpire between the time of 
enactment (or the time when the likelihood of enactment seems certain) and the 
effective date o f a new replacement consumption tax. In this case, the stiff penalty 
on pre-enactment investment that results from the absence of transition relief could 
cause a severe slowdown in business investment. This slowdown would likely be 
followed by a rapid burst of investment once the favorable tax rules of the new regime 
became effective.
108Senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, Sam Gibbons of Florida.
109Closely related to this issue is the treatment of the sale of partially depreciated plant and equipment after 
enactment. Without special transition rules, the full sale proceeds will enter the tax base of the seller.
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2. Amortization o f  Existing Inventories
Most consumption tax proposals would allow items put into inventory and 
similar capitalized items to be deducted when purchased instead o f when used. Thus, 
unlike an income tax, a consumption tax allows deductions for additions to inventory. 
However, also unlike an income tax, reductions to inventory are not deductible unless 
special transition rules are put into effect In order to not penalize businesses, the 
balance of inventories and other capital items existing on the date of enactment should 
be deductible when balances drop below the date-of-enactment level. Otherwise, 
businesses will be denied deductions for legitimate costs.
3. Carryover o f  Net Operating Losses and Tax Credits
The availability of net operating losses can be an important source o f value for 
a firm that expects to be profitable in the future. If  net operating losses could not be 
used under a new business tax, there could be a substantial reduction in a firm’s value. 
Similarly, the inability to utilize unused business tax credits against a new business 
consumption tax could represent a substantial reduction in value for a business. On 
financial statements, unused operating losses and tax credits are shown as pre-paid 
tax assets. Their elimination would require a write-off of that asset.110 The most 
prominent business credits under existing law are the alternative minimum tax credit, 
the foreign tax credit, the credit for research expenditures, the alternative fuels credit, 
and the targeted jobs tax credit.111
4. Accrual-To Cash-Method Accounting
Many consumption tax proposals purport to place all businesses on the cash 
method of accounting. Special transition rules will need to be implemented to prevent 
double taxation. For example, income accrued on a transaction prior to the effective 
date o f a cash method consumption tax but subsequently determined uncollectable 
might not be allowed a bad debt deduction because such deductions are inconsistent 
with the cash method.112
110Even if losses can be used under the new system, their value may be reduced if the rate of tax is reduced. For 
a more general discussion of accounting issues under a new consumption tax, see Chapter 17, also see Gann and 
Strowd (1995).
111 When the investment tax credit was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, credits carried forward to 
taxable years after enactment were reduced by 35 percent.
112Not all transition rules need be beneficial to taxpayers. Some might argue that reserves for bad debts 
accumulated by thrift institutions and certain commercial banks should be taken into income before the expiration 
of an income tax.
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E. Impact Over the Business Cycle and Over the Life Cycle o f  a Firm
1. Business Cycles
Because profits are highly procyclical, taxes on profits have served as an 
“automatic stabilizer” for the economy—disproportionately increasing taxes when the 
economy is strong and disproportionately reducing taxes during recessions. Under 
an income tax, when business is bad, many firms can escape income tax entirely. 
Some are even able to collect refunds.
Although collections from a consumption tax are also likely to follow the 
business cycle, their variability (in percentage terms) will likely be far less than that 
o f a profits tax. The historical patterns are shown in Chart 9.1. The good news for 
business is that when profits are high, the burden of the consumption tax will not 
increase dramatically. On the other hand, because the largest component of value- 
added is wages, businesses experiencing severe financial difficulties may still be 
liable for substantial business taxes.
2. Start-Up Firms
Lack of profitability is also characteristic of start-up firms. Typically, a new 
business does not generate income tax liability for several years. If  the new business 
is not taxed as a corporation, losses are generally deductible against owners’ other 
income reported on their individual tax returns. For new businesses that are taxed as 
corporations, losses may not be used on owners’ returns, but net operating losses and 
tax credits generated during the start-up years can keep the firm free of income tax 
years after profitability has been achieved. This is a stark difference to what firms 
may expect under a value-added tax. New businesses—whether incorporated or not— 
will have no start-up tax holiday under a value-added tax. Unless losses are very 
large, start-up firms are likely to generate tax liabilities right from the beginning of 
their existence.113
3. Business Reorganizations
Under current law, tax specialists go to great pains to minimize both corporate 
and individual income tax liability that may be triggered during business 
reorganizations. Reorganizations involving changes of ownership o f a business (e.g., 
merger, sale of a business) or change in entity (e.g., partnership to a corporation) will 
not be taxable events under a new consumption tax. (As noted in Chapter 1, this is 
a major simplification relative to current law.) If, however, assets—rather than
113This is another respect in which these taxes are more akin to payroll taxes than income taxes.
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ownership shares— are sold or exchanged, the entire proceeds114 from the sale of 
tangible assets (e.g., inventories, plant and equipment) would generally be taxable to 
the seller115 and deductible for business purchasers.
F. Conclusion
Businesses remain unclear about the impact of a consumption tax on their tax 
liability. They want to know (1) whether they pay more or less under a consumption 
tax than an income tax, and (2) the relative burden of each consumption tax.
This chapter has tried to introduce the reader to the key factors that make up 
the strange and new consumption tax landscape. The following two chapters provide 
some details on the two leading consumption tax plans now under consideration by 
Congress.
114Transition rules may allow some or all o f the basis of existing assets to be excluded from tax.
115In general, the sales of financial assets are exempt from a value-added tax.
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Chapter 10 
The Flat Tax
Summary
• The Flat Tax—proposed by House Majority Leader Dick Armey—is a type o f  
value-added tax collected from both businesses and individuals. (Other value-added 
taxes are collected only from  businesses.) Under the Flat Tax, value added from  
labor is collected from individuals in the form  o f  a wage tax. A ll other value added 
is collected from  business using a subtraction method VAT modified to allow 
deductions fo r  wages.
• Except fo r  a standard deduction and some additional deductions fo r  
dependents, there are no deductions or credits fo r  individuals under the Armey 
proposal. Most notably, deductions fo r  mortgage interest, charitable contributions, 
and state and local taxes would not be allowed.
• Unlike almost all other consumption taxes, the Flat Tax does not have border 
tax adjustments.
A. Introduction
Before his ascent to Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, 
Representative Dick Armey o f Texas introduced H.R. 4585, "The Freedom and 
Fairness Restoration Act of 1994" in June of 1994. Majority Leader Armey re­
introduced largely the same legislation in the 104th Congress as H.R. 2060 on July 
19, 1995. At the same time, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama introduced the same 
bill in the Senate as S. 1050.
The proposed legislation provides for a complete overhaul o f U.S. economic 
policy consistent with traditional conservative principles of less regulation and less 
government spending. In addition, in a few short pages, the bill eliminates the
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individual income tax and corporate income tax systems116 and replaces them with a 
consumption tax system unlike any other that ever has been actually implemented. 
As a consumption tax, the Flat Tax would not possess the bias against saving that is 
so prominent in the current U.S. tax system. However, the Flat Tax is more than a 
switch from an income tax to a consumption tax. If enacted as currently conceived, 
it would be a massive tax reform that would eliminate dozens of special interest 
provisions. It would also be a massive simplification that would eliminate much of 
the complexity that plagues the current system.
The idea of the Flat Tax is not new. Although the proposal in its current form 
lacks many details, it is clear that the Armey proposal is a direct descendent o f a flat 
tax proposed by two Hoover Institution scholars, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, 
in their 1983 book entitled Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax. The Flat Tax has two 
parts: a tax on individuals and a tax on businesses.117
B. The Individual Tax
Under the Flat Tax individuals pay a wage tax at a flat rate o f 17 percent. 
Pension benefits are included in the wage base, but fringe benefits118 and income 
earned abroad are excluded. All capital income—interest, dividends, capital gains, 
etc.—are untaxed.119 Large standard deductions and additional large deductions for 
dependents would remove tens o f millions of taxpayers from the tax rolls. The 
standard deductions and dependent deduction in the Armey bill are shown in Table 
10.1 These amounts are for 1996—the first year of the tax according to the proposed 
statute—and would be indexed for inflation thereafter.
116The proposal would retain current payroll taxes but not estate and gift taxes which are specifically removed 
from the Internal Revenue Code.
117The most recent version of the Hall-Rabushka, The Flat Tax, can be found in a 56-page special supplement 
to the August 4, 1995 edition of Tax Notes.
118It is important to note, however, that fringe benefits also will not be deductible by employers.
119As under current law, "inside build-up" as well as the proceeds of life insurance policies would be tax exempt.
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Table 10.1
Types of Deduction Amount
Basic Standard Deduction
Married Filing Jointly $21,400
Head o f  Household $14,000
Individual $10,700
Married Filing Separately $10,700
Additional Deduction Per Dependent $5,000
The Individual Tax is noteworthy for what it is not. Every itemized deduction 
and every tax credit allowed under current law would be repealed under the Flat Tax. 
Most important among these are the mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for 
state and local taxes, and the deduction for charitable contributions. The major 
individual tax expenditure items that would be repealed under the Flat Tax are 
summarized in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2
Special Tax Provisions Repealed 
Under the Individual Flat Tax
• Deduction for Mortgage Interest
• Deduction for Property Taxes
• Deduction for Income State and Local Taxes
• Deduction for Charitable Contributions
• Exclusion of Scholarship and Fellowship Income
• Exclusion of Employee Awards
• Credit for Child Care and Dependent Expenses
• Earned Income Tax Credit
• Deduction for Casualty and Theft Losses
• Tax Credit for Elderly and Disabled
• Additional Standard Deduction for Blind and Elderly
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The basic operation of the Individual Flat Tax is illustrated in the following 
example. If the currently proposed structure is maintained, the tax would be simpler 
than the current income tax for many individuals—particularly those taxpayers with 
itemized deductions and those with significant capital income.
Table 10.3
The Flat Tax on a Family 
of Four in the Year 2000
A. FLAT TAX
Wages $70,000
Standard Deduction120 $29,579
Dependent Deductions $11,975
Total Deductions $41,554
Tax base $28,446
Tax @17% $4,836
B. CURRENT LAW
Wages $70,000
Personal Exemptions $11,736
Standard Deduction $7,604
Total Deductions $19,340
Taxable Income $50,660
Tax Paid in 15% Bracket $6,826
Tax Paid in 28% Bracket $1,443
Total Tax $8,269
120The estimated inflation adjustments for the years 1996-2000 used in these calculations are those currently 
used by the Congressional Budget Office in its official revenue estimates. The CBO assumes an inflation rate of 
approximately three percent annually.
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Much of the reduced complexity in the individual tax is the result o f the 
elimination of exceptions to general rules. The special rules that exempt certain types 
of capital income cease to be relevant because all capital income is exempt from tax. 
It would no longer be necessary to have complex rules to differentiate exempt from 
non-exempt capital income. This is not, however, good news for everyone. Many 
political objectives could be seriously frustrated by this change. For example, there 
would no longer be any tax benefit to investing in municipal bonds. State and local 
governments would no longer enjoy competitive advantages in capital markets. 
Likewise, life insurance and annuities would no longer be tax-advantaged vis-a-vis 
other investments (because other investments would also receive the same tax benefit 
that life insurance now enjoys). Life insurance companies would no longer have a 
major tax advantage over their bank and mutual fund competitors. Table 10.4 lists 
some tax expenditures that would become obsolete under the Flat Tax.121
Table 10.4
Items Described as Tax Expenditure Items That Lose
S p e cial Emphasis Because All Capital  Income Is Exemp t
• Exclusion of Investment Income on Life Insurance and Annuity 
Contracts
• Exclusion of Investment Income from Structured Settlement 
Accounts
• Deferral of Gain on Sale
• Exclusion of Gain on Home Sales for Person Age 55 and Over
• Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Bonds
• Maximum 28% Tax Rate on Long-Term Capital Gain
• Exclusion of Capital Gains at Death
• Exclusion of Interest on Education Savings Bonds
• Deferral o f Interest on Savings Bonds
121The Flat Tax assumes the elimination of specific items described as tax expenditures. Some argue that the 
need for these programs and indirect expenditures still exist and that these expenditures will be brought back in 
a different form.
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C. The Business Tax
The Business Flat Tax would be imposed on all corporate and noncorporate 
businesses. Thus, under the proposal “flow-through” entities—such as sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations which are not currently 
subject to an entity level tax--would be subject to tax along with Subchapter C 
corporations. The tax base, referred to as "gross active income,” starts with gross 
business receipts and has deductions for (1) material inputs, (2) wages and 
compensation paid, including contributions to pension (but not other fringe benefits), 
and (3) investment in capital. No other deductions would be allowed. Because capital 
purchases would be expensed, there would no longer be any depreciation deductions 
(but there is likely to be generous transition relief that allows depreciation on capital 
in place before the date of enactment). The basic operation of the Business Flat Tax 
is illustrated in the following example.
Table 10.5
Basic Operation of  the Business Flat Tax
GROSS RECEIPTS 100
Less
MATERIALS COST 20
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 10
EMPLOYEE 40
COMPENSATION
TOTAL 70
COSTS
Equals
TAX BASE 30
TAX @ 17% 5.10
As with the Individual Flat Tax, the Business Flat Tax is noteworthy for what 
it excludes. Table 10.6 is a partial list of repealed business tax credits:
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Table 10.6
Some Tax Credits Repealed Under the Flat Tax
• Research Tax Credit
• Energy Tax Credits
• Rehabilitation Tax Credit
• Low-Income Housing Credit
• Tax Credit for Orphan Drug Research
• Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
Also, many current tax expenditures would become irrelevant because they 
would be made obsolete by general provisions of the new tax. For example, deferral 
of tax on income generated by businesses operating abroad is no longer an advantage 
because the business tax is a territorial tax excluding all foreign source income. 
Similarly, generous depreciation provisions available under current law no longer 
provide a tax advantage because all capital expenditures are expensed.
Table 10.7
Some Current Business Tax Benefits
• Deferral of Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations
• Expensing of Exploration and Development Costs
• Section 179 Expensing
• Expensing of Magazine Circulation Expenses
• Possessions Tax Credit
D. Equivalence o f  the Flat Tax to a Subtraction Method VAT
One way o f gaining insight into the operation of the Flat Tax is to view the 
Business and Individual Taxes as a single tax collected from  two sources. When 
combined, the two tax bases approximate a consumption tax base. In fact, if  the 
Individual Tax did not have standard deductions, the Flat Tax base would exactly 
replicate the tax base of a subtraction-method value-added tax. The two taxes are 
compared in Table 10.8:
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Table 10.8
Comparison of  th e  Flat Tax and a Subtraction Method VAT
SUBTRACTION
METHOD VAT
THE FLAT TAX
A. BUSINESS TAX A. BUSINESS TAX
GROSS RECEIPTS 100 GROSS RECEIPTS 100
Less Less
MATERIALS COST 20 MATERIALS COST 20
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES 10
CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES 10
EM PLOYEE
COM PENSATION 40
TOTAL COSTS 30 TOTAL COSTS 70
Equals Equals
TAX BASE ___ 70_ TAX BASE ___ 30_
TAX @ 17% 11.90 TAX @ 17% 5.10
B. INDIVIDUAL TAX B. INDIVIDUAL TAX
-N ONE- EM PLOYEE
COM PENSATION
40
Less
STANDARD
DEDUCTIONS
15
Equals
TAX BASE 25
TAX @ 17% 0.00 TAX @ 17% 4.25
TOTAL TAX 11.90 TOTAL TAX 9.35
NOTE:
TOTAL TAX
WITHOUT STANDARD 
DEDUCTIONS 11.90
Under a subtraction method VAT, all tax is collected from businesses. From gross 
receipts, deductions are allowed for purchases of material and for capital expenditures
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but not for employee compensation and interest. The Flat Tax allows business to 
deduct employee compensation but then taxes employees directly on this 
compensation.
E. Economic Effects
Because of its equivalence to a subtraction-method value-added tax, many of 
the economic effects o f the Flat Tax are the same as those of a broad-based 
consumption tax. For example, because the corporate income tax is eliminated, the 
proposal eliminates the bias against capital formation in the corporate sector. 
Because the tax does not apply to income from capital, the bias against capital 
formation in general under current law is entirely eliminated. To the extent the 
current tax system is an impediment to saving and capital formation, the Flat Tax 
could foster increases in productivity, wages, competitiveness, and economic growth.
The major impediment to passage o f the Flat Tax in its current form--as with 
most consumption taxes- is  that these taxes are generally considered regressive. This 
is the case because it is generally assumed that consumption taxes are passed forward 
in prices and low-income households spend more in proportion to their incomes than 
do high-income households. Although there is much dispute about how to measure 
the distributional effects of consumption taxes, it is noteworthy that a recent Treasury 
study122 showed that the Armey Flat Tax would hurt families with incomes below 
$200,000 and help those with incomes above $200,000.123
One notable difference between the Flat Tax and other consumption tax 
proposals is that the tax is not imposed on imports and there is no tax relief for 
exports. Such "border tax adjustments" are common to consumption taxes currently 
in place around the world and common to all current consumption tax proposals. 
(Chapter 9 presents some calculations showing that the absence of border tax 
adjustments makes a large difference to exporters.)
F. Political Prospects
A key attraction of the Flat Tax is its simplicity relative to current law. Under 
the proposal, corporate income taxation would be eliminated, the minimum tax would 
be eliminated, taxation of overseas earnings would be eliminated, documentation of 
depreciation, interest, and charitable contributions would no longer be necessary, and
122See Toder (1995).
123With regard to distributional issues, it is important to note that the proposal would repeal the earned income 
tax credit.
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there would be no taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains. Proponents claim 
that under the proposal both individuals and businesses would file tax returns the size 
of a postcard. There can be little doubt that this proposal in its current form is simpler 
than current law for a large number of taxpayers.
It is unlikely, however, that the tax would be so absolutely simple as 
proponents claim. First o f all, many issues under current law would remain 
problematic under the Flat Tax. For example, under either tax there is no bright line 
between business expenses and personal consumption in the case of self-employed 
individuals. Second, new issues arise that are not present under current law. For 
example, the value of employee fringe benefits, which business cannot deduct under 
the Flat Tax, must be calculated. Finally, it is often remarked that it is not really fair 
to compare a tax system functioning in the real world to an idealized system that has 
not yet been subjected to the political maneuvering necessary for passage into law. 
If history is any indicator, it seems likely that in the name of political expediency the 
proposal would rapidly be burdened with special exceptions and adjustments as it 
moved through the legislative process.
O f course, the tax must also raise sufficient revenue. The Treasury 
Department claims that the 17-percent Armey Flat Tax would reduce tax collections 
by nearly $250 billion annually. Given the low probability of reductions in 
government spending by this amount, and given the current intolerance for larger 
Federal deficits,124 it seems likely that any Flat Tax enacted into law would have a tax 
rate greater than 17 percent. The Treasury Department estimates125 that the Armey 
proposal would require a rate of approximately 24 percent to raise the same revenues 
as the corporate and individual income taxes it would replace.126
124Early in the 104th Congress, a balanced-budget amendment passed the House of Representative and missed 
obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate by one vote.
125See Toder (1995).
126If current revenue estimating methodologies were altered to take into account possible economic growth 
resulting from the proposal (i.e., so called "dynamic" revenue estimates), the revenue neutral rate could be lower. 
At this time, it is unclear whether the new Congress will adopt this new approach and how significant its impact 
might be.
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Chapter 11
The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax
Summary
• The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax proposal eliminates the individual and 
corporate income taxes and imposes a new consumption tax on individuals and 
a new consumption tax on businesses.
• The Individual Tax is a personal consumption tax with a progressive rate 
structure and a top rate o f  40 percent. Unlike the Armey plan, favorable 
treatment is retained fo r  housing, charitable contributions, and state and local 
income taxes.
• The Business Tax is a subtraction method consumption tax with a rate o f  
11 percent. The tax applies to all businesses, not ju st corporations.
• The Nunn-Domenici proposal contains complicated transition rules under 
both the Individual and Business Taxes fo r  deducting basis o f  assets acquired 
before the effective date o f  the new system.
A. Overview
After years o f preparation, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and Senator Pete 
Domenici of New Mexico introduced the 293-page "USA Tax Act o f 1995" (S. 722). 
Like flat tax proposals, the Nunn-Domenici plan would completely eliminate the 
individual and corporate income taxes127 and would replace them with a system of 
consumption taxes levied on both individuals and business.
There are important differences, however, between the Armey Flat Tax and the 
Nunn-Domenici USA Tax. For example, unlike the individual portion of the Flat 
Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax would have progressive rates and would
127The Nunn-Domenici proposal would retain the current estate and gift taxes and current payroll taxes, but 
subject to a carryover in tax basis at death.
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allow deductions for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and local 
taxes. Unlike the business portion of the Flat Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax 
would not allow deductions for wages. The Nunn-Domenici proposal, however, 
would allow all employer and most employee payroll taxes to be credited against the 
new tax. Furthermore--unlike the Flat Tax, but like most consumption taxes—the 
proposal imposes tax on imports and exempts exports, i.e., the tax is border adjusted.
B. The Individual Tax
1. In General
The Individual Tax under the Nunn-Domenici plan is an individual 
consumption tax. Under the tax, individuals would file annual returns much as they 
do under current law. Moreover, they would include on this return their "gross 
income" that is similar to adjusted gross income under current law, and they would 
deduct itemized deductions and allowances for personal exemptions in order to arrive 
at taxable income. The key difference between the current individual income tax and 
the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax is a deduction for additional saving. In fact, the 
"USA" in the proposal’s title refers to Unlimited Savings Allowance.
Under the proposal, gross income includes wages, salaries, interest, dividends, 
distributions from proprietorships and partnerships, pension benefits, proceeds from 
life insurance and annuity contracts128, and—with some important exceptions—the 
entire proceeds of asset sales. In order to arrive at taxable income, individuals would 
first deduct generous "Family Living Allowances" and personal exemption amounts. 
These are summarized in Table 11.1.
128As under current law and the Flat Tax, the inside build-up on life insurance would be exempt from tax. Under 
current law and the Flat Tax, proceeds from life insurance policies are exempt from tax.
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Table 11.1
Personal Exemptions and Family Living Allowances 
Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan
PERSONAL EXEM PTIO N
A ll Returns $2,250
F A M IL Y  LIVIN G  ALLO W ANCE
Form o f  Return
Joint $7,400
Surviving spouse $7,400
Head o f  Household $5,400
Individual $4,400
Married filing separately $3,700
Thus, a family of four would not be liable for individual tax unless their gross income 
exceeded $16,400.129 All of these amounts are for 1996 and would thereafter be 
indexed for inflation. It is interesting to note there is no standard deduction.
2. Itemized Deductions
The Nunn-Domenici proposal would allow five itemized deductions for the 
following purposes:
(1) mortgage interest
(2) charitable contributions
(3) tuition for education and training
(4) additional savings
(5) transition basis
The deductions for mortgage interest and charitable contributions would 
operate under the same rules as apply under the current individual income tax system. 
The deduction for education expenses would be a new itemized deduction. The 
deduction would allow for tuition relating to post-secondary education. It would be 
limited to $2,000 per year per eligible student and could not exceed $8,000 per 
household annually. As noted above, the Nunn-Domenici plan includes a deduction
129Of  the approximately 115 million individual income tax returns filed in 1990, 47 million were for households 
with adjusted gross income of less than $15,000.
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for saving. This deduction is similar to the deduction for contributions to individual 
retirement accounts, except there would be no limitations on the amounts that could 
be contributed and no restrictions on withdrawals.
Except for the transition-basis deduction and the deduction for new saving 
(both discussed below), no other deductions would be allowed under the new 
Individual Tax. In particular, deductions would not be allowed for state and local 
property taxes, moving expenses, casualty losses, and medical expenses.
3. Tax Rates
The tax rates under the Nunn-Domenici plan are summarized in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2
Individual Tax Rates Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan
— Taxable Income by Filing Status— — Tax Rate in Each Year—
Married
Filing
Jointly
Head o f  
House­
hold
Unmarried
Individual
Married
Filing
Separately
1996 1997 1998 1999
2000
and
after
Up to  
$5,400
Up to 
$4,750
Up to 
$3,200
Up to 
$2,700
19% 15% 13% 10% 8%
$5,400-
$24,000
$4,750-
$21,100
$3,200-
$14,400
$2,700-
$12,000
27% 26% 25% 20% 19%
Over
$24,000
Over
$21,100
Over
$14,400
Over
$12,000
40% 40% 40% 40% 40%
As noted above, individuals can always lower their taxes by saving instead of 
spending. Nevertheless, the low thresholds for the top tax brackets mean that a large 
number o f middle-class taxpayers would be subject to the 40-percent tax rate.
4. Tax Credits
As under current law (and unlike under the Flat Tax), a refundable earned 
income tax credit would be available under the Nunn-Domenici plan. An innovation 
of this provision of the Nunn-Domenici plan is the credit for the employee portion of
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payroll taxes. Under current law, the employee portion of payroll taxes equals 7.65 
percent o f the first $61,200 (1995 level) o f wages and 1.45 percent on all wages 
above that amount. No other tax credits would be allowed.
5. Example
Table 11.3 presents a simple example that illustrates the basic operation o f the 
tax and compares it to current law.130 Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, this family 
with wages income of $70,000 can deduct a living allowance and itemized 
deductions, and taxes are reduced by a payroll tax credit. Under the Nunn-Domenici 
proposal, however, this family is subject to a higher rate of tax.
Table 11.3
Computation of Individual Tax Under 
The Nunn-Domenici Plan for a Family of Four in the Year 2000
A. NUNN-DOMENICI INDIVIDUAL TAX
Wages $70,000
Less Personal Exemptions 10,199
Less Living Allowance 8,386
Less Itemized Deductions 7,000
Equals Taxable Income 44,415
Tax at 8% 490
Tax at 19% 4,005
Tax at 40% 6,888
Total Tax 11,383
Less Payroll Credit 5,355
Net Tax 6,028
B. CURRENT INDIVIDUAL INCOM E TAX
Wages 70,000
Less Personal Exemptions 11,736
Less Standard Deduction 7,604
Equals Taxable Income 50,660
Tax at 15% 6,826
Tax at 28% 1,443
Total Tax 8,269
130See Chapter 13 for more examples of the operation of the Nunn-Domenici proposal.
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6. Treatment o f  Saving
a. General Rules
At the core of the Nunn-Domenici proposal is its treatment of personal savings 
The following section summarizes the basic mechanics. Before getting mired in the 
details, it may be helpful to keep in mind four main points:
(1) Net additions to savings are deductible.
(2) New borrowing is included in income (but most mortgage, 
automobile, and credit card indebtedness is exempt from this 
rule).
(3) Withdrawals from accounts and proceeds from sales are 
included in income.
(4) There are deductions for basis of assets held before January 1, 
1997. For investors with less than $50,000 of basis, basis may 
be deducted ratably over three years. For other investors, basis 
may only be deducted when there is net dissaving, generally 
during retirement.
Deductible additions to savings include deposits in all types of banks, mutual funds, 
brokerage and retirement accounts as well as the purchase or investment in stock, 
bonds, certificates of deposits, ownership interests in partnerships and 
proprietorships, life insurance, and annuities. Conversely, withdrawals from these 
accounts and sales of these assets are included in the tax base. Purchases o f land 
(whether directly or indirectly) and collectibles are not deductible.
New borrowing increases tax but not if borrowing is "exempt." Exempt 
borrowing includes:
(1) up to $1 million of mortgage indebtedness;
(2) up to $25,000 of debt used to purchase a consumer durable;
(3) credit card charges paid within the first billing cycle; and
(4) any other debt up to $10,000.
Needless to say these exceptions remove most personal indebtedness from 
consideration. It is unclear what in the statute or in practice will prevent taxpayers 
from borrowing and using the loan proceeds for deductible saving. For example, 
under the proposal, an individual could get a $25,000 deduction by taking out a
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second mortgage with a principal of $15,000 and borrowing $10,000 secured against 
a new $10,000 certificate of deposit. This would result in large revenue losses for the 
government with no net increase in private saving.
b. Pre-Effective Date Basis
Under the general rules of a personal consumption tax, all new savings are 
deductible and the entire amount withdrawn (in the case of a account) and the entire 
proceeds of a sale (in the case of a savings asset) are subject to tax. Thus, there is no 
need to distinguish between principal and interest or between gain and basis.
This cash-flow approach creates serious difficulties during the transition from 
an income tax to a consumption tax. Without transition relief, assets purchased before 
the effective date of the new consumption tax are penalized. From the perspective of 
an income tax, these assets are overtaxed because basis as well as gain is subject to 
tax. From the perspective of a consumption tax, these assets are overtaxed because 
no deduction was received when the original investment was made. In effect, assets 
whose holding period straddles the effective date are whipsawed between the two 
systems—subject to more tax than they would be under either system when fully 
phased in. This is illustrated in Table 11.4.
In Panel A of the table, the taxpayer earns $10,000 that is subject to tax at 28 
percent which leaves $7,200 available for investment. Earnings are subject to tax 
annually but are plowed back into investment. At the end of five-years, the taxpayer 
has $9,526.64. In Panel B the taxpayer also earns $10,000 and this entire amount is 
available for investment under an individual consumption tax where saving is 
deductible. Over the life of the investment (in this case, five years) the income is not 
subject to tax. In the last year, however, the entire proceeds of the investment 
($13,604 plus $1,088) are subject to tax, leaving the taxpayer with $10,579.16. Thus, 
after five years, a taxpayer in the 28-percent bracket who is saving $10,000 of 
earnings is more than a thousand dollars richer under a consumption tax than he or 
she would be under an income tax.
In Panel C the taxpayer is caught between an income tax and a consumption 
tax and gets the worst of both. When the taxpayer makes the initial investment there 
is no deduction for saving, but when the taxpayer liquidates the investment the entire 
proceeds are subject to tax. This leaves the taxpayer with only $7,459—a far worse 
outcome than under the income tax.
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Table 11.4
Return on an Investment of $10,000 is Earnings 
Under an Income Tax, Under Consumption Tax, and During the 
Transition From an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax
A . INCOM E TAX
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) BEGINNING BASIS 7200.00 7614.72 8053.33 8517.20 9007.79
(2) INCOME 576.00 609.18 644.27 681.38 720.62
(3) TAX 161.28 170.57 180.39 190.79 201.77
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) + (2) - (3) 7614.72 8053.33 8517.20 9007.79 9526.64
B. FULLY PHASED IN CONSUMPTION
TAX
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) BEGINNING BASIS 10000.00 10800.00 11664.00 12597.12 13604.89
(2) INCOME 800.00 864.00 933.12 1007.77 1088.39
(3) TAX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4114.12
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) + (2) - (3) 10800.00 11664.00 12597.12 13604.89 10579.16
C. SW ITCH TO CONSUMPTION TAX IN 1996, W ITHOUT 
TRANSITION RELIEF
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) BEGINNING BASIS 7200.00 7614.72 8223.90 8881.81 9592.35
(2) INCOME 576.00 609.18 657.91 710.54 767.39
(3) TAX 161.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 2900.73
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) +  (2) - (3) 7614.72 8223.90 8881.81 9592.35 7459.01
Note: The assumed tax rate is 28 percent and the assumed pre-tax rate o f return is 8 percent.
In order to provide relief to "old capital" most proposals for a personal 
consumption tax provide transition relief for pre-effective date assets in the form of 
deductions for pre-effective date basis. Before explaining the particular basis 
deduction rules under the Nunn-Domenici plan, two points are worth noting.
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First, the entire reason for providing such relief is to provide equity between 
old and new savers. It provides no benefits to the economy. (In fact, by requiring 
higher tax rates in a revenue-neutral setting it is detrimental to growth.) It is true that 
old saving would be unduly penalized without transition rules but providing relief to 
existing assets does little to encourage new investment and economic growth.
Second, the problem of overtaxation of existing assets is prevalent under all 
consumption taxes. Under a retail sales tax or a VAT, relief in the form of basis 
adjustment is not practical. (Remember, under these options all tax collections are 
from businesses, and individuals do not even file returns.) Thus, under other types 
of consumption taxes, the additional burden on taxpayers who have already saved is 
ignored or relief is directed toward the elderly (for example, by exempting 
prescription drugs).
Under the Nunn-Domenici plan, there are two methods for recovering pre­
effective date basis. The first is available only to investors with no more than $50,000 
of pre-effective date basis. These taxpayers will be eligible to ratably include basis 
over the first three years the consumption tax is in effect. This is referred to as the 
transition basis deduction.
This option is not realistic for all taxpayers because of the severe revenue 
losses that would result. (Existing aggregate basis in the economy is probably greater 
than an entire year's taxable income.) Thus, under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, 
savers would only be allowed to deduct basis when there are net withdrawals to 
savings. The practical effect of this rule is that many who must use their savings will 
get some tax relief.131
131The statutory language is difficult to follow. In each year in which there is a sale of a pre-effective date asset, 
"withdrawals" (which are deducted from net deductible saving) are reduced by basis and net deductible saving is 
also reduced by basis. The net result of this is that pre-effective basis does not generally figure into any one year's 
deduction for saving, as shown in the following formula:
Net Saving = Additions - ( Proceeds - Basis ) - Basis - Borrowing 
For example, if a taxpayer deposits $100 in a bank account, borrows $50, and sells an asset for $30 with a basis 
of $20, the taxpayer's net deduction for saving is $20 = $100 - ($30-$20) - $20 - $50).
It is only when saving (which is generally deductible) turns negative (and therefore potentially taxable) that 
pre-effective date basis can be helpful to the taxpayer. Pre-effective date basis is included in the "general basis 
account." This account may be used to reduce or eliminate otherwise taxable withdrawals:
Net Taxable Withdrawal = Net Negative Saving - General Basis Account
Returning to the prior example, except that the taxpayer only makes a deposit of $10 (instead of $100), net negative 
saving is $40. This taxable amount may be reduced by the $20 of basis so that there is $20 of net taxable 
withdrawal.
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C. The Business Tax
1. In General
The Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is a subtraction method VAT levied at an 
11-percent rate. As is common to all subtraction method VAT proposals, exports are 
excluded from gross receipts and imports are subject to a duty at a rate equal to the 
tax rate. The tax is territorial so there is no taxation of foreign subsidiaries. All 
businesses, not just corporations, must pay the tax. Wages and interest are not 
deductible, but capital may be expensed.
There are two important features of the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax that are 
not necessarily part of a standard subtraction method VAT. First, there is the 
treatment o f state and local taxes. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, all taxes paid 
by businesses to state and local governments are deductible. Second, there is the 
credit against the business tax for the employer portion of payroll taxes.
Many of the key features of the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax can be 
illustrated with the following example:
Table 11.5
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax 
and the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax
Current
Corporate 
Income Tax
Nunn-
Domenici
Business
Tax
Business Receipts—Domestic 90 90
Business Receipts—Exports 10
Interest Income 5
Total Gross 105 90
Receipts
Business Purchases 55 55
Wages 25 -
Interest Cost 10
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Depreciation 10 -
Capital Spending - 15
Total Deductions 100 70
Tax Base 5 20
Tax @ 35% , 11% 1.75 2.2
Wages Below Wage Cap 20
Payroll Tax Credit 0 1.60
Net Tax 1.75 0.60
2. The Payroll Tax Credit
The payroll tax credit deserves careful attention for two reasons. First, it is 
important to understand how it works in order to gauge the tax’s overall impact on 
wage costs. As noted, wages are not deductible under the general 11-percent tax. 
However, this is substantially offset by the availability of a tax credit for the employer 
portion of the payroll tax. The employer portion of the payroll tax is 7.65 percent up 
to a per employee annual ceiling ($61,200 in 1995, indexed to wage growth) and an 
additional 1.45 percent tax on all wages without limit. As illustrated in the following 
table, the net burden of the tax on labor is larger for firms that pay high salaries.
Table 11.6
The Differential Benefit of the Payroll Credit 
on Low-Wage and High-Wage Firms
Total payroll 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Average salary 50,000 75,000 100,000 200,000
# of employees 20 13 10 5
Tax at 6.2 % , per 3,100 3,794 3,794 3,794
employee
Tax at 1.45% per employee 725 1,088 1,450 2,900
Total tax per employee 3,825 4,882 5,244 6,694
Total payroll tax credit
(# of employees times per 76,500 63,446 52,440 33,470
employee tax)
VAT cost @ 11% 110,000 110,000 110,000 110,000
Net increase in wage cost
(VAT less payroll credit) 33,500 46,554 57,560 76,530
Percentage increase 3.35% 4.66% 5.76% 7.65%
122
The second issue is the impact of the payroll tax credit on the international 
competitiveness o f domestically produced goods. The ability to credit the entire 
employer portion of the payroll tax against the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is 
equivalent to repealing the employer portion of the payroll tax and using the business 
tax to restore the lost revenues. Under the rules of the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) border adjustments are permitted for "indirect” sales and value- 
added taxes but are not allowed for "direct" taxes on wages and profits. By replacing 
payroll tax revenue with VAT revenues, the Nunn-Domenici proposal effectively 
replaces a non-border-adjustable tax with a border adjustable tax. This will be true 
to the extent the burden of payroll taxes is passed forward to consumers in higher 
prices (and not backward to employees in lower after-tax wages). In general, 
economists believe that the burden of wage taxes is bom by labor in the form of lower 
after-tax wages.
Because the payroll tax is not repealed outright, however, some commentators 
strongly contend that the payroll tax credit violates GATT rules on border 
adjustability.132
3. Amortization o f  Pre-Effective Date Basis and Other Transition Rules
The Nunn-Domenici Business Tax provides a large incentive for capital 
formation by allowing all purchases o f new capital to be expensed. If, however, no 
depreciation deductions are allowed for the remaining basis of existing capital, this 
capital will be subject to a tax penalty. To prevent the imposition of an undue burden 
on existing capital, the Nunn-Domenici proposal allows a "transition basis deduction" 
for the amortization of remaining basis on the effective date for any assets placed into 
service before the effective date. The amount of the deduction is determined 
according to the following schedule:
Table 11.7
Transition Basis Recovery Periods 
Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan
Type of Property
Remaining 
Amortization On 
Effective Date
Under C urrent Law
Amortization
Period Under 
Nunn-Domenici
Category I basis Less than 15 yrs. 10 years
Category II basis More than 15 yrs. 30 years
Category III basis Not depreciable 40 years
132See, McLure (1987), pp. 86-88.
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In addition, unrecovered inventory costs would be deducted ratably over three years.
Carryforwards of net operating losses, alternative minimum tax credit, and 
other business credits—including the R&E tax credit-generated under the existing 
income tax could not be carried forward to reduce liability under the new Business 
Tax. This will impose a particularly large burden on start-up firms.
D. Conclusion
The Nunn-Domenici proposal is not as simple as the Flat Tax nor is it as 
sweeping in its elimination of tax preferences. The argument can be made, however, 
the plan contains the most important elements o f consumption taxation but at the 
same time makes realistic accommodations that may be necessary to ensure sufficient 
political support for enactment. The following table summarizes some of the key 
differences between current law and the two leading consumption tax alternatives:
Table 11.8
Summary Comparison of Current Law,
The Nunn-Domenici Proposal, and the Flat Tax
Biased Against 
Capital 
Form ation?
Simpler Than 
C urrent Law?
Distribution of 
Tax Burden
B order Tax 
Adjustm ents?
C urrent
Law
Yes, but
numerous special 
rules provide 
relief.
Progressive.
No.
Nunn-
Domenici
No.
In some matters, 
Yes. In some 
matters, No.
Approximately 
as progressive as 
current law.
Yes.
Flat Tax No. Yes.
Less progressive 
than current law. No.
The following two chapters provide much more detailed, numerical comparisons of 
the Nunn-Domenici proposal and the Flat Tax.
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Chapter 12
Impact of Consumption Taxes on Various Business Sectors
Summary
• About two thirds o f  total value added in the economy is employee 
compensation. Therefore, an ordinary VAT primarily is a tax on wages.
• The business components o f  the Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici proposal are 
similar to value-added taxes except that the Flat Tax allows a deduction fo r  wages 
and the Nunn-Domenici proposal provides a tax credit fo r  wages. Although this 
relief is substantial, these proposals in general still favor capital-intensive relative 
to labor-intensive industries.
• The exclusion o f  exports from  gross receipts provides large tax benefits to 
those firm s with exports. For a typical manufacturing exporter, the availability o f  
border tax adjustments under the Nunn-Domenici proposal can easily cut a 
business's tax bill in half. In contrast, the Flat Tax does not have border tax 
adjustments.
The primary objective of the study is to provide insight to businesses and 
policymakers about the impacts of consumption taxes. Along these lines, this chapter 
uses real data to estimate the effects of real proposals on various sectors of the 
economy. This is tricky business because proposals are always changing. Also, data 
are incomplete. Economic impacts are complex and uncertain.
Moreover, generalizations can be misleading: any conclusion derived from the 
industry calculations should not necessarily be interpreted as applicable to all 
businesses within an industry. The effects of new consumption tax proposals will 
often depend on each business’ unique circumstances. For example, a firm with high 
profits might prefer a consumption tax to the current corporate income tax, but this 
firm’s highly leveraged competitor might prefer current law. A third competitor- 
even if  it is paying relatively little corporate income tax—might prefer a border- 
adjustable consumption tax if  it is able to entirely eliminate its tax liability (or even 
generate refunds) by exporting a small fraction of its total sales.
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Chapter 9 developed concepts to help readers think about consumption taxes. 
Chapters 10 and 11 provided an overview of the two proposals currently receiving the 
most attention on Capitol Hill. This chapter builds on all this information and 
combines it with information from Commerce Department economic data on value 
added in different industry segments.
A. Overview o f  the Data: The Importance o f  Wages
Official statistics published by the Commerce Department provide an excellent 
starting point for evaluating and comparing consumption tax proposals. From these 
statistics, value added can be computed as the sum of total employee compensation 
(including wages and fringe benefits), corporate profits, net interest paid, net non­
income taxes paid by business and net income received by owners of noncorporate 
business.133 (It is not possible to differentiate between "wages” and "profits" that 
owners o f closely held businesses pay to themselves, so no distinction is made 
between the two in official statistics.) These components are shown in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1
Total Private Sector Value Added,
Commerce Department Data, 1993 
(Billions of dollars)
Wages $2,517 51.2%
Fringe Benefits $ 498 10.1%
Corporate Profits $ 391 7.9%
Net Interest $ 460 9.4%
Payments to Owners
of Noncorporate Business $ 520 10.6%
Net Indirect Business Taxes $ 529 10.8%
Total $4,915 100%
This small table makes a big point. Employee compensation (wages plus 
fringe benefits) is at least 60 percent o f  all private-sector value added.
133This is the addition method o f calculating value added. Most proposals for value-added taxation use the 
subtraction method (or some variant o f the concept). See the beginning of Chapter 3 for a comparison.
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Considering that some significant portion of payments to owners o f noncorporate 
business is also wages, it is reasonable to assume that about two-thirds o f all private- 
sector value added are payments for labor services. Thus, in a "plain vanilla" value- 
added tax, employee compensation is the dominant factor determining business tax 
liability.
Table 12.2 shows the ratio of employee compensation to total value added for 
13 major industry groups. The main point o f this table is that not only is employee 
compensation an important component o f value added for the economy as a whole, 
it is also important for most major industry groups. Only for three of the 13 
industries-agriculture, utilities, and real estate- is  the ratio o f employee compensation 
to total value added less than 50 percent. (Except for utilities, these ratios are low 
because much of the return to labor is in the form of payments to owners of 
noncorporate business.) Even for such industries that are commonly considered 
"capital-intensive"--i.e., manufacturing, mining, and construction—wages and fringe 
benefits are still the largest component of value added.
Table 12.2
Employee Compensation as Percentage of 
 Total  Value Added, by Industry, 1993 
(1) AGRICULTURE 35%
(2) MINING 62%
(3) CONSTRUCTION 72%
(4) MANUFACTURING-DURABLES 86%
(5) MANUFACTURING-NONDUR 66%
(6) TRANSPORTATION 76%
(7) COMMUNICATION 53%
(8) UTILITIES 38%
(9) WHOLESALE TRADE 64%
(10) RETAIL TRADE 63%
(11) FINANCE 62%
(12) REAL ESTATE 7%
(13) SERVICES 75%
TOTAL PRIVATE 61%
Source: U.S. Department o f Commerce. See Appendix for details.
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Given these facts, it is not surprising (from a political perspective), that the two 
leading consumption tax proposals provide substantial relief for the wage component 
o f the consumption tax. The Nunn-Domenici proposal provides a payroll tax credit 
for the employer portion of payroll taxes (7.65% of wages below the $61,200 and 
1.45 percent for all wages above that amount). The Armey Flat Tax exempts wages 
entirely from the business tax base.
B. Calculating the Tax Base fo r  the Leading Proposals
1. Adjustments to the Data
Although the Commerce Department data measure value added, several 
adjustments must be made to get a reasonable approximation of the aggregate tax base 
under alternative proposals. Depending on the proposal, adjustments must be made 
for the following items:
(1) expensing
(2) exports
(3) imports
(4) deductible business taxes
And, although not conceptually related to value added, the following calculations are 
critically important to determining the impact of some consumption tax proposals:
(5) transition depreciation
(6) the payroll tax credit
The details of how these adjustments are made are presented in Appendix 12B 
following this chapter.
2. Using the Data to Calculate Aggregate Tax Liability
Table 12.3 shows the results of all of these adjustments, and uses them to 
calculate the tax liability for the economy as a whole for (a) a five-percent broad- 
based VAT, (b) the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax, and (c) the Armey Flat Tax. The 
latter two are chosen because they are the two proposals currently receiving the most 
attention on Capitol Hill. Although not currently in favor, an ordinary VAT serves 
as a useful benchmark for comparison. A broad based 5-percent VAT is routinely
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included in the Congressional Budget Office's annual catalogue o f revenue-raising 
proposals.134 Five percent is the rate that is approximately revenue neutral to current 
corporate income tax.
Table 12.3
Adjusting from Value Added in the 1993 Commerce Departm ent Data 
to the Business Tax Base Under Three Leading Proposals 
(billions of dollars)
5% VAT 11% N-D 
USA Tax
17% Flat 
Tax
1993 Value added (in 4915 4915 4915
Commerce Dept. Data)
Adjustments
Wages -2517
Benefit of Expensing -205 -205 -205
Benefit of Export Exemption -457 -457
Inclusion of Imports 538 538
Benefit of Excise Tax -258 -258 -258
Deduction
Total Adjustments 382 382 2980
Tax Base 4533 4533 1935
Tax Rate 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 227 499 329
Payroll Credit -177
Net Tax (w/o Transition 227 322 329
Depreciation)
Note: Maximum Transition 580 580 580
Depreciation
Note: Tax Benefit of 29 64 99
Transition Depreciation
Net Tax (with Transition 198 258 230
Depreciation)
134See, for example, Congressional Budget Office (1995).
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a. Five-Percent Value-Added Tax
In order to calculate the aggregate amount of tax collected under a "plain 
vanilla" VAT, four adjustments must be made to the Commerce Department measure 
of value added. First, when expensing is allowed instead of depreciation, value added 
is reduced by the excess of current capital expenditures over current depreciation. 
Next, because VATs usually operate under the destination principle,135 the tax base 
must be reduced by the amount of exports and increased by the amount o f imports. 
Because the United States routinely runs trade deficits, the net effect of implementing 
the destination principle is to enlarge the tax base. Finally, value added in the 
Commerce Department data includes sales and excise taxes, but these taxes are often 
deductible in value-added taxes. Thus, the tax base of a broad-based "plain vanilla" 
value-added tax is estimated to be approximately $4.5 trillion in 1993.
b. Nunn-Domenici Business Tax
As noted previously, the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is similar to an 
ordinary broad-based value-added tax. Accordingly, the same adjustments are made 
to the Commerce Department data to arrive at the Nunn-Domenici tax base, and the 
Nunn-Domenici tax base is also approximately $4.5 trillion. The big difference 
between the Nunn-Domenici proposal and an ordinary VAT is the availability o f the 
payroll tax credit, equal to 7.65 percent of most wages. By what percentage this 
reduces the overall take of a VAT depends on the tax rate. For the Nunn-Domenici 
proposal with a rate of 11 percent, the amount of revenue raised is reduced from $499 
billion to $322 billion, a 35-percent reduction.
c. The Armey Business Flat Tax
The Armey Flat Tax has two important differences from the Nunn-Domenici 
proposal. First, it does not have border tax adjustments. Although this will make an 
enormous difference to individual firms (as discussed below), it only results in a net 
increase of approximately 2 percent on the overall tax base.136 The second difference 
is of such importance it should probably be the defining characteristic of the Flat Tax.
135See Chapter 7 for more explanation.
136In Table 12.3, the net increase in the tax base due to border adjustments is $119 billion. The total tax base 
is $4,533 billion.
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Although there are no payroll tax credits under the Flat Tax, wages are entirely 
deductible. This reduces the tax base to approximately one-half of what it otherwise 
might be.
The business portion of the Armey Flat Tax has a narrower base than the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal. The Flat Tax, however, has a higher tax rate (i.e., 17 
percent) and no payroll credit. It is striking that these rough calculations show the 
two taxes raising approximately the same revenue.
d. Transition R elief Under the Proposals
As noted in Chapter 9, transition relief is a large issue. Table 12.3 underscores 
its importance. For the regular VAT, the calculations show transition relief reducing 
total taxes by approximately one-eighth at the beginning of the transition. For the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal, the reduction in tax revenue is approximately one-seventh. 
For the Flat Tax, the reduction in tax revenue is approximately one-third. (To offset 
this reduction in revenue, the Nunn-Domenici proposal has higher individual tax rates 
during its first four years of existence. The Armey plan would impose a tax rate of 
20 percent on individual and businesses during its first two years.)
Transition relief could be larger than shown in these calculations if, for 
example, inventories can be written off (as proposed under Nunn-Domenici); if  
credits (such as the research credit or the alternative minimum tax credit) could be 
carried forward and credited against the new tax; or if  operating losses could be 
carried forward and deducted against the new tax. Transition relief, however, could 
be smaller if statutory rules simply reduce the amount of existing capital that may be 
deducted. In all cases, to the extent there is any transition relief, its importance 
diminishes over time.
C. Comparison to the Corporate Income Tax
1. Estimates o f  Burden on Corporations
There is interest not only in the differences between various proposals, but also 
in the differences between proposals and current law. The initial focus here will be 
on comparing the business components of proposed consumption taxes to the current 
corporate income tax. (The following chapter will discuss noncorporate business.)
The data are not perfectly suited to this task, so some further assumptions and 
calculations must be made. In Commerce Department data, the corporate and non­
corporate portions of value added are not always separately stated. While corporate 
profits and corporate depreciation are separate, there is no distinction made, for
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example, between interest and wages paid by corporations and interest and wages 
paid by non-corporate businesses. Therefore, as described in the appendix to this 
chapter, some educated guesses have been made. (Again, none of these calculations 
should be taken as precise, because they are no more than good-faith estimates given 
the available data.)
Table 12.4 presents the estimated tax liability incurred by all corporations 
under (a) the corporation income tax, (b) a five-percent VAT, (c) the Nunn-Domenici 
Business Tax, and (d) the Armey Business Flat Tax. Under the corporate income tax 
only corporate profits are subject to tax.
Table 12.4
Estimated Corporate Tax Liability Under C urren t Law and 
Under Alternative Consumption Tax Proposals 
(1993 data, dollar amounts in billions)
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0 2011 2011 0
Fringe Benefits 0 409 409 409
Interest 0 131 131 131
Profit 391 391 391 391
Nondeductible Taxes 0 188 188 188
Benefit of Expensing 0 -139 -139 -139
Imports Less Exports 0 69 69 69
Tax Base 391 3060 3060 1049
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 137 153 337 178
Payroll Credit 0 0 141 0
Net Tax 137137 153 196 178
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0 394 394 394
Tax Benefit o f Transition 0 20 43 67
Depreciation
Tax With Transition 137 133 153 111
137In 1993 the corporate income tax actually raised $117.5 billion. The lower actual figure is not surprising 
given the more accelerated depreciation allowed for tax purposes and the availability of tax credits. 1995 Budget, 
Historical tables, p. 22.
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The calculations show that if all of these tax proposals were fully effective 
(i.e., no transition) in 1993, they would raise revenues in the same general order of 
magnitude—between $153 billion and $178 billion. The calculations show that a 5- 
percent VAT raises a little more than would be needed to replace the revenues lost 
from repeal o f the corporate tax.138 The Nunn-Domenici tax has a higher rate than 
the regular VAT (11 percent versus five percent), but it also has a generous payroll 
credit. The calculations indicate that for the corporate sector the benefit o f the credit 
does not compensate for the higher rate: the 11-percent Nunn-Domenici tax imposes 
a net higher burden than a five-percent VAT. The Armey proposal does not have a 
payroll credit, but a full deduction for wages, which is a greater benefit than the 
Nunn-Domenici credit. To compensate for this lost revenue, the Armey proposal 
must have a higher tax rate than the Nunn-Domenici proposal.139
As noted above, transition rules have the potential to provide substantial 
temporary relief under all the alternatives. The proportionate benefit of transition 
relief is related to the tax rate. Thus, transition rules under the Armey plan provide 
the greatest percentage reduction in tax.
2. Key Factors Determining Tax Liability
From Table 12.4 above (as well as Tables 12.A1 through 12.A11 which 
follow), a pattern begins to emerge about business consumption taxes. The four most 
important factors for determining overall liability are:
(1) The amount o f  each firm's wages and the treatment o f  wages under the 
alternative proposal. For almost all businesses, wage payments are the 
largest component of the tax base, but treatment of wages can be vastly 
different (i.e., included in base, deductible, or creditable) under 
alternative proposals.
(2) Transition rules. Transition relief can have an enormous impact on tax 
liabilities. This revenue loss may or may not be offset by temporarily 
higher tax rates. Transition relief may come in a variety of forms, and 
it is possible for it to be entirely omitted from the plans.
138This relationship is consistent with the tabulations presented in Congressional Budget Office (1995). 
According to the CBO, a 4.3 percent VAT would be needed to raise as much revenue as the corporation tax. 
The tables presented here are consistent with a 4.5 percent revenue neutral rate.
139A recent empirical study by Price Waterhouse also indicates that both the Nunn-Domenici proposal and 
a 17% Flat Tax generate more revenue from corporations than does the current corporation tax. See, Merrill, 
Wertz, and Shah (1995), p. 743, Exhibit 2. The calculations in the Price Waterhouse study are based on 1992 
Statistics o f Income data for nonfinancial corporations, while the calculations presented in this study are based 
on 1993 Commerce Department data for all corporations.
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(3) Tax rates. The range of possible rates for different reasonable 
proposals is enormous (as was stressed at the end of Chapter 9). 
Sometimes the simple impact of differences in tax rates is neglected 
because so much effort must be devoted to understanding the 
differences in the tax base.
(4) Exports and imports. It was noted above that in the aggregate the 
impact of border tax adjustments on the tax base is relatively small— 
about two percent of the total consumption tax burden. Underlying 
these aggregate figures, however, there lies a wide degree of variation. 
For example, it is not uncommon for a firm's exports to exceed 10 
percent of its sales.140 For many firms, even with this low exports-to- 
sale ratio, the deductibility o f exports can be a dominant factor in 
determining tax liability. In many cases, tax liability can be 
eliminated.141
3. Discussion o f  Exports and Imports 
a. Exports
The example in Table 12.5, based on actual data142 for manufacturers, demonstrates 
the importance of border adjustments for firms that export.
140See, Farnham (1987).
141The importance of exports was also stressed in the Price Waterhouse study of corporate tax liability. “The 
single most important factor in determining whether industries would have paid more or less under the USA 
proposal is net exports: industries with relatively high net exports per dollar o f gross receipts pay less tax.” Merrill, 
Wertz, and Shah (1995), p. 744.
142The details are explained in the Appendix to this chapter.
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Table 12.5
The Impact of the Deduction for Exports 
on the "Typical" Exporting Manufacturer
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Total Sales 100.0 100.0
Less Exports 10.0 10.0
Less Business 64.0 64.0
Purchases
Equals Tax Base 26.0 26.0
Tax Rate 5% 11%
Gross Tax 1.3 2.9
Wages 27.0 27.0
Wage Credit 0.0 1.9
Net Tax 1.3 1.0
Note: Net Tax
without Deduction for 1.8 2.1
Exports
Note: % Reduction in
Tax Due to Export
Deduction 28% 53%
For the "typical” manufacturer, the exclusion of exports from the tax base reduces the 
tax burden of a plain vanilla VAT by 28 percent. For the Nunn-Domenici proposal, 
the exclusion of exports from gross receipts reduces the tax burden by 53 percent. 
The Armey proposal does not provide any such relief for exports. Thus, in general it 
seems likely that exporters will favor the Nunn-Domenici proposal (and other 
consumption taxes with border tax adjustments) over the Armey Flat Tax.143
143Under the current income tax, exporters can benefit from either of two provisions: (1) the Foreign Sales 
Corporation (commonly known as "FSC") rules and the favorable "title-passage" export sourcing rules. The order 
of magnitude of benefits from these rules is much smaller than that which would be provided with border tax 
adjustments. Export benefits under current law exempt a certain portion o f income from exports from tax. Border 
tax adjustments exempt the entire amount of gross receipts from exports from tax.
135
b. Imports
Although the U.S. economy typically imports more than it exports, the impact 
o f import duties has not been included in the industry-by-industry calculations 
presented in this chapter. This is not because they are unimportant. As noted in the 
appendix to this chapter, U.S. imports were $538 billion in 1993. From Table 12.4, 
it can be seen that this amount accounts for about one-sixth o f the revenue collected 
under a regular VAT and about one-quarter of the revenue collected under the Nunn- 
Domenici proposal.
The reason for the exclusion of imports is the particular difficulty they pose 
in presentation. If—as is assumed by economists—the burden of consumption taxes 
is passed forward in price, businesses purchasing domestically-produced inputs will 
be subject to the same rise in costs as importers. For example, a border-adjustable 10- 
percent VAT will raise import prices and domestic prices by 10 percent. In this case, 
there is no special burden borne by importers. If import duties were included in the 
tables, they would result in a greater tax liability on importers even though their 
economic burden is no different than that faced by other domestic firms.
Suppose instead, for the sake of argument, that a border-adjustable VAT raised 
import prices by 10 percent and domestic prices by six percent. If  the firm is an 
importer and pays the import duty, including these duties in the calculation of liability 
would overstate the relative burden borne by the business. That firm would be worse 
off than the firm with purely domestic sources of supply, but only by four percent 
(and not the ten percent that would be shown in calculations of pure tax liability).
In addition, a firm that indirectly imports (e.g., a retailer supplied by an 
importing wholesaler) should not necessarily expect to bear no burden as a result of 
an import duty (when in fact its import costs may have risen by the full amount of the 
tax). The bottom line is that import duties can place a significant direct or indirect 
burden on a business. How different this burden is compared to non-importing firms 
is not clear. And no one calculation will do justice to the variety o f ways the tax may 
impact importing sectors. Accordingly, businesses that rely on imports as sources of 
supply should carefully study the possible impact of import duties on their costs.
D. Impact on Various Corporate Sectors
The previous section used aggregate corporate data to analyze how 
consumption tax proposals might affect a "typical" firm in the economy. In this 
section, the current income tax is compared to consumption tax proposals for a 
“typical” firm in a variety of business sectors. Of the thirteen components o f the total 
private sector analyzed, two industries—agriculture and real estate—were dropped
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from the analysis because of the small proportion of business activities undertaken by 
corporations in those sectors. The estimated proportion o f corporate business in each 
sector is shown in Table 12.6.144
Table 12.6
Estimated Proportion of Corporate Business
in Each Major Business Sector
Industry
Corporate
Percentage
(1) Manufacturing-Durables 97%
(2) Manufacturing- 94%
Nondurables 
(3) Mining 86%
(4) Construction 68%
(5) Transportation 86%
(6) Communication 88%
(7) Utilities 92%
(8) Wholesale Trade 97%
(9) Retail Trade 83%
(10) Finance 96%
(11) Services 63%
(12) Agriculture 20%
(13) Real Estate 7%
Total Private Sector 68%
Source: U.S. Department o f Commerce. See Appendix.
Tables 12.A1 through 12.A11 (in the Appendix to this Chapter) present 
estimates of tax liability under the current law and three consumption tax alternatives. 
The calculations are made for four different sets o f assumptions, as shown in the 
following table:
144The Appendix to this Chapter explains how the components of value added were allocated between the 
corporate and noncorporate sectors of each industry group.
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Table 12.7
Alternative Assumptions Used in Industry Tables
Assumptions 
Used in Tables
Legislation Transition 
Relief
Firms Export Position
#1 None No Exports
#2 Maximum Relief No Exports
#3 None "Typical" Exporter
#4 Maximum Relief "Typical" Exporter
These tables provide a great deal of information, and at first it is difficult to discern 
any patterns. Some industries appear to be winners, and some are losers. Patterns do 
emerge, however, after careful inspection.
7. No Transition, No Exports
Focusing first on the case of no transition and no exports (assumption #1), 
industries with percentages of employee compensation (wages and fringe benefits) 
that are low relative to other industries do better under the alternatives. This makes 
sense because consumption tax alternatives tax wages while the current corporate tax 
does not. Also, industries with relatively high levels o f profit seem to do better under 
the alternatives. Again, this makes sense because the corporate income tax is a tax 
exclusively on profits. Under the alternatives, profits are only a small component of 
the tax base.
To highlight this point, the ratio of profit to employee compensation was 
calculated for each industry, and then the industries were sorted by this statistic. The 
estimated ratio of profit to employee compensation for each of the 11 major corporate 
sectors is shown in Table 12.8.
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Table 12.8
Ratio of Profit to Total Employee Compensation 
For M ajor Corporate Sectors, 1993
Industry Profit Divided by 
Compensation
Utilities 64%
Communications 48%
Finance 42%
Manufacturing-
Nondurables
23%
Wholesale 16%
Retail 12%
Mining 10%
Manufacturing-Durables 8%
Transportation 7%
Services 6%
Construction 6%
When tax liabilities are sorted by this ratio a clear pattern emerges: In general, the 
higher the ratio o f  profi t-to-employee compensation, the more attractive are 
consumption tax proposals relative to current law. In other words, industries with 
relatively high profits would prefer a consumption tax to an income tax. This can be 
directly observed in Chart 12.1 which appears at the end of this chapter.
Among industries, utilities, communications, and finance pay less tax under all three 
alternatives because of their relatively high level of profits and relatively low level of 
wages. Other industries fare worse under the alternatives (compared to current law) 
because of low profitability and/or their greater labor intensity.
2. Peak Transition, No Exports
Whether or not—and in what form --transition relief will be part of consumption 
tax alternatives is an open issue. The calculations in this study show that transition 
relief has the potential during the transition period to be important to many firms in 
a variety of industries. In Chart 12.2, transition benefits are assumed to be available 
under all three consumption tax alternatives. Two observations can be made. First, 
o f the three consumption alternatives, the relative attractiveness of the Flat Tax 
improves most due to transition relief. This is because transition depreciation 
deductions are more valuable under the proposal's 17-percent rate than under the
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lower rates of the other alternatives (i.e., 11- and five-percent). Second, transition 
relief is more beneficial to the more capital-intensive industries, like manufacturing 
and mining, as shown in Chart 12.2 which appears at the end of this chapter.
3. No Transition, "Typical" Exporter
Border tax adjustments would be available under a typical VAT and under the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal. They are not available under the Flat Tax or under current 
law. Chart 12.3, which appears at the end of this chapter, shows that if  a firm in any 
o f these sectors exports as much as a "typical" manufacturer, comparisons of the 
alternatives change dramatically. The Nunn-Domenici proposal becomes the best 
alternative for nine of the 11 corporate sectors.
4. Overview o f  Results and Caveats
In the long run (i.e., after any transition period), a key factor for determining 
the relative position before and after imposition of a replacement consumption tax is 
the ratio of profit to total employee compensation. High-profit/low-wage firms will 
find alternatives to current law attractive. Transition rules can provide significant 
relief if  the firm is capital intensive. Furthermore, transition deductions will be more 
valuable as the tax rate climbs. Finally, the availability of border tax adjustments is 
extremely important to exporters.
It must be stressed that these calculations are only approximations of what 
particular firms in each industry might experience. All o f the calculations assume no 
tax preferences. Clearly this is not true under current law, and it is yet to be seen how 
important tax preferences will be under the proposed reforms. Another issue is tax 
rates. The tax rates used follow the current legislative drafts, but rates are highly 
susceptible to change--e.g., to pay for additional preferences, to pay for transition 
relief, or to raise additional revenue for deficit reduction.
The data used are based on 1993 data that may no longer be relevant for 1996 
or later years. (Cycles and trends in profitability make profit figures particularly 
suspect.) For each industry, the corporate components of wages, fringe benefits, and 
interest had to be estimated. How transition relief and "typical" exporters are 
characterized are only good estimates. Transition relief under actual proposals and 
export intensity of particular firms are both likely to vary widely.
For this reason it is important for individual firms (and their advisors) to take 
stock of their (and their client's) own circumstances in assessing the impact of 
consumption taxes. Toward this end, the worksheets of the following section should 
provide some useful guidance.
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E. Worksheets fo r  Individual Firm Analysis
The calculations presented thus far hopefully have helped to take abstract 
discussions of consumption taxes and turn them into reality. To further bring home 
the reality of these taxes, the following recently published worksheets allow tax and 
accounting professionals to determine consumption liabilities for their own and their 
clients’ businesses.145,146
Under the Armey plan (see Table 12.9), businesses include all receipts from 
domestic business-including exports—in gross active income. Wages are deductible, 
but fringe benefits are not. Capital purchases are expensed. Interest income is not 
includable and interest expense is not deductible. There are no deductions for 
property or state income taxes. There are no tax credits. The tax rate is 17 percent, 
and payroll taxes are unaffected by the tax.
Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal (see Table 12.10), exports are excluded 
from the tax base and imports are subject to tax at the border. The rate of tax and rate 
of import duty are both 11 percent. As under the Armey plan, capital purchases are 
expensed. As under the Armey plan, interest expense, fringe benefits, and property 
and state income taxes are not deductible. Wages are not deductible, but the 
employer portion of the payroll tax is creditable against the tax.
145The worksheets were developed by Arthur Andersen and were recently reprinted in Tax Notes Magazine. 
See Bernstein, Fogarsi, and Gordon (1995).
146The calculations look at the “big picture”. They do not examine all gradations and industries. Some 
generalizations about industries may be misleading because of significant differences in structure within the 
industry.
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Table 12.9
ARMEY FLAT TAX PLAN 
Business Tax Worksheet
Gross Active Income:
Gross Receipts from Sales of Goods and Services
Proceeds from Sales o f Business Assets
TOTAL INCOME
Deductions:
Compensation
Contributions to Qualified Retirement Plans
Capital Equipment
Inventory Items
Real Estate
Other Business Property
Supplies
Services
Travel and Entertainment
Excise Taxes
Transition Deductions
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS ( )
NET RECEIPTS
Business Tax Rate (17%) x .17
TOTAL TAX LIABILITY
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Table 12.10
NUNN-DOMENICI USA PLAN 
Business Tax Worksheet
Receipts:
Gross Receipts from Domestic Sales of Goods and
Services __________
Proceeds from Sales o f Business Assets __________
TOTAL RECEIPTS ___________
Business Purchases:
Capital Equipment __________
Inventory Items __________
Real Estate __________
Other Business Property __________
Rent __________
Supplies __________
Services __________
Bad debts __________
Travel and Entertainment __________
Excise Taxes __________
Transition Deductions ___________
TOTAL PURCHASES ( _________)_
GROSS PROFIT (not less than zero) ___________
Business Tax Rate (11%) x .11
Tax liability ___________
Payroll tax credit (__________
TOTAL BUSINESS TAX DUE (a) ___________
Imports
Total cost o f imported products & services purchased ___________
Import Tax (11%) x .11
TOTAL IMPORT TAX DUE (b) ___________
TOTAL TAX LIABILITY (a)+(b)
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Appendix 12A
Computation of Corporate Tax Liability for 11 Industry 
Groups Under Current Law and Three Major Alternatives
The following calculations are the basis for Charts 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 in the 
text. Calculations are made for the four sets of assumptions shown in Table 12.7. “#1 
Net Tax” assumes no exports and no transition relief. “#2 Tax with Transition” 
equals Net Tax minus the product of the tax rate and Maximum Transition 
Depreciation. “#3 Tax for Exporter” equals Net Tax times the product of the tax rate 
times “Exports.” “#4 Tax for Exporter with Transition” equal “#3 Tax for Exporter” 
minus the product of the tax rate times Maximum Transition Depreciation. Further, 
details about the underlying data are found in Appendix 12.B. As noted in the text, 
many assumptions have been made to produce these tables. The information in the 
two appendices will allow industrious readers who are uncomfortable with the 
assumptions made to substitute their own.
Table 12.A1
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and Consumption Tax 
Alternatives: MANUFACTURING-DURABLES
Current
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Arm ey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.0 344.4 344.4 0.0
Fringe Benefits 0.0 88.5 88.5 88.5
Interest 0.0 6.4 6.4 6.4
Profit 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3
Nondeductible Taxes 0.0 10.6 10.6 10.6
Benefit o f Expensing 0.0 -24.6 -24.6 -24.6
Total Tax Base 36.3 461.7 461.7 117.3
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 12.7 23.1 50.8 19.9
Payroll Credit 0.0 0.0 24.2 0.0
#1 Net Tax 12.7 23.1 26.6 19.9
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.0 69.4 69.4 69.4
"Exports" 0.0 166.2 166.2 0.0
# 2  Tax with Transition 12.7 19.6 18.9 8.1
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 12.7 14.8 8.3 8.1
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 12.7 11.3 0.7 8.1
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Table 12.A2
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and Consumption Tax 
Alternatives: MANUFACTURING-NONDURABLES
Current
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.0 224.2 224.2 0.0
Fringe Benefits 0.0 54.7 54.7 54.7
Interest 0.0 30.5 30.5 30.5
Profit 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0
Nondeductible Taxes 0.0 25.9 25.9 25.9
Benefit o f Expensing 0.0 -19.6 -19.6 -19.6
Total Tax Base 63.0 378.7 378.7 154.5
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 22.0 18.9 41.7 26.3
Payroll Credit 0.0 0.0 15.8 0.0
#1 Net Tax 22.0 18.9 25.9 26.3
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.0 55.3 55.3 55.3
"Exports" 0.0 136.3 136.3 0.0
# 2 Tax with Transition 22.0 16.2 19.8 16.9
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 22.0 12.1 10.9 16.9
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 22.0 9.4 4.8 16.9
Table 12.A3
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Current
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.00 22.27 22.27 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 5.36 5.36 5.36
Interest 0.00 1.71 1.71 1.71
Profit 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 4.77 4.77 4.77
Benefit of Expensing 0.00 -10.28 -10.28 -10.28
Total Tax Base 2.86 26.69 26.69 4.43
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 1.00 1.33 2.94 0.75
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 1.57 0.00
#1 Net Tax 1.00 1.33 1.37 0.75
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 29.07 29.07 29.07
"Exports" 0.00 9.61 9.61 0.00
2 Tax with Transition 1.00 -0.12 -1.83 -4.19
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 1.00 0.85 0.31 -4.19
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 1.00 -0.60 -2.88 -4.19
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Table 12.A4
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax 
and Consumption Tax Alternatives: CONSTRUCTION
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.00 89.66 89.66 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 17.97 17.97 17.97
Interest 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.68
Profit 6.54 6.54 6.54 6.54
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 2.20 2.20 2.20
Benefit o f Expensing 0.00 -2.67 -2.67 -2.67
Total Tax Base 6.54 114.36 114.36 24.71
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 2.29 5.72 12.58 4.20
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 6.30 0.00
#1 Net Tax 2.29 5.72 6.28 4.20
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 7.55 7.55 7.55
"Exports'* 0.00 41.17 41.17 0.00
# 2 Tax with Transition 2.29 5.34 5.45 2.92
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 2.29 3.66 1.75 2.92
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 2.29 3.28 0.92 2.92
Table 12.A5
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: TRANSPORTATION
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
F lat Tax
Wages 0.00 95.03 95.03 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 22.35 22.35 22.35
Interest 0.00 9.24 9.24 9.24
Profit 7.88 7.88 7.88 7.88
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 5.07 5.07 5.07
Benefit o f Expensing 0.00 -7.81 -7.81 -7.81
Total Tax Base 7.88 131.76 131.76 36.73
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 2.76 6.59 14.49 6.24
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 6.68 0.00
#1 Net Tax 2.76 6.59 7.81 6.24
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 22.08 22.08 22.08
"Exports" 0.00 47.43 47.43 0.00
# 2 Tax with Transition 2.76 5.48 5.38 2.49
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 2.76 4.22 2.60 2.49
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 2.76 3.11 0.17 2.49
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Table 12.A6
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: COMMUNICATION
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.00 45.45 45.45 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 12.92 12.92 12.92
Interest 0.00 11.31 11.31 11.31
Profit 28.02 28.02 28.02 28.02
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 7.69 7.69 7.69
Benefit o f Expensing 0.00 -12.69 -12.69 -12.69
Total Tax Base 28.02 92.69 92.69 47.24
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 9.81 4.63 10.20 8.03
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 3.19 0.00
#1 Net Tax 9.81 4.63 7.00 8.03
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 35.88 35.88 35.88
"Exports" 0.00 33.37 33.37 0.00
# 2 Tax with Transition 9.81 2.84 3.05 1.93
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 9.81 2.97 3.33 1.93
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 9.81 1.17 -0.62 1.93
Table 12.A7
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: UTILITIES
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.00 38.52 38.52 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 9.85 9.85 9.85
Interest 0.00 21.05 21.05 21.05
Profit 30.93 30.93 30.93 30.93
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 12.92 12.92 12.92
Benefit o f Expensing 0.00 -12.57 -12.57 -12.57
Total Tax Base 30.93 100.71 100.71 62.19
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 10.83 5.04 11.08 10.57
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 2.71 0.00
#1 Net Tax 10.83 5.04 8.37 10.57
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 35.54 35.54 35.54
"Exports" 0.00 36.26 36.26 0.00
# 2 Tax with Transition 10.83 3.26 4.46 4.53
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 10.83 3.22 4.38 4.53
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 10.83 1.45 0.47 4.53
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Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: WHOLESALE TRADE
Current
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.00 199.30 199.30 0.00
Fringe Benefits 0.00 36.89 36.89 36.89
Interest 0.00 6.28 6.28 6.28
Profit 38.35 38.35 38.35 38.35
Nondeductible Taxes 0.00 38.66 38.66 38.66
Benefit o f Expensing 0.00 -9.61 -9.61 -9.61
Total Tax Base 38.35 309.87 309.87 110.57
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 13.42 15.49 34.09 18.80
Payroll Credit 0.00 0.00 14.01 0.00
#1 Net Tax 13.42 15.49 20.07 18.80
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.00 27.19 27.19 27.19
"Exports" 0.00 111.55 111.55 0.00
# 2 Tax with Transition 13.42 14.13 17.08 14.17
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 13.42 9.92 7.80 14.17
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 13.42 8.56 4.81 14.17
Table 12.A9
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: RETAIL TRADE
Current
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.0 245.1 245.1 0.0
Fringe Benefits 0.0 42.6 42.6 42.6
Interest 0.0 10.4 10.4 10.4
Profit 35.3 35.3 35.3 35.3
Nondeductible Taxes 0.0 46.6 46.6 46.6
Benefit o f Expensing 0.0 -10.1 -10.1 -10.1
Total Tax Base 35.3 369.9 369.9 124.8
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 12.4 18.5 40.7 21.2
Payroll Credit 0.0 0.0 17.2 0.0
#1 Net Tax 12.4 18.5 23.5 21.2
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.0 28.6 28.6 28.6
"Exports" 0.0 133.2 133.2 0.0
# 2 Tax with Transition 12.4 17.1 20.3 16.3
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 12.4 11.8 8.8 16.3
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 12.4 10.4 5.7 16.3
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Table 12.A10
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: FINANCE
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
Flat Tax
Wages 0.0 213.8 213.8 0.0
Fringe Benefits 0.0 38.4 38.4 38.4
Interest 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Profit 106.9 106.9 106.9 106.9
Nondeductible Taxes 0.0 19.2 19.2 19.2
Benefit o f Expensing 0.0 -11.4 -11.4 -11.4
Total Tax Base 106.9 366.2 366.2 152.3
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 37.4 18.3 40.3 25.9
Payroll Credit 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0
#1 Net Tax 37.4 18.3 25.2 25.9
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.0 32.3 32.3 32.3
"Exports” 0.0 131.8 131.8 0.0
# 2 Tax with Transition 37.4 16.7 21.7 20.4
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 37.4 11.7 10.7 20.4
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 37.4 10.1 7.2 20.4
Table 12.A11
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and 
Consumption Tax Alternatives: SERVICES
C urrent
Law
5%
VAT
Nunn-
Domenici
Armey 
F lat Tax
Wages 0.0 485.6 485.6 0.0
Fringe Benefits 0.0 78.6 78.6 78.6
Interest 0.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Profit 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6
Nondeductible Taxes 0.0 10.8 10.8 10.8
Benefit o f Expensing 0.0 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9
Total Tax Base 36.6 608.7 608.7 123.1
Tax Rate 35% 5% 11% 17%
Gross Tax 12.8 30.4 67.0 20.9
Payroll Credit 0.0 0.0 34.1 0.0
#1 Net Tax 12.8 30.4 32.8 20.9
Maximum Transition Depreciation 0.0 39.2 39.2 39.2
"Exports" 0.0 219.1 219.1 0.0
# 2 Tax with Transition 12.8 28.5 28.5 14.3
# 3 Tax for "Exporter" 12.8 19.5 8.7 14.3
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition 12.8 17.5 4.4 14.3
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Appendix 12B
Additional Notes About Data
The data used in this chapter are unpublished 1993 data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the Commerce Department. Value added for each industry was 
calculated by subtracting depreciation from gross domestic product. The data were 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis on a diskette labeled, "Gross Product 
by Industry, 1947-93," USDOC, BEA, NIWD (BE-51)," Washington DC 20230, 
Release Date May 1995.
A. Aggregate Tax Liability
The adjustments to the Commerce Department data shown in Table 12.3 were 
calculated as follows:
(1) Expensing. The Commerce Department calculates value added by 
depreciating capital equipment (the "income method"). Most value- 
added taxes calculate the tax base by expensing capital purchases (the 
"consumption method").147 In 1993, the Commerce Department data 
show that gross private domestic investment ($882.0 billion) exceed 
depreciation ($669.1 billion) by 31.8 percent.148 As the first step 
toward adjusting Commerce Department value added to a VAT tax 
base, depreciation is multiplied by 1.318 and subtracted from 
Commerce Department value added.
(2) Exports and Imports. Total U.S. exports in 1993 were $456.9 billion. 
On that year total U.S. imports were $538.0 billion. In the data 
analyses of this chapter, exports and imports were allocated across 
industries in proportion to their value added, and then between 
corporate and noncorporate components o f each industry by the 
proportion of depreciation in the corporate and noncorporate 
component of each industry.
(3) Indirect business taxes. Indirect business taxes are composed primarily 
of excise taxes and property taxes. Under the Armey and the Nunn- 
Domenici plans, excise taxes are deductible but property taxes are not. 
In 1993, total state and local excise taxes equaled $212.4 billion and 
Federal excise taxes equaled $45.6 billion. In the aggregate 
calculations, this amount is subtracted from the value-added tax base.
147See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further explanation.
l48U.S. President, Executive Office of the President, Economic Report o f  the President 1995, p. 294.
150
Across industries, this amount is allocated in proportion to indirect 
business taxes. (In the aggregate, excise taxes were 49 percent o f total 
indirect business taxes in 1993.)
(4) Transition Depreciation. Whether or not transition relief will be 
granted is a controversial issue. As an illustration of the potential 
impact of these provisions, the calculations include a downward 
adjustment of the tax base equal to 90 percent of depreciation 
allowance in 1993. This is meant to be a proxy for the amount of 
transition depreciation that would be allowed in the first year after the 
effective date. O f course in later years (or if  transition relief was not 
complete), the amount would be less. In the aggregate, total private 
sector depreciation in 1993 was $644 billion, 13.1 percent o f value 
added.
(5) Payroll credit. A critical component o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal 
is the payroll credit. The payroll credit is 7.65 percent o f wages paid 
to each individual up to $61,200 (in 1995) and 1.45 percent for all 
amounts above $61,200. In this analysis it is assumed that 90 percent 
o f all wages generate the 7.65 percent tax credit. Thus, the average 
effective rate o f credit is 7.03 percent.
B. Allocations Between Corporate and Noncorporate Businesses
Corporate profits and payments to owners of noncorporate business were 
allocated 100 percent to the corporate and noncorporate sectors respectively. Other 
components of value added—wages, fringe benefits, net interest, rent, and business 
taxes—were allocated in proportion to the amount of corporate and noncorporate 
depreciation in each sector. The ratio o f corporate to total depreciation in each 
industry is shown in Table 12.6 and is used in Tables 12A. 1 through 12A. 11.
C. Estimate o f  the “Typical” Exporter
The "typical" exporter for each industry is calculated in the following manner. 
Based on the observation that large exporters typically export between five and fifteen 
percent of their sales,149 it is assumed that a "typical" exporter has exports equal to 10 
percent of sales. Total sales by manufacturers in 1993 was $3,015 billion.150 Total 
value added (as measured under a regular VAT tax base) for the manufacturing sector
149Fortune (1987), p.80.
150Economic Report of the President (1995), p. 382.
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is $840 billion.151 Thus, the ratio of value added to sales is approximately 28 percent 
and the ratio of exports to value added is approximately 36 percent. These estimates 
are used in Table 12.5 and Tables 12A.1 through 12A.11.
151See Tables 12.9a and Table 12.9b of this chapter.
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Chapter 13
The Impact of Consumption Taxes 
on Individuals and on Noncorporate Businesses
Summary
• Under current law, the individual tax burden per dollar o f  income is largest 
fo r  upper-income households.
• Relative to current law, the Nunn-Domenici proposal appears to provide tax 
relief to the lowest and highest income classes, and a modest tax increase to middle- 
income taxpayers.
• The individual component o f  the Flat Tax appears to provide tax relief for 
nearly all individual taxpayers. It is likely, therefore, that with a 17-percent rate, the 
Flat Tax raises significantly less revenue than the current individual income tax.
• Under the Flat Tax, the individual tax burden per dollar o f  income is largest 
fo r  middle-income taxpayers. Higher-income households enjoy substantial relief 
under the tax because capital income is exempt.
• Both the Nunn-Domenici proposal and the Flat Tax impose new tax burdens 
on noncorporate business. For a "typical” small business, the Nunn-Domenici 
proposal imposes a greater business burden than the Flat Tax.
• For owners o f  unincorporated businesses, the combined individual and 
business tax burden under the Flat Tax appears to be less than the burden under 
current law. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, the combined burden appears to 
be greater than current law except in the case o f  low-income business owners 
(particularly when business income is only a small component o f  total family income). 
In contrast, high-income owners o f  unincorporated businesses generally appear to 
pay a much greater amount o f  taxes under the Nunn-Domenici proposal than under 
current law.
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The focus o f this study so far has been on business taxes. In this chapter 
attention is shifted to individual taxes. Part A compares the individual tax burden 
under (1) current law, (2) the Flat Tax, and (3) the Nunn-Domenici tax. Part B 
examines the combined individual and business tax burdens o f the owners o f 
noncorporate business under these same three alternatives. To acquaint readers with 
the details o f each alternative, numerous examples are presented. In all cases, care 
has been taken to present examples that are realistic. This is achieved by basing the 
calculations on the extensive data collected by the IRS from individual and business 
tax returns.
A. The Impact o f  Consumption Taxes on Individuals
1. Background
Before delving into the calculations, it is useful to review some basic facts 
about the current individual income tax. In 1993 (the latest year for which 
comprehensive data are available), $632 billion of federal individual income tax 
revenue was collected, and more than 115 million individual income tax returns were 
filed. As shown in Chart 13.1, which appears at the end of this chapter, more than 
half o f these returns showed adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than $30,000. These 
returns accounted for only about 10 percent o f total individual income tax collected. 
In contrast, more than one third of total individual income tax revenue is collected 
from the four percent of tax returns with adjusted gross income in excess o f $100,000. 
It is also worth noting that only 29 percent of all individual tax filings included 
itemized deductions.152
2. Preview o f  Calculations
The factual basis for the calculations presented in this chapter are the data 
collected by the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division o f the IRS. Because o f the likely 
lag in enactment o f any major consumption tax proposal, all data were adjusted to 
levels that would prevail in the year 2000 based on currently available Congressional 
Budget Office estimates of inflation. Data for each income class (e.g., those returns 
with adjusted gross income between $10,000 and $25,000) were then averaged and
152The 1993 individual income tax return data that serve as the basis o f the comments in this paragraph, as 
well as the basis for individual tax return calculations in the following tables are shown in Table 13A.1 in the 
Appendix to this chapter.
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adjusted so AGI classifications were round numbers. The resulting data used in the 
calculations are intended to be reasonable approximations of what tax returns for a 
given amount of AGI might be in the year 2000. It is extremely important to 
remember, however, that there can be substantial variance within each income 
category. For example, some high-income individuals who are renters will have no 
mortgage deductions even though the average mortgage deduction in their income 
category may be quite large.
In addition to adjusting the data, computer models were developed for each of 
the three alternatives examined. For current law, it was assumed that 1993 law would 
prevail in the year 2000. Current law and the two consumption tax alternatives have 
numerous adjustments for inflation (e.g., for the standard deductions, exemption 
amounts, and tax brackets). All of these adjustments were calculated for levels that 
would prevail in the year 2000 given current projections about future inflation.
3. The Results o f  the Calculations
a. The Current Individual Income Tax
Table 13.1 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two 
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under current law. Personal 
exemptions and the standard deduction allow most low-income households to entirely 
escape tax. Many low-income households with children receive refunds as a result 
o f the earned income tax credit (EITC). As income increases, so do itemized 
deductions, and therefore most taxpayers with adjusted gross income in excess of 
$50,000 itemize deductions.153 In general, the larger amounts of itemized deductions 
are on average not enough to offset the impact o f the progressive rate structure 
enacted into law in 1993 (and to a lesser extent, the phase out of itemized deductions 
and personal exemptions enacted into law in 1990). On the whole, tax as a 
percentage of AGI rises as income rises, i.e., the current tax system is progressive.
b. The Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax
Table 13.2 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two 
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under the individual tax of the Nunn- 
Domenici proposal. In addition to the earned income credit, the refundable payroll
153As shown in Table 13A.1, the three largest itemized deductions are deductions for state and local taxes, 
deductions for mortgage interest, and deductions for charitable contributions.
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tax credit provides substantial tax relief to low-income working households. Under 
the Nunn-Domenici proposal, personal exemption amounts are slightly lower than 
current law (but they do not phase-out for high-bracket taxpayers as under current 
law). On the other hand, the family allowance (which can be considered the 
equivalent to the standard deduction under current law) is slightly larger than the 
standard deduction available under current law. Moreover, unlike the itemized 
deduction, the family allowance is available to all taxpayers (and, therefore, low 
income taxpayers will get some benefits from itemized deductions).
Unlike current law, where the top 39.6-percent bracket is not imposed until 
taxable income reaches $250,000, the Nunn-Domenici proposal imposes its top 40- 
percent rate on middle-income households. As a general rule, most saving is done by 
the wealthiest individuals, and low-income households in general do little or no 
saving. The great benefit to high-income households is the deduction for new saving. 
But this benefit varies widely because the rate o f saving among high-income 
households can vary greatly.
In general, the Nunn-Domenici proposal seems to place tax burdens on middle- 
income taxpayers that are comparable to current law and provides some relief to low- 
and high-income taxpayers.
c. The Individual Flat Tax
Table 13.3 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two 
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under the individual component of 
the Flat Tax. Perhaps the most prominent feature of the individual Flat Tax is the size 
of the personal allowances. They are far larger than the combined standard deduction 
and personal exemptions available under current law or the Nunn-Domenici proposal. 
For a family of four, these allowances are estimated to sum to $35,250 by the year 
2000. These large personal allowances permit lower-income taxpayers to escape tax 
in far greater numbers than current law. Moreover, unlike current law, taxpayers may 
claim refunds for negative tax (i.e., for an amount equal to the tax rate times any 
excess of deductions over adjusted gross income). To some extent, this offsets the 
impact of the repeal o f the earned income tax credit under the proposal.
The Flat Tax has a single low rate that provides a significant advantage to 
high-income taxpayers relative to current law and relative to the Nunn-Domenici 
proposal. Moreover, because high-income taxpayers receive a far greater fraction of 
their income from capital than low-income taxpayers, high-income taxpayers enjoy 
significant tax relief under the Flat Tax despite the complete elimination of itemized 
deductions.
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d. Comparison o f  the Alternatives
The three alternatives can be compared at a glance with the summary presented 
in Chart 13.2, which appears at the end of this chapter. This graph shows tax as a 
percent of AGI for married couples with two children for different income levels. 
With regard to overall amount of tax paid, the most striking feature of the diagram is 
the significantly lower amounts of individual tax collected under the Flat Tax 
compared to current law. It is likely that the Flat Tax's 17-percent rate would have 
to be increased substantially to raise as much revenue as the current individual income 
tax.
With regard to the distribution of the tax burden, both the current individual 
income tax and the individual Nunn-Domenici tax appear to maintain progressivity 
through all income levels. Compared to current law, the Nunn-Domenici proposal 
provides more relief for the poor—primarily through the refundable payroll credit— 
and more relief for the wealthy—primarily through the deduction for savings. The 
individual component of the Flat Tax provides substantial relief to the poor—despite 
the repeal of the EITC--by allowing refunds when taxable compensation is negative. 
The highest income categories actually may have lower effective tax rates than upper- 
middle income taxpayers because income from capital is exempt from tax.
B. The Impact o f  Consumption Taxes on Noncorporate Businesses
1. Background
In the prior chapter, business taxes were analyzed by comparing the business 
consumption taxes to the corporate income tax. The focus there was purely on entity- 
level taxes. In this section, the impacts of consumption taxes on noncorporate 
business are analyzed by comparing current law to the combined impact of individual 
and business-level taxes under the proposed alternatives.
The Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service 
collects and publishes extensive amounts of data on sole proprietorships and 
partnerships.154 The data were carefully inspected to identify some realistic and 
representative examples of noncorporate business.
154The underlying partnership and sole proprietorship data are presented in more detail in the appendix to this 
chapter in Tables 13A.2 and 13A.3.
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Chart 13.3 shows that partnership income is heavily concentrated among those 
businesses providing highly skilled professional services—such as lawyers (36 percent 
o f total partnership income), physicians (9 percent), and accountants (8 percent). 
Chart 13.4 shows that partners in these professions on average generate far greater 
income from their partnerships than do other partners in other lines o f business. Chart 
13.5 shows that partnership and S corporation income is highly concentrated in the 
upper-income brackets.155
In contrast to the case o f partnerships, sole proprietorship income is more 
evenly spread throughout different types of business. This is shown in Chart 13.6. 
This is because sole proprietorship data are dominated by numerous small businesses 
generating relatively low levels o f income. Chart 13.7 shows that as in the case of 
partnerships the highly skilled professionals still generate higher than average returns. 
Chart 13.8 indicates that sole proprietorship income is spread much more uniformly 
across income classes than partnership income.156
2. Case Studies o f  Noncorporate Business
With these data as points of reference, case studies o f four noncorporate 
businesses and their owners were constructed and analyzed. The data and the results 
of the calculations are described below.
a. Case 1. Mom and Pop Retail Store
Although not important in terms of income generated, truly small businesses 
are quite numerous in the Unites States. In 1992, there were 2.8 million sole 
proprietorships in retail and wholesale trade. The average income generated by each 
of these businesses was just under $5,000. In the first case study (Table 13.4), a 
family of four has total adjusted gross income of $21,000 in the year 2000 o f which 
$20,000 is from their small business. They have two part-time employees whom they 
pay $12,500 each.
Under current law, this family takes the standard deduction. This deduction, 
along with four personal exemptions, nearly eliminate their entire income tax liability. 
There is no entity-level business tax.
155The data source for this chart is Michael E. Weber, "Individual Income Tax returns, 1993: Early Tax 
Estimates," Statistics o f  Income Bulletin, Internal Revenue Service, Fall 1994, Washington D.C.
156The data source for this chart is the same as for Chart 13.5. See footnote 3.
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Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, the family benefits relative to current law 
because they can deduct their mortgage interest payments and charitable 
contributions, and their small addition to saving. This approximately offsets the 
personal exemption deductions that are somewhat smaller than current law. The 
biggest difference, however, between the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax and the 
current individual income tax is the availability of the refundable payroll credit under 
the new system, which provides a substantial benefit to this family. These benefits 
on the individual side, however, are more than offset on the business side. While the 
business pays no income tax under current law, there is an 11-percent tax on the small 
business's value-added (primarily wages to employees and payments to the owner). 
Despite the availability of the payroll credit, this results in a significant new tax 
burden on the family business, and a much greater total burden on its proprietors.
Under the Flat Tax, the family has a significant negative tax liability because 
o f the large family and dependency deductions allowed. Because negative tax 
liability is refundable under the proposal, this results in a large refund to the family. 
This large refund offsets the business tax burden and leaves the family with a 
somewhat smaller total tax burden than current law. (The business tax burden is 
significantly less than under the Nunn-Domenici proposal because salaries and 
payments to owners are deductible under the Flat Tax.)
Overall, for this family with a small business, both consumption tax 
alternatives provide substantial individual tax relief relative to current law. In the 
case of Nunn-Domenici, this benefit is overwhelmed by a large new business tax 
burden. In the case of the Flat Tax, the new business tax burden is almost entirely 
negated by individual tax benefit.
b. Case 2. Two-Earner Couple with One Earner 
Owning Small Business
In the second case study (Table 13.5), a family of four has two breadwinners. 
One is an employee with an annual salary of $33,000, and the second has a small 
business clearing $15,000. Thus, unlike the first case study, a much smaller portion 
of family income is business income. The business pays about $11,000 in wages to 
its single employee.
As in the first case, with regard to the individual tax, the family does better 
than under current law. In the case of the Nunn-Domenici proposal, this is due to the 
availability o f the family allowance and personal deductions in addition to itemized 
deductions and the deduction for new saving. In the case of the Flat Tax, this is due 
to the generous family and dependency deductions.
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Also, as in the first case, the benefits under the individual consumption tax 
alternatives are countered by a higher business tax. In this case, however, business 
income and business taxes are not as dominant in the family finances, and under both 
plans the family has a reduced tax burden relative to current law.
c. Case 3. Sole Practitioner Physician
In the third case study (Table 13.6), a family of four has $145,000 of income 
in the year 2000 from two sources. $120,000 is generated by one spouse with a 
medical practice, and the remainder is income from investments. Part o f the medical 
practice expenses are $22,000 of salary to its sole employee.
Under current law, the $14,500 of itemized deductions is used instead of the 
standard deduction. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, tax rates are generally 
higher, but the family benefits from the availability of a family allowance and a 
deduction for additional saving. The net result is that this family pays virtually the 
same individual tax under current law and the Nunn-Domenici proposal. Under the 
Flat Tax, despite the denial of itemized deductions, the family is far better off than 
under current law because of family and dependency deductions and because of the 
lower tax rate imposed.
The Nunn-Domenici business tax provides a large new tax burden for the 
medical practice and overall leaves the family with a larger tax burden than under 
current law. The business component of the Flat Tax also provides a new burden, but 
it is small relative to that under Nunn-Domenici and insufficient to completely offset 
the individual benefits under the Flat Tax.
d. Case 4. Partner at Law Firm
This fourth case (Table 13.7) is in many ways similar to the prior case except 
income levels are higher. The family of four generates $230,000 of income—most o f 
it from one parent's share of law partnership profits. If  the law partnership's salaries 
to employees were allocated in proportion to partners' income, this partner's share 
would be about $150,000.
Under current law, this family itemizes deductions. Under Nunn-Domenici, 
the family gets a family allowance and savings deduction in addition to itemized 
deductions, but these benefits do not offset the burdens of higher rates. The family 
pays significantly more individual tax than under current law. The family pays less 
individual tax under the Flat Tax than under current law, primarily due to the lower 
rates available under the new plan.
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Consideration of business taxes make the Nunn-Domenici proposal even less 
attractive. Not only does the Nunn-Domenici individual tax impose a greater burden 
than current law, but in addition a substantial new business tax is incurred. The 
business tax disallows deductions for employment costs, so salaries and benefits of 
hired labor as well as o f the partners are all taxed. The net result is that under the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal the total individual and business tax burden for this family 
increases by nearly 80 percent relative to current law. The Flat Tax imposes a much 
smaller business tax burden, and (as in the case of the physician's family, above), this 
new business burden does not completely offset the benefits enjoyed (relative to 
current law) under the individual tax. Thus, for these professionals the burden of the 
Flat Tax is less than that o f current law.
C. A Note About the Taxation o f  Estates, Trusts, and Gifts
Under current law, bequests at death are taxed under a separate federal estate 
tax. A federal gift tax is imposed on lifetime transfers. Also, income generated by 
trusts and estates are subject to income tax after reflecting a flow-through deduction 
for distributions to beneficiaries.
The administration of estate and gift taxes is separable from the administration 
o f consumption taxes. Thus, a new retail sales tax, value-added tax, or individual 
consumption tax could be implemented with or without existing estate and gift 
taxes.157 The proposed Flat Tax eliminates these transfer taxes while the Nunn- 
Domenici tax system retains estate and gift taxes and provides for carryover basis at 
death. As a matter of policy, some might argue that estate and gift taxes are more 
important than ever if  a consumption tax replaces the income tax because estate and 
gift taxes are highly progressive taxes that would be necessary to offset the 
regressivity of consumption taxes. On the other hand, others argue that estate and gift 
taxes—like income taxes—penalize the accumulation of saving and wealth that is 
necessary for capital formation. Thus, Rep. Archer has suggested that estate and gift 
taxes be eliminated under a National Sales tax, but has not done so by proposed 
legislation to-date.
With regard to the income from trusts and estates, it seems likely that under 
any retail sales tax or value-added tax (which are only collected from businesses) 
their gross receipts would be exempt from tax unless these receipts were business 
receipts (i.e., these receipts were generated by business transactions where the 
business's legal entity is the trust itself and did not flow through a taxable business
157Bequests and inheritance could be brought into the system through accessions.
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entity). However, it does seem that trusts could be considered taxable businesses if 
they engage in an active trade or business. Under the Flat Tax, individuals do not pay 
tax on gifts, inheritances, or income from trusts.
Without specific legislative markup language or commentary, it is assumed that 
the current system for taxing fiduciaries and beneficiaries would continue under a flat 
tax. However since most receipts and disbursements, especially distributions to 
beneficiaries, reflect investment activities (dividends interest, gains and losses on 
sales o f investment assets, passive income and loss from partnerhips/S corporation 
and similar investment entities like REITs, RICs, etc.) most fiduciary activities would 
not be subject to a flat tax at either the fiduciary or beneficiary level.
Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, an entirely new set of rules have been 
developed to govern the tax treatment o f distributions to beneficiaries. In general, 
under these rules, the trust is treated as a flow through entity. Principles similar to 
those governing the operation of the unlimited saving allowance seem to be in 
operation, i.e., assets in trust on the date of enactment have basis, but distribution of 
the entire proceeds of post-enactment trust assets, which have no basis, may be 
subject to tax upon distribution.
How this concept will interrelate with state law and governing instruments that 
utilize fiduciary accounting income concepts is very problematic.
D. Conclusion
The data presented in this chapter show that consumption tax alternatives will 
substantially redistribute the tax burden. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, 
individual taxes will be less for low-income households primarily because of a 
deductible payroll tax credit. High-income households will pay less primarily 
because o f the deduction for new saving.
Under the Flat Tax, all individual taxpayers appear to pay less. This is 
particularly true for low-income households that could receive refunds for negative 
tax liability—which would be commonplace under the proposal because o f the 
generous family deduction and dependency deductions. It would also be particularly 
true for high-income households that no longer face a progressive rate structure and 
only pay tax on wage income.
Under current law, noncorporate businesses pay no entity level income tax as 
they would under both consumption tax alternatives. For noncorporate businesses, 
the business taxes proposed under both Nunn-Domenici and the Flat Tax would pose 
substantial new tax burdens. The Nunn-Domenici tax is particularly harsh for 
"typical" noncorporate businesses because these business are labor-intensive and 
wages are not deductible under the tax (as they are under the Flat Tax).
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Table 13.4
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law, 
Nunn-Domenici, and the Flat Tax — Case 1: Mom and Pop Retail Store160
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LAW
NUNN-
DOMENICI
FLAT
TAX
Income from Noncorporate Business $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Other Wage Income $0 $0 $0
Other Capital Income $1,000 $1,000 $0
Total Gross Income $21,000 $21,000 $20,000
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance $7,600 $8,400 $24,250
Personal/Dependency Deduction-Number 4 4 2
Personal/Dependency Deduction-Amount $11,800 $10,200 $11,300
Charitable Deduction $0 $200 $0
Mortgage Deduction $0 $800 $0
Deduction for Net Saving $0 $500 $0
Tax Base $1,600 $900 ($15,550)
Tax $240 $72 ($2,643)
Payroll Credit $0 $1,530 $0
Net Tax $240 ($1,458) ($2,643)
BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT NUNN- FLAT
LAW DOMENICI TAX
Wages to Employees $25,000 $0
Fringe Benefits $9,000 $9,000
Interest $4,750 $4,750
Income to Owner $20,000 $0
Tax Base $58,750 $13,750
Tax Rate 11% 17%
Gross Tax $6,463 $2,338
Payroll Credit $1,750 $0
Net Tax -  n one- $4,713 $2,338
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX $240 $3,255 ($306)
160The cash flow to the individual owner will be affected where money from the business is not available to pass
through.
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Table 13.5
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under 
Current Law, Nunn-Domenici, and the Flat Tax —
Case 2: Two Earner Couple, One Owning a Small Business
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LAW
NUNN-
DOMENICI
FLAT
TAX
Income from Noncorporate Business $15,000 $15,000 $15,000
Other Wage Income $33,000 $33,000 $33,000
Other Capital Income $2,000 $2,000 $0
Total Gross Income $50,000 $50,000 $48,000
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance $7,600 $8,400 $24,250
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Number 4 4 2
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount $11,800 $10,200 $11,300
Charitable Deduction $0 $700 $0
Mortgage Deduction $0 $2,700 $0
Deduction for Net Saving $0 $3,000 $0
Tax Base $30,600 $25,000 $12,450
Tax $4,590 $4,079 $2,117
Payroll Credit $0 $3,672 $0
Net Tax $4,590 $407 $2,117
BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT NUNN- FLAT
LAW DOMENICI TAX
Wages to Employees $10,950 $0
Fringe Benefits $5,190 $5,190
Interest $548 $548
Income to Owner $15,000 $0
Tax Base $31,688 $5,738
Tax Rate 11% 17%
Gross Tax $3,486 $975
Payroll Credit $1,530 $0
Net Tax — n o n e - $1,956 $975
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX $4,590 $2,363 $3,092
170
Table 13.6
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law, 
Nunn-Domenici, and the Flat Tax — Case 3: Sole Practitioner Physician
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LA W *
NUNN-
DOMENICI
FLAT
TAX
Income from Noncorporate Business $120,000 $120,000 $120,000
Other Wage Income $0 $0 $0
Other Capital Income $30,000 $30,000 $0
Total Gross Income $150,000 $150,000 $120,000
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance $0 $8,400 $24,250
Personal/Dependency Deduction-Number 4 4 2
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount $11,800 $10,200 $11,300
Charitable Deduction $3,500 $3,500 $0
Mortgage Deduction $11,000 $11,000 $0
Deduction for Net Saving $0 $20,000 $0
Tax Base $112,961 $96,900 $84,450
Tax $25,803 $32,377 $14,357
Payroll Credit $0 $6,703 $0
Net Tax $25,803 $25,674 $14,357
BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT NUNN- FLAT
LAW DOMENICI TAX
Wages to Employees $21,600 $0
Fringe Benefits $28,320 $28,320
Interest $432 $432
Income to Owner $120,000 $0
Tax Base $170,352 $28,752
Tax Rate 11% 17%
Gross Tax $18,739 $4,888
Payroll Credit $8,215 $0
Net Tax — none- $10,524 $4,888
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX $25,803 $36,198 $19,244
*N ot shown are an $11,000 deduction fo r state and local income taxes and property taxes, and a $261 
deduction disallowance fo r high income taxpayers.
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Table 13.7
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law, Nunn- 
 Domenici, and the Flat Tax — Case 4: Law Partner
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LAW*
NUNN-
DOMENICI
FLAT
TAX
Income from Noncorporate Business $180,000 $180,000 $180,000
Other Wage Income $0 $0 $0
Other Capital Income $50,000 $50,000 $0
Total Gross Income $230,000 $230,000 $180,000
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance $0 $8,400 $24,250
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Number 4 4 2
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount $11,800 $10,200 $11,300
Charitable Deduction $5,000 $5,000 $0
Mortgage Deduction $14,000 $14,000 $0
Deduction for Net Saving $0 $30,000 $0
Tax Base $188,618 $162,400 $144,450
Tax $42,756 $58,577 $24,557
Payroll Credit $0 $7,573 $0
Net Tax $42,756 $51,004 $24,557
BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT NUNN- FLAT
LAW DOMENICI TAX
Wages to Employees $153,000 $0
Fringe Benefits $66,600 $66,600
Interest $1,530 $1,530
Income to Owner $180,000 $0
Tax Base $401,130 $68,130
Tax Rate 11% 17%
Gross Tax $44,124 $11,582
Payroll Credit $18,283 $0
Net Tax — n o n e - $25,841 $11,582
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX $42,756 $76,845 $36,139
*Not shown are a $16,000 deduction for state and local income taxes and property taxes, a $2,757 
reduction in personal exemptions for high income taxpayers, and a $2,661 reduction in itemized deductions 
for high income taxpayers.
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Chapter 14
Treatment of Housing and Other Consumer Durables 
Under a Consumption Tax
Summary
• In theory, the rental value o f  homes should be subject to a consumption 
tax, but formidable administrative and compliance problems block this approach. 
As an alternative to taxing rents, tax may be "prepaid" by taxing the purchase 
price o f  homes.
• In most other countries with consumption taxes, new housing is taxed and 
existing housing is exempt.
• Under an individual consumption tax, housing receives preferential 
treatment i f  both mortgage interest is deductible and additions to mortgage debt 
are not included in gross income.
A. Introduction
The taxation of consumer durables under a consumption tax poses substantial 
theoretical, administrative, and political problems. Appliances, furniture, tools, 
computing equipment, and automobiles—when used for personal consumption--are 
all examples of consumer durables. Of course, the most important consumer durable 
is housing. This chapter will focus on this "special case" of housing, but most of the 
analysis applies to consumer durables in general.
There are basically two ways of taxing housing under a consumption tax. One 
is to tax annual rental value. The other is to tax the purchase price. Economists 
consider taxing annual rental values is the more theoretically pure approach. In 
practice, however, taxing the purchase price of housing is more common.
There is the threshold issue of whether housing should be taxed at all. In 
particular, tax relief for housing is often under consideration because such relief can 
help alleviate some of the inherent regressivity of a consumption tax. Moreover, the 
deduction for mortgage interest is the most cherished of middle-class tax preferences, 
and there is no particular reason to expect the switch from an income tax to a 
consumption tax will obviate the political need to maintain housing prices and the 
happiness of homeowners.
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It is likely that housing will receive preferential treatment under any 
consumption tax that has a realistic chance of being enacted. The relief can take a 
variety of forms, and it is likely that any relief granted will be uneven. As under the 
income tax, the tax benefits for housing can depend on whether housing is debt- or 
equity-financed and on whether housing is owner-occupied or for rent. In addition, 
as with changes under an income tax, there is likely to be differential treatment for 
housing built before and after the date a consumption tax becomes effective.
B. Taxing Rent
By definition, a consumer durable provides services to consumers for more 
than one year. Economists assert that the correct theoretical treatment of housing and 
other consumer durables is straightforward: tax the consumption provided by these 
durables as measured by their annual rental values.161 For rental housing, owners can 
be taxed directly on the market rents charged to residents. For owner-occupied 
housing, however, rental value must be imputed and then taxed. This poses major 
valuation problems. The necessary imputations would present issues at least as 
difficult as those surrounding the valuation of property for local property taxation. 
Valuation disputes would be particularly contentious when one considers the high 
rates of tax (e.g., 25 percent) being contemplated for a national consumption tax. In 
addition, most homeowners would be unfamiliar with and hostile to the notion that 
their homes generate "services" that should be taxed.
Even if valuation were not an issue, other administrative concerns make 
taxation of rent unattractive. Under a value-added or retail sales tax, almost all 
revenues would be collected from businesses. Taxation of rents would necessitate the 
collection of tax from tens of millions of households that would otherwise be exempt 
from business tax. Compliance would appear to be a major problem not only for 
owners who occupy their own homes but also for the numerous landlords who rent 
only one or two dwellings.
If  small residential property owners remain untaxed, it would be difficult 
politically to only tax rents collected by large landlords (even though major 
compliance or valuation issues would likely be more manageable). Singling out 
rentals of multi-family residential housing units would be perceived as unfair because 
of the high proportion of low-income families in this type of housing.
161 Consumption services should not be confused with depreciation, which is sometimes referred to as 
"capital consumption." In an otherwise outstanding volume, the study by Tait (1988) seems to make this 
mistake. In economic theory, rental value equals depreciation plus the carrying cost of capital. Tait makes the 
claim that land should not be taxed because it is not consumed. This conclusion can be challenged because 
land certainly does provide consumption services (as is evident by rental changes), even if it does not 
depreciate.
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It seems reasonable to conclude that the taxation o f rents will not be the 
primary mechanism for the treatment of housing under any realistic consumption tax. 
The issues are summarized in the Table 14.1.
Table 14.1
Summary of the Problems with Taxing Rents
Type of Owner
Imputation
Problem?
High
Administrative 
Cost/ Low 
Compliance?
Political
Problems?
Owner-Occupiers YES YES YES
Small Landlords NO YES YES
Large Landlords NO NO YES
C. Taxing the Purchase Price
The alternative treatment of housing under a consumption tax is to include the 
purchase price in the tax base. In fact, under certain circumstances the taxation of 
rent and the taxation of purchase price are economically equivalent. It is a basic tenet 
of economics and appraisal that the purchase price of a home equals the present value 
of expected future rents. (This is illustrated in Table 14.2.) Thus, if  tax rates are 
equal over time, taxation of the purchase price of a home is equivalent to taxing all 
the future rents.162 For this reason, tax imposed on the purchase price of a home is 
sometimes referred to as a ’’prepayment'’ o f tax.
Table 14.2
Example Showing Home Value is 
Equivalent to the Present Value of Future Rents
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
(1) Value at Beginning of Year 100.0 75.0 50.0 25.0
(2) Rent 35.0 32.5 30.0 27.5
(3) Depreciation 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
(4) Net Rental Income [(2) minus (3)] 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5
(5) Value at End o f Year [(1) minus (3)] 75.0 50.0 25.0 0.0
Present Value o f Rents 100.0
Notes: Rate of return is 10 percent. Depreciation is straight-line. Rent equals owners income plus 
depreciation.
162There are some additional technical issues about this equivalence that are not appropriate for this discussion. 
The interested reader can consult Graetz (1979) for further details.
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While removing the need to impute rental values of owner occupied housing, 
the prepayment approach opens up a Pandora's box of new issues. For example, 
imposing tax all in one year can create cash flow problems for home buyers (who are 
often cash constrained even without a new tax). The major difficulty arises with 
regard to the taxation of existing housing. Equitable treatment o f existing and new 
homes would necessitate that owners of existing houses be taxed on the value of their 
homes at the time of enactment. Existing homes, however, cannot be taxed under this 
method without severe administrative and political problems.
D. Exemption fo r  Existing Housing
Neither the rental-value nor purchase-price approaches provide good ways of 
taxing existing housing.163 For this reason, most industrialized countries with 
consumption taxes do not tax existing homes, and it is unlikely the United States 
would break new ground in this area. These countries only impose tax on new 
homes—and improvements to existing homes— and leave existing housing exempt 
from tax. Under this approach, all rental payments are exempt from tax.
Economists contend that exemption of existing housing would provide a 
windfall to existing owners: prices o f existing houses would rise along with the new 
housing subject to tax. Moreover, this favoritism does nothing to spur new housing 
starts. These concerns have hardly deterred most other countries that have 
implemented this system. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the taxation of 
new housing.
E. Taxation o f  Newly Constructed Owner-Occupied Housing
1. Newly Constructed Owner-Occupied Housing
When a builder sells a newly constructed home to a final consumer, the 
proceeds of that sale should be included in the builder's taxable receipts. Under a 
retail sales tax or a VAT, exclusion (or zero-rating) of these proceeds would exempt 
this housing from tax. Under any real-world consumption tax, the homeowner is 
"outside of the system."164 Thus, it is the treatment o f the seller, not the purchaser,
163One method of taxing existing housing would be to tax the market value of existing homes on the date 
of enactment of a consumption tax. As shall be shown in the next section, the market value of any home 
should be equal to the present discounted value of future rentals. The other method would be to tax existing 
housing on the first sale after the date of enactment. This would result in a lock-in effect as homeowners could 
avoid tax as long as they did not sell. See, Conrad (1990).
164Thus, the purchaser effectively does not deduct his investment in housing nor does he include his rental 
returns in gross receipts. Equivalently, the purchaser could be allowed to deduct his investment and include 
his rents--a much more complex regime.
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which generally determines whether or not owner-occupied housing receives 
preferential treatment. Most countries with a consumption tax require full inclusion 
of sales by builders. One notable exception is the United Kingdom, which allows 
zero-rating on the sales o f new residential houses.
2. Newly Constructed Rental Housing
The taxation of new rental housing is a bit more complex. One possibility 
would be to treat owners of rental housing like any other business: purchases of 
building (like other capital purchases) would be fully deductible and rents collected 
from the lessee would be included in taxable receipts. The problem with this 
approach, as noted above, is that taxation of small landlords would impose large 
compliance and administrative costs.
This has prompted most industrialized countries to entirely exempt owners of 
residential rental real estate from tax. In the case of a retail sales tax, builders selling 
homes are considered retailers (instead of building owners collecting rent). And in the 
case of a VAT, the last link in the chain subject to tax are sales to owners o f housing, 
not the provision of housing to renters. This creates the problem of excluding from 
tax any value added by owners (e.g., services—such as maintenance-provided by 
owners' employees).
F. Mortgage Interest
Under a VAT or a retail sales tax, deductibility of mortgage interest is not at 
issue for individual taxpayers because only businesses pay taxes. Under general rules 
of interest payments under a VAT, businesses that own residential real estate are not 
allowed deductions (or credits, in the case of a credit invoice VAT) for interest costs.
Under an individual consumption tax system, the situation is more complex. 
In order to understand the implications of mortgage deductibility it is necessary to 
review the general treatment of indebtedness under the tax. Under an individual 
consumption tax, net additions to saving are deductible. Under a standard individual 
consumption tax, (1a) increases in indebtedness are included in the tax base (because 
they present opportunities for increased consumption) and ( 1b) payment of interest 
and principal are deductible (because this is income that is not consumed). 
Equivalent treatment of debt can be achieved by (2a) not including increases in 
indebtedness in the tax base and (2b) not allowing deductions of interest and 
principal.165
165 As shown in the following example (that assumes a 10 percent rate of interest), the value of a loan on its 
beginning date equals the present discounted value of future interest and principal payments. Therefore, the 
inclusion in taxable income of either the loan amount at the beginning of the loan or interest and principal are over 
the life o f the loan economically equivalent.
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Table 14.3
Treatment of Consumer Debt 
Under a Personal Consumption Tax
New Indebtedness Payments of Interest and 
Principal
Standard Approach ( 1a) Include ( 1b) Deduct
Equivalent Approach (2a) Exclude (2b) Do Not Deduct
Therefore, whether or not mortgage-financed housing is favorably treated under a 
personal consumption tax does not hinge entirely on whether mortgage interest is 
deductible,166 but depends as well on the treatment o f new debt and retirement of 
existing debt. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, mortgage financed housing is 
favored because new debt is not included in income and mortgage interest (but not 
principal) is deductible.
G. Existing Housing and Used Goods
Under a consumption tax, if  the entire purchase price is taxed, the present 
value of all future rentals is taxed. This holds true even if  the consumer durable is 
sold. Therefore, if  tax has been paid on the purchase price of a new consumer 
durable, sales of used goods that had been subject to tax when new should not be 
subject to tax on resale. Therefore, housing built after the effective date of a 
consumption tax and then resold should not be subject to tax. This should not create 
major administrative problems. For other consumer durables, the recordkeeping and
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Principal at Beginning of Year 100 75 50 25
Principal Payment 25 25 25 25
Interest Payment 10 7.5 5 2.5
Principal at End of Year 75 50 25 0
Present Value of Interest and Principal Payments
  100
166In fact, if  mortgage is deductible and principal is not, and mortgage indebtedness is included in income, 
mortgage-financed debt would be a penalized form of investment.
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other compliance costs might be large in comparison to the amount o f tax collected. 
Dealers in used goods would be required to keep records of which used goods are 
subject to tax.167
H. Conclusion
It seems that if housing is not entirely exempt from a retail sales tax or a VAT, 
only new housing would be subject to tax. For housing to receive preferential 
treatment under the individual consumption tax, it is not sufficient for mortgage 
interest to be exempt from tax; mortgage debt must be exempted from the general rule 
that new indebtedness be included in income.
167It should be noted that a used good, originally purchased before the effective date and then sold after the 
effective date and subject to tax, should not be taxed if it is resold again. Thus, if a consumption tax came into 
effect, for example, in 1999, it would not be sufficient to merely know the vintage of an automobile (e.g., 
1996) to determine if that vehicle should be taxed on resale.
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Chapter 15
Taxation of Financial Institutions 
Under a Consumption Tax
Summary
• Because it is difficult to identify and value services provided by financial 
institutions, no country with a consumption tax has been able to tax financial 
services in a manner consistent with consumption tax principles.
• Exemption o f  financial institutions from consumption tax generally results 
in overtaxation o f  financial services provided to businesses and undertaxation o f  
services provided to consumers.
Countries with consumption taxes have experienced significant difficulties in 
finding an acceptable method of taxing banks, insurance companies, and other 
financial service companies. These difficulties have caused most countries to simply 
leave financial services untaxed. This hands-off policy has, however, led to other 
problems. The first part of this section describes the problem o f taxing financial 
intermediaries. The second part describes the problems that result when financial 
services are untaxed. The third part discusses possible methods of imposing tax on 
financial services.
A. Problems Under the Credit-Invoice Method VAT
There are three major difficulties under the credit-invoice method VAT with 
respect to taxation of financial intermediaries. The first is identifying the correct 
amount of tax for each financial intermediary. The second is identifying the correct 
amount of tax credit for each o f the intermediaries’ business customers. Because it 
is likely that special rules should apply to financial intermediaries, the third difficulty 
is determining a workable definition of a financial intermediary to which the special 
rules would apply. (This chapter initially focuses on issues related to banking. 
Consumption tax issues relating to insurance companies are discussed below in 
section D.)
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In general, under a value-added tax, interest income is not included in the tax 
base and interest expense is not deductible. This makes sense in the case of most 
businesses (e.g., a manufacturer) because interest income does not emanate from any 
value generated by the business (i.e., it is just income flowing through the business) 
while interest expense is a payment to providers of capital used to generate value. 
This general rule, however, makes little or no sense in the case of a traditional 
financial intermediary, as shown in the following simple example:
Table 15.1
The Problem with Measuring the Value Added of a Financial 
Institution Under Conventional Methods
(Total Bank Assets = $100 Loans 
Total Bank Liabilities = $90 Deposits plus $10 Equity )
Income Statement:
Interest Income @ 8% $8.00
Interest Expense @ 6% ($5.40)
Gross Profit $2.60
Salaries ($0.80)
Materials ($0.20)
Net Profit $1.60
Subtraction Method:
Business Receipts $0.00
Business Purchases ($0.20)
Value added ($0.20)
Naive application of standard VAT methods in this case leaves the bank with a tax 
base o f negative $0.20. As shall be shown later (in Table 14.6), the bank in this 
example actually has value added of $1.60. The gross inaccuracy of standard VAT 
rules has lead most countries with value-added taxes to remove financial institutions 
from the VAT system, but this leads to other problems as discussed below.
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B. Problems with Placing Financial Institutions Outside the VAT System
The main problem of removing financial institutions from the VAT system is 
that this special treatment will usually result in economic distortions. Some bank 
customers will be favored and others penalized, and certain types of financial 
institutions may be given a competitive advantage. Moreover, the nature of the 
distortion will depend on the type of VAT (credit-invoice or subtraction), the method 
o f relief (zero-rating or exemption), and the type of bank customer (business or 
consumer).
In the case of the credit-invoice VAT, the problems of exemption and zero­
rating for financial institutions are largely the same as those discussed for taxpayers 
generally in Chapter 3. Under the credit-invoice method, exemption does provide 
some relief in the case of financial services provided to consumers, but at the same 
time can result in overtaxation of (or cascading of tax on) services provided to 
business customers. Zero-rating solves the overtaxation problem of business 
customers under the credit-invoice VAT, but it exacerbates the distortions on 
consumer financial services by entirely eliminating tax.
Under the subtraction method, business customers are unable to deduct implicit 
fees for financial services because these fees cannot be identified. This offsets any 
benefit to the bank from exemption, so the net result is that business services with 
implicit charges are fully taxed.168 (Financial services for explicit charges still enjoy 
the benefit of exemption.) In the case of financial services provided to consumers, 
exemption eliminates the tax associated with bank value added. The discussion in 
this paragraph is summarized in Table 15.2.
168Note that this differs from the effect discussed in Chapter 4 of exemption of a business providing services to 
other business. In the case of exemption of a nonfinancial firm providing services to other businesses, that firm’s 
value added is excluded from the tax base and its customer is able to deduct the cost of those services.
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Table 15.2
Summary of Problems with Relief for Financial Institutions
Business Customer Consumer Customer
Credit-Invoice Method:
Exemption Overtaxation of Financial 
Services Due to 
Cascading (No credits 
for business customers)
Undertaxation of 
Financial Services 
Because Bank's Value 
Added Not Taxed
Zero-Rating Full Taxation (Bank's 
undertaxation offset by 
customer's overtaxation)
Undertaxation of
Financial Services 
Because Total Value 
Added Not Taxed
Subtraction Method:
Exemption Full Taxation (Bank's 
undertaxation offset by 
customer's overtaxation)
Undertaxation of 
Financial Services 
Because Bank's Value 
Added Not Taxed
C. Methods o f  Including Financial Institutions in a VAT System
Most countries have abandoned attempts to include financial institutions in 
their VAT systems. There are, however, many aspects o f the new consumption taxes 
currently under consideration in the United States that differ from the experience of 
other countries. It is likely that any serious attempt to enact a consumption tax will 
include efforts to put financial intermediaries on a level playing field with other 
businesses. It is possible in theory to calculate bank value added under either the 
subtraction or addition method. This section explores the viability o f either o f these 
alternatives in practice.
The reasons for the enormous errors in the calculation of bank value added 
under standard approaches (see Table 15.2) is that implicit fees for financial services 
are often embedded in interest charges and netted against interest payments. For 
example, banks provide a range of services (e.g., free checking) to depositors without 
explicit charges. Banks receive payment for these service by paying depositors lower 
rates of interest than would be charged on financial exchanges for more convenient 
sources of funds, such as commercial paper. Banks also provide services to borrowers
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(e.g., processing, assumption of risk) often without explicit fees. In these cases banks 
receive payment for these services by charging borrowers higher rates of interest than 
would be paid for less cumbersome investments, such as corporate bonds.169
These implicit fees for financial services provided to customers should be 
included in gross receipts when calculating VAT liability. The central problem 
concerning the treatment of banks under a consumption tax is that these charges 
usually are not separately identified. These points are illustrated in the example of 
Table 15.3.
Table 15.3
(1) Interest Income @8%
(2) Implicit Service Charge @ 0.5%
(3) Pure Interest @7.5%
$8.00
$0.50
$7.50
(4) Interest Expense @6%
(5) Implicit Service Charge @1.5%
(6) Pure Interest @7.5%
($5.40)
$1.35
($6.75)
(7) Gross Profit
(8) Operating Expenses
(9) Salaries
(10) Materials
(11) Net Profit
$2.60
($1.00)
($0.80)
($0.20)
$1.60
Notes:
Value Added Applying Normal Credit-Invoice 
Rules (zero less line 10) ($0.20)
Note: Actual Valued Added Using the Subtraction 
Method and Making Service Charge Explicit (line
2 plus line 5 less line 10) $1.65
Actual Value Added Using the Addition Method 
(line 11 plus line 9 plus line 6 minus line 3) $1.65
169It should be noted that there is an increasing trend for banks to separately state fees for specific financial 
services.
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In this example, the bank charges its borrowers 0.5 percent annually per dollar o f loan 
principal and therefore can charge 8 percent instead of the simple market rate of 7.5 
percent. Similarly, the bank charges its depositors a rate of 1.5 percent for each dollar 
of account balance. The bank nets this charge against a simple market rate o f interest 
of 7.5 percent and therefore pays its depositors 6 percent.
As noted above, the problem with straightforward calculation of the credit- 
invoice method is that it is invariably inaccurate. Under this method, interest income 
is not included in gross receipts and interest paid is not deductible. It is in interest 
charges, however, that bank fees are included. (Note that in the above example only 
the items in bold are observable.) Thus, the credit-invoice method does not take into 
account the major source of bank value added. In this example, the credit invoice 
method would measure bank value added as minus $0.20 when it is actually $1.65.170
Under the subtraction and credit-invoice methods the problem could be solved 
if  the implicit fees charged by banks all would be made explicit. In this case, fees 
would be included in gross receipts (just as with any other service business) and 
interest paid and charged would be excluded entirely from the calculation. (Of 
course, many bank fees (e.g., for safe deposit boxes) are explicit and these are already 
correctly treated under the credit-invoice method.) Bank fees could be estimated by 
trying to disentangle service fees from "pure" interest.
This estimate might be accomplished by taking the difference between a 
market rate o f interest and actual bank interest charges and assuming that the 
difference is implicit bank charges that should be included in gross receipts. The 
administrative problems with this approach are formidable. A market or 'standard' 
rate of interest would have to be chosen that would have to vary with the estimated 
maturity of the corresponding loan or deposit. In a period of volatile interest rates, 
these rates would have to be adjusted frequently. Because tax liability depends on 
spreads between interest rates, small measurement errors could result in large errors 
in tax liability. And, o f course, the compliance burden involved would hardly 
represent tax simplification.
170Under the subtraction method, and assuming implicit fees were made explicit, value-added ($1.65) equals 
total fees ($0.50 plus $1.35) minus business purchases ($0.20). Under the addition method, value added ($ 1.65) 
equals net profit ($1.60) plus salaries ($0.80) minus net interest paid ($6.75 minus $7.50).
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Under the addition,17 method,171 bank value added is equal to profit plus wages 
plus net interest paid. In this case, an imputation would need to be made to calculate 
net interest paid because net interest calculated should not include charges for 
financial services. Thus, under both the addition and subtraction method, estimates 
must be made of a 'pure' rate of interest. It turns out that, given a standard rate of 
interest, both methods yield the same results, and so neither is more accurate than the 
other. Some sample calculations shown in Appendix indicate that one of these 
methods might be acceptable when used under a general subtraction method if  
administrative and compliance costs are not prohibitive and if  the standard rate of 
interest can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
D, Taxing Insurance Companies Under a Consumption Tax
The problems with taxation of insurance companies under a consumption tax 
are analogous to those which arise with the taxation of banks. Application of 
standard VAT rules yield highly inaccurate measures o f true VAT liability. If 
insurance companies are exempted from a credit-invoice VAT, insurance services 
provided to business customers will be overtaxed, and insurance services provided to 
consumers will be undertaxed. If insurance companies are exempted under the 
subtraction method, undertaxation results for services provided to both businesses and 
consumers.
Any attempts to bring insurance companies into the system are thwarted by 
measurement problems. Premiums paid to insurance companies often have three 
elements: (1) funding for current and future claims, (2) savings for the policyholder, 
and (3) compensation for the owners of the insurance companies (profits), their 
lenders (net interest), and their employees (wages). Only the last element is value 
added. Because of the difficulty in identifying pure interest, it is difficult to measure 
net interest under the addition method. Because of the difficulty in identifying the 
value of implicit fees, it is difficult to measure gross receipts under the subtraction 
method. Thus, taxation of insurance under a VAT is largely similar to the problems 
of taxing other financial services.
E. Definition o f  Financial Intermediary
If financial intermediaries are going to be exempt or zero-rated (and perhaps, 
subject to a special separate tax), the term 'financial institution' would need to be 
defined for tax purposes. Clearly, banks and insurance companies fit that definition, 
but questions may arise in the case of other financial intermediaries and service
 171If the addition method is found to have acceptable results for financial institutions, it is possible to implement 
the addition method for financial institutions even when all other taxpayers use the subtraction method. If financial 
institutions use the addition method when all other taxpayers are using the credit-invoice method, this would result 
in overtaxation of financial services to businesses that is even larger than the overtaxation from exemption.
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providers such as finance companies, mortgage companies, and securities dealers and 
brokers. Special problems may also arise in the case of financing subsidiaries of 
nonfinancial corporations and self-insurance by nonfinancial corporations.
F. Conclusion
Financial intermediation poses special problems for the design of value-added 
taxes. Most other nations with VATs simply exempt financial institutions (or most 
o f their value added) from tax.172 It may be possible, however, to implement some 
rules that reasonably approximate the correct amount of VAT liability for financial 
services. Unfortunately, such rules would almost certainly be complex and 
cumbersome.
172There are indications that these countries are reconsidering this position. See, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (1994).
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Appendix 15A
Financial institutions may be taxed under either the subtraction or addition 
method in a system where taxpayers are generally subject to the subtraction method. 
Both methods, however, require estimates and imputations to approximate the correct 
amount o f liability.
Under the addition method, a bank’s tax base would equal wages plus profit 
plus net interest paid. In this case, an imputation would need to be made to calculate 
net interest paid. Under the subtraction method, bank liability would equal explicit 
and implicit fee income less purchases from other business. In this case, an 
imputation would be needed to calculate implicit fee income. In both cases, 
imputation would depend on the choice of the pure rate of deposit interest and a pure 
rate of loan interest.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted in the following table to determine which 
method would generally be more accurate and how large errors could be under either 
method. In this example, a bank has $100 o f loans and $95 o f deposits. The bank 
charges its borrowers 8.5% and earns annual implicit fees equal to 1.0% of loan 
balances. The bank pays its depositors 5.5% and charges depositors implicit fees 
equal to 2.0% of deposit balances. The "pure" rate of interest is 7.5%.173
In the first column, it is assumed that the pure rate of interest and implicit fees 
can be identified. Under the subtraction method, the tax base is $1.90, the sum of 
implicit fees ($2.90) and explicit fees ($1.00) less purchases from other businesses 
($2.00). Under the addition method, the tax base is also $1.90, the sum of net interest 
paid calculated using the pure rate of interest ($7.13 - $7.50 = -$0.37), salaries 
($2.00), and net profit (0.28).
The following six columns calculate the error in calculation of the correct tax 
base when the pure rate o f interest is not estimated correctly. Even when the pure 
interest rate is in error by 100 basis points, the error in the calculation of tax liability 
is less than three percent.
Thus, the table shows that for a given estimate of a pure rate o f interest both 
methods provide the same result, so neither is more accurate than the other. It shows 
that if  pure interest estimates are not grossly inaccurate, the margin of error due to 
inaccurate imputations may be acceptable.
173The “pure” rate of interest is the rate of interest that would prevail if no financial services were provided with 
transaction. The rates of interest on a marketable security is an example of a pure rate of interest.
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Table 15A.1
Error in Measured VAT Liability Due 
to Inaccurate Imputation of "Pure" Interest Rate
Error in 'Pure’ Rate 0.00% 0.25% -0.25% 0.5% -0.5% 1.0% -1.0%
Bank Assets 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bank Deposits 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Loan Rate 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50% 8.50%
Implicit Fee 1.00% 1.25% 0.75% 1.50% 0.50% 2.00% 0.00%
Pure Interest 7.50% 7.25% 7.75% 7.00% 8.00% 6.50% 8.50%
Deposit Rate 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50%
Implicit Fee 2.00% 1.75% 2.25% 1.50% 2.50% 1.00% 3.00%
Pure Interest 7.50% 7.25% 7.75% 7.00% 8.00% 6.50% 8.50%
Interest Earned 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50
Implicit Fee 1.00 1.25 0.75 1.50 0.50 2.00 0.00
Pure Interest 7.50 7.25 7.75 7.00 8.00 6.50 8.50
Interest Charged 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.23
Implicit Fee 1.90 1.66 2.14 1.43 2.38 0.95 2.85
Pure Interest 7.13 6.89 7.36 6.65 7.60 6.18 8.08
Explicit Fees 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gross Profit 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28
Material 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Salaries 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Operating Expense 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Net Profit 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Value Added —
Subtraction Method 1.90 1.91 1.89 1.93 1.88 1.95 1.85
Value Added —
Addition Method 1.90 1.91 1.89 1.93 1.88 1.95 1.85
Error in Calculation o f VAT 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.05
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Chapter 16
The Treatment of State and Local Governments and 
Charitable Organizations Under a Consumption Tax
Summary
• State and local governments could be subject to large, new financial 
burdens as a result o f  a new Federal consumption tax.
• State and local governments have several concerns. They would suffer 
financial hardship i f  their taxes were not deductible against Federal taxable 
income and i f  their services were subject to tax under a comprehensive 
consumption tax. State and local governments are also particularly worried that 
a Federal VAT or sales tax might encroach on their ability to levy their own sales 
taxes.
• In many respects, the potential burdens o f  charitable organizations under 
a consumption tax are comparable to those o f  state and local governments. 
Charitable organizations would suffer i f  charitable contributions were not 
deductible, and services provided by charitable organizations might be subject 
to tax under a comprehensive consumption tax.
A. State and Local Governments
1. Introduction
State and local governments would be affected by the replacement of the 
current income tax with a consumption tax in a variety of ways. The five most 
important potential effects of a replacement consumption tax are:
(1) infringement on state and local governments sales tax base;
(2) loss o f Federal income tax deduction to state and local citizens and 
residents for state and local property and income taxes;
(3) taxation of government activities;
(4) loss of tax-favored status to investors in state and local government 
debt; and
(5) loss o f ability of state income tax systems to piggyback on Federal 
system once Federal income tax system is repealed
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For state and local governments, any one of these changes could pose a major new 
burden. The impact o f the loss of all five of these benefits could be devastating. It 
is therefore likely that a consumption tax that did not provide relief from these 
problems would face stiff opposition from state and local governments. If  state and 
local governments keep existing income tax systems, taxpayers will still have the cost 
o f complying with multiple systems.
2. Infringement on Sales Tax Base
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, a retail sales tax and credit-invoice VAT would 
pose problems for state and local governments in a variety o f ways. First, as a 
political matter, it may be more difficult for these governmental units to raise 
additional revenue through sales tax increases if  the combined Federal and state tax 
rate is high. For example, there may be less tolerance for a sales tax increase from 
five to six percent if  the Federal government has just imposed a 15-percent--let alone 
a 25-percent--Federal sales tax. Second, it is widely believed by tax administrators 
that enforcement problems begin to be unmanageable when retail tax rates get into 
double digits. Third, state and local governments would be under much pressure to 
conform to Federal sales tax rules in order to simplify taxpayer compliance. This 
would, however, greatly lessen the ability of state and local governments to achieve 
policy objectives through adjustments in the sales tax base. Finally, even with total 
conformity in the tax base, there must be some coordination o f the tax rates between 
the Federal and local tax bases: it must be decided whether, for example, the Federal 
tax will include local tax in the Federal tax base.
Almost all of these problems disappear under a subtraction method VAT or an 
individual consumption tax. Concerns only remain if  public perception likens them 
to a sales tax. Although the equivalence of consumption taxes is widely recognized 
by economists, this is not the case for the public at large—particularly if  the tax is not 
separately stated at the cash register. Thus, while the infringement issue looms as a 
large problem for the states in the case of a Federal sales tax or a Federal VAT, it 
does not appear to be a major problem for a subtraction method VAT or an individual 
consumption tax.
3. Loss o f  Federal Income Tax Deduction fo r  Income and Property Taxes
In 1993 individuals deducted $175 billion of state and local income and 
property taxes from their Federal income taxes. If the average marginal Federal 
income tax rate is 30 percent, this deduction provides taxpayers a benefit of 
approximately $50 billion annually. Taxpayers in high-tax states—such as New York 
and California—would face a larger burden.
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Individuals would not be able to deduct local taxes under a retail sales tax or 
a VAT. Although it would be possible to do so under a Flat Tax, no such proposal 
has yet been offered. Just as under the individual income tax, the deductibility of 
local taxes under an individual consumption tax can be made available. Under the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal, deductions for state and local taxes are allowed. 
Moreover, it is likely under this tax that there may be greater Federal tax benefits for 
local tax payments than under current law for two reasons. First, the value of these 
deductions is greater for a larger number o f taxpayers because most state and local 
taxes are likely to be paid by taxpayers in the 40-percent bracket (Under the Nunn- 
Domenici plan, taxpayers with taxable income as low as $12,000 (in the case of a 
single individual) face a 40-percent rate while under current law only taxpayers with 
taxable income in excess of $250,000 pay tax at a 39.6 percent rate). Second, under 
the Nunn-Domenici proposal, all taxpayers—not just itemizers as under current law -- 
may deduct taxes paid to state and local governments.
4. Taxation o f  Government Activities
In theory there is no reason that goods and services provided by governments 
should not be subject to a retail sales tax or a VAT at the same rate as goods and 
services provided by the private sector. In practice, however, government goods and 
services are almost always excluded from tax. This gives government an unfair 
competitive advantage over private industry. Political pressures from private firms 
that compete with governments, as well as need for revenue, mean that this issue is 
likely to be revisited during any debate about a Federal consumption tax.
If governments are provided relief under a credit-invoice VAT, the issue arises 
as to whether they should be exempt from tax or "zero-rated.” As noted in Chapter 
3, zero-rating is likely to provide more relief, and it is possible that exemption may 
result in overtaxation of governments relative to private business.
An individual consumption tax effectively taxes all government services. 
Relief is provided, however, to the extent state and local services are financed by 
income and property taxes and the individual consumption tax does allow them to be 
deducted. It is also relevant to note that the Flat Tax is partially effective in taxing 
governments because wages are subject to tax under the individual component o f the 
Flat Tax and—because government is extremely labor-intensive—wages paid are a 
relatively accurate measure of value-added in the government sector.
5. Loss o f  Tax-Favored Status fo r  State and Local Debt
Under a retail sales tax, value-added tax, and the Flat Tax, all interest income 
would be exempt from tax. Thus, state and local governments, and investors in their 
securities, would not lose the benefit of tax exemption of interest on their 
indebtedness (and, in fact, they would benefit from removal of regulations and
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restrictions dictated by Federal tax rules). However, under these taxes, state and local 
governments would lose the special status that allows them to issue securities 
providing yields approximately 35 percent less than yields on taxable securities of 
comparable maturity and risk. The interest on all debt would be tax-exempt, so there 
would no longer be large interest-rate spreads between yields on private bonds and 
state and local bonds. How much this lack of distinction hurts state and local 
government depends on how much interest rates in general decline as a result of a 
new tax regime. It is likely that interest rates will decline, but it is unlikely that they 
will decline to such a level that would be available to state and local governments if  
they were the only type of tax-exempt security. Moreover, it removes the competitive 
advantage governments currently enjoy over various private offerings.
The impact of an individual consumption tax on the municipal bond market 
can be more problematic. Under the general principles of individual consumption 
taxation, all interest income would be subject to tax, but purchases of new securities— 
if they represented new saving--would be deductible. (In contrast, all interest income 
is exempt under the Flat Tax, but purchases of securities are not deductible.) Without 
special transition rules retaining tax-exemption for the interest income they generate, 
previously issued bonds--now facing the prospects of taxation—would decline in 
value.174 Because purchased newly-issued securities could be deducted, they would 
effectively be tax exempt.175  
The individual consumption tax included in the Nunn-Domenici proposal 
retains tax-exemption for all state and local government bond interest and, in 
addition, allows purchases of newly issued securities to be deductible. Thus, state 
and local bonds retain a special status under the Nunn-Domenici proposal despite the 
general relief from taxation on all capital income.
6. Relationship Between Federal and State Income Taxes
Most states that collect income taxes rely heavily on the Federal income tax. 
Taxable income for state income tax purposes often is based on taxable income for 
Federal tax purposes. States also benefit indirectly from Federal enforcement efforts. 
The elimination of Federal income taxation will increase the complexity of state 
income taxation. The likely heightened dissatisfaction with state income taxes will 
likely increase pressure on states to reduce or reform their income taxes.
174This decline in value would begin once the markets perceived the possibility of loss of deductions for interest 
might occur. Value would rise and fall as the prospects for overall legislation and the particular details changed 
through the legislative process.
175The equivalence of tax-exemption of interest and tax deductibility of the purchase price of bonds is discussed 
in Chapter 6.
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7. Conclusion About State and Local Governments
Consumption taxes can result in a real challenge for state and local 
governments. Yet, it is possible to design consumption taxes that do not impose new 
hardships on state and local governments. It is even possible, as exemplified by the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal, to design a consumption tax that in many respects makes 
state and local governments better off than under current law.
B. Charitable Organizations
1. Possible Elimination o f  the Deduction fo r  Charitable Contributions
The elimination of the deduction for charitable contributions could be a serious 
blow to the charitable sector. In 1993 deductions against the individual income tax 
for charitable contributions totaled approximately $100 billion. If  the average 
marginal tax rate is 30 percent, this could represent a loss in value of approximately 
$30 billion annually to the charitable sector. The imposition of this burden could be 
particularly burdensome at this time when it seems likely there will be less 
government spending for social services and a corresponding increase in demand for 
privately-funded charity. It may be the case that charitable contributions would not 
change as a result of this change in tax benefits (i.e., such contributions are "inelastic" 
with respect to tax changes). It is the feeling among those working in the charitable 
sector, however, that recent experience with changes in the tax rates and in tax rules 
regarding the alternative minimum tax treatment o f appreciated property has had a 
significant impact on the timing and amounts of charitable giving.
As noted in the case of deductions for state and local taxes, a replacement 
retail sales tax or VAT would entirely eliminate this deduction for individuals. It 
could be made available under the individual component of the Flat Tax (but no 
version of the Flat Tax has yet been offered that does so). The deduction is optional 
under the individual consumption tax (as it is under the individual income tax). In the 
tax case of the Nunn-Domenici version of the individual consumption tax, the 
deduction is available and is, in fact, enhanced because of the generally higher 
marginal tax rates and the availability to taxpayers who currently are precluded from 
taking the charitable deduction because they use the standard deduction.
2. Possible Taxation o f  Activities o f  Charitable Organizations
Under current law, charitable organizations' business activities that are 
unrelated to their exempt purpose are subject to unrelated business income tax 
(UBIT). These unrelated activities would almost certainly continue to be subject to 
tax under any consumption tax imposed on businesses. The real question is whether 
activities related to charitable purposes (e.g., educational services provided by 
universities, medical services provided by hospitals) would be included in the new
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consumption tax base. Economists assert that it would be more efficient to tax all 
services—whether provided by an exempt organization or a private firm—equally. 
This proposition is, however, also true under the current income tax, but has had little 
impact on policy. Tax-exempt hospitals, for example, continue to enjoy a competitive 
advantage over taxable hospitals. It is unclear whether the political dynamics of a 
new consumption tax would result in inclusion of all charitable activities in the 
consumption tax base.
Even if all activities of all charitable organizations are not subject to tax, some 
curtailment of tax advantages to certain types of tax-exempt organizations may be on 
the horizon. For example, the Nunn-Domenici proposal repeals the tax exemption for 
certain types of educational organizations (more commonly known as "think tanks") 
as well as certain organizations whose activities may be in the public interest but are 
not considered to be purely charitable.
3. Other Issues fo r  Charitable Organizations
Many charitable organizations, like hospitals and universities, have been able 
to issue tax-exempt securities. As noted above in the discussion relating to state and 
local government debt, a new consumption tax may result in some new burdens for 
entities currently issuing—and investors currently holding—tax exempt debt.
The Nunn-Domenici proposal includes a deduction for post-secondary tuition 
(limited to $2,000 annually per eligible student). This may provide some relief to 
universities and other institutions of higher learning that wish to raise tuition.
4. Conclusion fo r  Charitable Organizations
As in the case of state and local governments, organizations that are currently 
tax exempt could be severely affected by the imposition of a Federal consumption tax. 
This would be a particularly onerous burden in light o f possibly reduced direct 
government support to these institutions and potentially increased needs for their 
services given other government cutbacks. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the 
Nunn-Domenici proposal, it is possible to design a Federal consumption tax that is 
generally favorable to tax exempt organizations.
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Chapter 17
Financial Statement Implications
Summary
• Investors, bankers, appraisers, and regulators rely heavily on financial 
statements to evaluate the financial health o f  businesses. Replacing the current 
system o f  income taxation with a new system o f  consumption taxation can have 
a major impact on both income statements and balance sheets.
• Without transition relief, the impact o f  a new consumption tax on the 
income and net worth reported on financial statements in many cases would be 
highly adverse. This could have a detrimental or even disruptive impact on 
financial markets. Without transition, very large special charges to income 
statements and reduction in shareholder equity may result.
A. Introduction
The financial reporting impacts of new consumption taxes are likely to be 
an issue of major importance to the business community. There are many aspects 
of a replacement consumption tax that have the potential to adversely affect the 
financial health of the firm as reported on financial statements. Because financial 
reporting is of critical importance to investors, creditors, bankers, appraisers, and 
regulators evaluating the financial soundness of firms, these impacts deserve 
careful consideration before adoption of any replacement consumption tax.
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of these issues, 
the discussion is divided into two parts: (1) the financial reporting involved in 
repealing the income tax and (2) the financial reporting involved in adopting a 
new consumption tax.
B. Accounting
1. The Benefit from  Eliminating Deferred Tax Liability
If the corporate income tax rate is 35 percent, and book profits are $100, 
the after-tax book profits on a business are $65. If  the availability o f accelerated 
depreciation for tax purposes reduces taxable income to $90 and the actual 
current tax liability to $31.50, after-tax profits o f a business are still recorded at 
$65. The $3.50 of tax reduction is really only a deferral of tax. Accountants
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record this $3.50 tax effect of the temporary difference o f $10 in taxable income 
which results from the excess o f tax over book depreciation as a deferred tax 
liability.
Another example of tax deferral is the treatment of repatriated foreign 
source income for tax purposes. Corporations with overseas subsidiaries 
recognize foreign source income for book purposes as its accrues, but generally 
foreign source income from overseas subsidiaries is only subject to U.S. tax when 
paid out in dividends to the U.S. parent company. Thus, if  there is an expectation 
that income will be repatriated, unrepartriated income in foreign subsidiaries can 
generate a deferred tax liability on financial statements (to the extent it is 
expected to be reinvested overseas indefinitely, no such liability need be 
reflected).
A reduction in the rate of income tax reduces deferred tax liabilities. 
Similarly, without transition provisions, total elimination of the income tax 
reduces deferred tax liabilities. Under the accounting rules for the treatment of 
income taxes—Financial Accounting Standard Board Statement 109: Accounting 
fo r  Income Taxes—businesses would eliminate their deferred tax liabilities and 
increase their recorded book income (and resultant shareholders’ equity) by the 
amount of deferred tax liability all in the accounting period in which the tax was 
repealed.
2. The Burden o f  Eliminating Tax Assets
Sometimes taxable income of businesses exceeds their book income. For 
example, a large commercial bank may record $100 of book income and $65 of 
after-tax profit. The nondeductibility of bad debt reserves for tax purposes can 
cause that same bank to have taxable income of $120. The $20 excess of tax over 
book income gives rise to $7 more tax actually paid than recorded on the 
financial statements (i.e., 35% of book income). This is considered a $7 deferred 
tax asset on the balance sheet of the bank’s which will be realized in tax 
reductions in the future when the bank loan is written off. Similar tax assets 
result to corporate America when other expenses are recognized earlier in 
financial statements than are allowed for tax purposes.
W ithout transition provisions, the elimination of the income tax would 
eliminate deferred tax assets. In the year in which the income tax was eliminated, 
businesses would be required to eliminate their deferred tax assets and decrease 
their recorded book income by the amount of deferred tax assets. This tax asset 
elimination would then be a dollar for dollar reduction in book income and 
shareholders’ equity.
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3. Other Tax Assets: Carryforwards o f  Losses and Credits
Besides deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences, businesses 
may cany other tax assets on their books. These arise from unused net operating 
losses, alternative minimum tax credits, foreign tax credits, research tax credits, 
and other business credits. If  it is more likely than not that these credits can be 
utilized against future tax liability, these unused tax benefits are book assets. 
Elimination of the income tax assets for unused losses and credits, without 
special transition rules that allow that use of these losses176 and credits against 
any new tax, would result in the write-off of those assets and an immediate 
reduction in book income and shareholders’ equity by the amount of the write­
off.
4. Conclusion About Elimination o f  the Income Tax
For firms that have accumulated a net deferred tax liability, the elimination 
of the income tax taken in isolation would result in a large improvement to 
balance sheets and a one-shot improvement to the income statement as these 
liabilities were eliminated. Over the long term, the impact on income statements 
of the elimination from the income tax could be favorable: a firm that previously 
would record $100 of before-tax and $65 of after-tax income might now record 
considerably more than $65 of after-tax income, depending on the new 
consumption tax rate and mix of factors comprising the tax base. Those with tax 
assets would be detrimental. Still on an overall basis, business would benefit 
since tax liabilities significantly exceed tax assets. Yet for any specific firm, the 
change could be of crucial impact.
C. Imposition o f  a New Consumption Tax
1. Introduction
The accounting treatment o f any new consumption tax depends critically 
on whether the new tax would be considered an income tax or a sales tax for 
accounting purposes. If the new business tax is considered an income (or profits) 
tax, FASB Statement No. 109 would apply. In this case, permanent differences 
between book and tax income—such as the lack of deductions for wages under a 
value-added tax—would be reflected in the income statement every year. 
Temporary differences—such as immediate tax deductions for items capitalized 
for financial statements—would be reflected on the balance sheet.
176Even if net operating losses could be deducted under a new consumption tax, their value would have to be 
reduced if the rate of tax were reduced. For example, a $100 net operating losses for a corporation could result 
in a $35 deferred tax asset under current law. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, net operating losses generated 
under the income tax cannot be deducted against the new business tax, but even if they could, their value in this 
example would have to be reduced from $35 to $11 given the 11 percent rate of tax under the plan.
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As a collection agent, the business would establish a liability account for 
any taxes collected until such time as they are remitted to the government. There 
would be no impact on revenue or expenses. As a sales tax the new consumption 
tax would not give rise to deferred tax assets or deferred tax liabilities. If the new 
consumption tax enacted is a retail sales tax or a credit-invoice VAT, it seems 
probable that this tax will not be considered an income tax. Conversely, the 
FASB could provide that some of the FASB Statement No. 109 concepts be 
applied as described below.
Although in many ways similar to a credit-invoice VAT, the case might 
be made that a subtraction method VAT is akin to a business income tax, and that 
the principles of FASB Statement No. 109 should apply. Certainly there is a 
legitimate question about whether a tax that disallows deductions for interest 
expenses, wages, salaries, and fringe benefits is an income tax. On the other 
hand, proponents of subtraction method VAT (and related proposals) stress that 
the tax is based on income concepts and accounting, and they often refer to the 
tax base as “gross profit.” (It should also be noted that, because the Flat Tax 
allows deductions for wages and salaries, the Flat Tax is even more likely to be 
categorized as an income tax than would be a regular subtraction method VAT.)
If  the new tax is accounted for under the principles of FASB Statement 
No. 109, there would be numerous important effects on financial statements. 
Some of the more notable effects are listed below. The first o f these effects has 
potentially significant implications for financial statements.
2. Treatment o f  Transition Basis
Loosely speaking, the term basis refers to that portion of the cost of an 
asset that will not be subject to tax. For depreciable assets, the remaining basis 
may be deducted over the useful life of the asset. For assets that are sold, only 
sale proceeds in excess of basis are income and therefore subject to tax. In 
contrast, under a consumption tax without transition relief all o f the book basis 
in existence on the date o f enactment would eventually be subject to tax. Without 
transition relief, deductions for depreciation of existing assets would not be 
allowed under the new tax, and the entire proceeds from a theoretical sale o f 
assets at the end of the reporting year for the initial application of the new tax law 
would be included in the tax base. These future tax payments would be booked 
as deferred tax liabilities equal in amount to the book value of these assets times 
the new tax rate.
Data from the Statistics o f Income Division o f the IRS indicate that U.S. 
corporations have approximately $20 trillion dollars in book basis. If  the new 
business tax had a tax rate of 10 percent, and no transition relief (i.e., deductions 
for existing depreciable assets over their useful life and deductions for basis upon
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sale) were allowed under the new system, it is possible that $2 trillion o f deferred 
tax liabilities would be created upon the enactment o f this new tax! Under the 
principles of FASB Statement 109, this entire amount would be reflected on the 
income statement in the year o f enactment. This amount would be reflected net 
o f all tax liabilities and tax assets that also would have to be “written off” as 
discussed above. Precise information on these latter two items is not readily 
available from statistical sources. If one assumes tax liabilities o f $600 billion 
and tax assets of $100 billion, the net charge to income statements and 
shareholders’ equity would be $1.5 trillion ($2 trillion less $.6 trillion plus $.1 
trillion). This would more than wipe out total corporate profits in any one year 
and severely reduce the amount of shareholders’ equity.177 Thus, financial 
statements would have to reflect the enormous increase in future taxes that results 
from lost depreciation deductions or taxable gain on sales due to the elimination 
of tax basis. The majority o f major U.S. corporations would likely reflect 
substantial losses in the year o f enactment.
3. Treatment o f  Expensing and Other Temporary Differences
As just noted, in the absence of transition rules, old assets might be treated 
harshly under a new consumption tax. In contrast, new asset purchases receive 
favorable treatment because these costs may be deducted entirely in the year of 
purchase, i.e., they may be “expensed.” Under income tax accounting principles, 
expensing allows tax payment to be deferred on an equal sum of value added or 
consumption tax base. This tax liability is like a loan from the government and, 
like a loan, is recorded as a liability on the balance sheet since the assets are 
capitalized for financial statement purposes.
4. Treatment o f  Permanent Differences
Under a subtraction method VAT like the Nunn-Domenici business tax, 
interest expense, wages and employee benefits are not deductible. (Under the 
Flat Tax wages are deductible, but interest and employee benefits are not 
deductible.) For most firms, the inability to deduct these result in the tax base 
being far in excess of book income. In this case, the firm’s effective tax rate (i.e., 
the ratio of tax to book income) will far exceed the statutory rate o f the new tax 
(e.g., 17 percent under the proposed Armey Flat Tax). Whether or not the firm’s 
effective tax rate will exceed the statutory corporate rate o f 35 percent under 
current law will depend on how many o f expenses for financial purposes are not 
deductible and also--on the plus side--and on how much of gross receipts (for 
example, exports and interest income) is excluded from the tax base.
177In 1993, total corporate profits were measured at approximately $486 billion. See, U.S. Executive Office 
of the President (1995), Table B-25, p. 303.
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D. Conclusion
In order to determine the impact of elimination of the income tax on 
financial statements, businesses need to determine (1) the net balance of their 
deferred tax assets and liabilities on their balance sheet, (2) the new tax rate, and 
(3) the amount of transition relief (if any).
In order to determine the impact o f the enactment o f a new consumption 
tax, firms need to determine (1) the book basis of their existing assets, (2) the 
new tax rate, (3) the amount o f transition relief (if any), (4) the net balance of 
their existing deferred taxes, and (5) if  the new tax would be considered an 
income tax for accounting purposes in which case FASB Statement No. 109 
applies. If  there is no transition relief and FASB 109 applies, there could be 
significant financial reporting effects in the year the new tax was enacted. These 
issues are summarized in the following table.
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Table 17.1
Summary of Major Impacts on Financial Statement Resulting From 
Repeal of Income Tax and Enactment of New Consumption Tax
I. Repeal of Current
Income Tax
W/ NO TRANSITION W/ FULL TRANSITION
Results in . . .  Results in . . .
A. Transition
Depreciation and Other 
Temporary Differences
. . .  Elimination of
Deferred Tax Liability 
(Assets) That Increases 
(Reduced) Equity and
Income in Year of
Enactment
. . .  Reduction in Deferred
Tax Liability (Assets)
Value Due to Reduction in
Tax Rate
B.1 Carryforwards:
Losses
. . .  Elimination o f Tax
Asset That Reduces
Equity and Income in
Year o f Enactment
. . .  Reduction in Tax
Asset Amount Due to
Reduction in Tax Rate
B.2 Carryforwards:
Tax Credits
. . .  Elimination o f Tax
Asset That Reduces
Equity and Income in
Year o f Enactment
. . .  No Impact on
Financial Statement
C.1 Unremitted Foreign 
Earnings:
Remittance Assumed
. . .  Elimination of
Deferred Tax Liability
That Increases Equity 
and Income in Year of 
Enactment
. . .  Reduction in Tax
Liability Amount Due To 
Reduction in Tax Rate
C.2 Unremitted Foreign 
Earnings:
Indefinite Reinvestment 
Overseas
No Impact No Impact
II. Imposition of 
Consumption Tax 
(Assuming F A S B  109
Applies)
Existing Assets
W /N O
TRANSITION
Results in . . .
W/ FULL TRANSITION 
Results in . . .
A. Book Basis of
Existing  Assets
. . .  Creation o f
Deferred Tax Liability
That Reduces Equity 
and Income in Year of 
Enactment
. . .  No Impact on
Financial Statement
213
Conclusion:
Some Remaining Questions
This study has attempted to introduce readers to some issues that are likely 
to receive attention in the upcoming consumption tax debate. The preceding 
seventeen chapters, however, do not do justice to the enormous issues involved 
in totally revising Federal tax policy. As a conclusion to this study, this chapter 
lists some questions about consumption taxes that deserve further attention and, 
in some cases, further research.
A. Questions o f  Tax Administration
• Will the Internal Revenue Service administer the new tax? Will its budget 
over the transition have to be increased?
• What are the additional administrative costs of transitioning into a new 
consumption tax?
• How much time is needed after enactment to prepare for administration of the 
new tax?
• How will tax administrators be trained? Over what time period?
• W hat new audit procedures need to be developed? How will they be 
coordinated with State audits? How will they be coordinated with on-going 
income tax audits?
• What new forms and instructions will have to be produced?
• W hat new regulations will need to be written? How quickly can these 
regulations be written?
• What implications does a replacement consumption tax have for existing tax 
treaties and new tax treaties?
• Should the new system be phased in over a number of years?
B. Questions fo r  State and Local Governments
• Would a national sales tax force States to conform to Federal rules?
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• How would States administer their income taxes in absence of the Federal 
income tax? How would taxes be calculated without reference to the Federal 
return? Would States need to increase their income tax audits? (Indeed, how 
much simplification is there for taxpayers who must still file State income tax 
returns?)
• I f  a replacement consumption tax reduces property values, what effect will 
this have on property tax revenue?
• What activities and services of State and local governments will be subject to 
this new tax?
C. Questions fo r  Businesses
• What will be the new recordkeeping and reporting requirements? How should 
computer software and information be changed? How will tax staffing 
requirements change? How will tax staff be retrained? What are the costs of 
these changes?
• Should businesses reconfigure their multinational operations that are currently 
structured around current rules?
• How are plans for business reorganizations affected by the change to a 
replacement consumption tax?
• Given that interest is unlikely to be deductible under these taxes, should 
businesses be reducing their indebtedness?
• Given that fringe benefits are unlikely to be deductible, should businesses 
continue to provide health insurance to their employees?
• Should partnerships and sole proprietorships consider incorporating now that 
they are subject to the same tax as corporations?
• With all forms of savings tax favored under a consumption tax, should 
pension plans be altered?
2). Questions fo r  Households
• How should financial planning be adjusted in anticipation of this tax? Will 
there be an estate and gift tax under the new system? Could the returns on 
existing investments be adversely effected by incomplete transition relief?
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• Should some types of investments not favored under the current system (e.g., 
stock with high dividends, certificates of deposit) be given additional weight 
in personal portfolios?
• Should some types of investments currently tax-favored (municipal bonds, 
whole life insurance) receive less weight in personal investment portfolios?
• If  there are no deductions for charitable giving, should contributions be 
accelerated before the effective date? Should charitable giving be reduced 
over the long term?
• If  there are no deductions for state and local income and property taxes, 
should relocation decisions be reconsidered because cost differences between 
low- and high-tax jurisdictions will increase?
E. Economic Questions
• Will consumption taxes have adverse pre-enactment effects? For example, 
will taxpayers delay capital purchases until the date the new system takes 
effect in order to expense their purchases? Will taxpayers delay exports, and 
rush imports, before border adjustable taxes take effect? Will taxpayers defer 
recognition of capital gains until the effective date?
• What quantitative effect will consumption taxes have on employment, wages, 
inflation, and productivity? How long will it take for any positive effects to 
take hold?
• What effect will these consumption taxes have on the distribution of income?
• What effect will a replacement consumption tax have on Federal revenues? 
If  there is a shortfall or excess in revenue from predicted levels will there be 
automatic adjustments in tax rates? Will pre-enactment behavioral responses 
significantly reduce revenues in the early years of the tax?
• What effect will a replacement consumption tax have on real estate values?
F. Political Questions
• Should revenue estimates include “dynamic” revenue effects, i.e., the impacts 
on revenue from any changes in economic growth that results from the tax? 
If  yes, which economic models will be used? How will differences in 
estimates between the executive and legislative branches be reconciled?
• What are the benefits in terms of compliance and administrative costs o f 
switching to a new system? Among the widely varying estimates o f the
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compliance costs of the current system, which should be used as a guide for 
policy makers in the current debate? How will the compliance costs of the 
new consumption tax system be estimated?
• What is to prevent the political process from weighing down any replacement 
consumption tax proposal with amendments that result in additional 
complexity? This applies not only to the original legislation, but also to 
actions by subsequent Congresses.
• Will likely "losers" under a consumption tax (e.g., realtors, insurance 
companies, State governments, unincorporated businesses, retailers, etc.) be 
accommodated with special tax relief? If  so, how?
• Is there any room for compromise on the notion of totally replacing the 
current income tax system? Could a new consumption tax be used to reduce 
income tax rates? Or perhaps just eliminate the corporation income tax?
• Can a replacement consumption tax be enacted without strong presidential 
leadership?
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